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Using Computational Psychology to Profile Unhappy and Happy People, by Matthew Samson 
Social psychology has a long tradition of studying the personality traits associated with subjective well-
being (SWB). However, research often depends on a priori but unempirical assumptions about how to 
(a) measure the constructs, and (b) mitigate confounded associations. These assumptions have caused 
profligate and often contradictory findings. To remedy, I demonstrate how a computational psychology 
paradigm—predicated on large online data and iterative analyses—might help isolate more robust 
personality trait associations.  
At the outset, I focussed on univariate measurement. In the first set of studies, I evaluated the extent 
researchers could measure psychological characteristics at scale from online behaviour. Specifically, I 
used a combination of simulated and real-world data to determine whether predicted constructs like big 
five personality were accurate for specific individuals. I found that it was usually more effective to 
simply assume everyone was average for the characteristic, and that imprecision was not remedied by 
collapsing predicted scores into buckets (e.g. low, medium, high). Overall, I concluded that predictions 
were unlikely to yield precise individual-level insights, but could still be used to examine normative 
group-based tendencies. In the second set of studies, I evaluated the construct validity of a novel SWB 
scale. Specifically, I repurposed the balanced measure of psychological needs (BMPN), which was 
originally designed to capture the substrates of intrinsic motivation. I found that the BMPN robustly 
captured (a) dissociable experiences of suffering and flourishing, (b) more transitive SWB than the 
existing criterion measure, and (c) unique variation in real-world outcomes. Thus, I used it as my 
primary outcome.  
Then, I focussed on bivariate associations. The third set of studies extracted pairs of participants with 
similar patterns of covarying personality traits—and differing target traits—to isolate less-confounded 
SWB correlations. I found my extraction method—an adapted version of propensity score matching—
outperformed even advanced machine learning alternatives. The final set of studies isolated the subset 
of facets that had the most robust associations with SWB. It combined real-world surveys with a total 
of eight billion simulated participants to find the traits most prevalent in extreme suffering and 
flourishing. For validation purposes, I first found that depression and cheerfulness—the trait 
components of SWB—were highly implicated in both suffering and flourishing. Then, I found that self-
discipline was the only other trait implicated in both forms of SWB. However, there were also domain-
specific effects: anxiety, vulnerability and cooperation were implicated in just suffering; and, 
assertiveness, altruism and self-efficacy were implicated in just flourishing. These seven traits were 
most likely to be the definitive, stable, drivers of SWB because their effects were totally consistent 
across the full range of intrapersonal contexts.  
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I enrolled as an undergrad in psychology at Macquarie University after brief but calamitous 
stints in investment banking and sports retail. Ginger from my transition from orderly 
comfortable high school, I simply wanted to learn some interesting facts. A decade on, I am 
somehow submitting a PhD at Cambridge (!!!). In the process, I have studied on four 
continents, made countless friends and, hopefully, learned as much outside psychology as 
within. I am extraordinarily lucky that my parents—Conny and Jeff Samson—always put my 
interests above their own and unconditionally supported my various crazy endeavours. Many 
other kind people were also hugely influential.  
My thanks to Dr Alex Kogan as both my former PhD supervisor, and as a friend and confidante. 
Dr Kogan agreed to take me on, at short notice, even though I did not have a clearly defined 
project or any formal training in computational methods. I particularly valued his advice on 
forming research questions, statistical analyses and communicating research results. He also 
gave me the autonomy to choose my own research trajectory, learn from the inevitable 
mistakes, help administer grant funding and circulate research findings. Finally, I also 
appreciated his optimistic, non-judgmental and problem-focussed approach to the not-so-
occasional Lab stressors.  
Many other academics and professionals selflessly donated their time to help my PhD. 
Foremost, my sincerest thanks to Dr Jason Rentfrow for stepping in as my supervisor for the 
final six months of the PhD. He reviewed everything I had written to-that point and guided me 
through the general introduction and discussion. He also helped clarify the central message in 
each chapter, was a reservoir for great readings and provided sound methodological advice. 
His calmness during an especially difficult and upsetting period was essential. Prior to that, 
Drs Kai Ruggeri, Simona Schnall, Jochen Menges, Joyce Pang, Wayne Warburton, Kay 
Bussey, Mike Jones and the late Doris McIlwain all patiently indulged my half-cooked 
academic fancies and, ultimately, inspired the level of confidence I needed to produce 
independent research. I also enjoyed a particularly fruitful four months computational training 
with the Advanced Analytics Team at McKinsey in Dusseldorf. A special thanks to Tobias 
Baer, Frank Jaeger and Myriam Thoemmes for trusting that I could move beyond my comfort 
zone, formalise novel ideas quickly in code and hit concrete milestones.     
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Renshaw-Vuillier, Laurie Parma, Moh Yearwood, Rui Sun and Sai Li—for always being there 
to laugh and help answer loads of empirical (and life) questions. Outside of lab, I’m equally 
thankful to Alina Guna, Eduardo Machicado, Greg Wilsenach, James Mackovjak, Johanna 
Lukate, Olly Melville, Shakked Halperin, Somer Greene, Sophie Rosenberg, Tim Rudnicki, 
Tomas Folke, and many others for the joyous ways they enhanced my PhD experience. Thanks 
also to the sports teams and student organisations—Cambridge University Cricket Club (CC), 
Gates Cambridge scholars, Remnants CC, St Giles CC and Trinity Hall MCR (Cohort, 
Committee, Football Club)—that were so often my favourite escapes. 
Finally, I give my humblest thanks to various sources of financial aid. The PhD was only 
possible with generous support from the Gates Cambridge Trust and the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation. During the PhD, I also received support from Trinity Hall and the Cambridge 
Philosophical Society. Prior to that, Trinity Hall, Cambridge Trusts, Endeavour Australia and 
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Chapter 1  
The Ethical Obtainment of Data 
1.1. Introduction 
There has recently been increased public scrutiny about the appropriate use of social media 
data by Dr Kogan—my former PhD supervisor—and his affiliates. To date, the principal focus 
has been on the large-scale acquisition of Facebook user data without explicit consent, and its 
subsequent use for commercial purposes. Absolutely none of these data, or the associated self-
report data, have contributed to or are reported in my final PhD. Rather, my PhD uses 
predominantly survey data acquired—to the best of my knowledge—in accordance with a 
subsequent and fully-approved University ethics application (PRE.2016.027.V8) titled “Cross-
National Study of Social Relationships, Prosociality, Well-Being, Health and Political 
Preferences Using Big Data”. Dr Kogan was the primary applicant and I was both a secondary 
applicant and the corresponding applicant. For full transparency, I describe pertinent details of 
the ethics application below. The full document is on file at the University of Cambridge 
School of Biological Sciences. Finally, wider discussion of the AXA project is the ideal context 
to clarify its sampling procedure and study characteristics, which I do at the end of the chapter. 
1.2. Project Overview 
The project aimed to use pre-existing archived Twitter behaviour to generate 
sociodemographic, psychological, health and related survey responses for millions of 
participants. It was intended for exclusively academic purposes. In the first stage, it proposed 
that up to 40,000 adult participants from across the world give explicit consent, share their 
Twitter behaviour (by logging into the Twitter API) and then answer a short battery of pre-
approved survey items. Then, different forms of Twitter behaviour—mentions (user references 
to other Twitter accounts), followed accounts (from which users receive updates), and tweets 
(user-written content)—were fully anonymised and consolidated into a finite number of 
abstract dimensions (e.g. 100). These dimensions were used as IVs in statistical models (i.e. 
algorithms) that predicted users’ survey responses. Then algorithms could be exported to 
predict concomitant survey responses for other users, who did not take the survey battery.  
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The primary benefit of the project was that it might generate psychological construct scores for 
a vast proportion of Twitter users from a smaller subset of participants who volunteered both 
their twitter data and answered my surveys. To this end, Philometrics Inc.—Dr Kogan’s private 
company—donated (totally free of charge) fully anonymous multinational Twitter data for 
around three hundred million users to the project. As such, algorithms could be exported to an 
extremely large and heterogenous sample. This could feasibly help overcome common research 
limitations in social psychology, such as small sample size and unrepresentative participants 
(Kosinski, Stillwell & Graepel, 2013). As a final step, data were made available for academic 
research beyond the listed co-applicants—via a pre-approved application procedure—to 
maximize the potential impact of the project. These data are documented in Figure 1.1.  
 
 
Figure 1.1. Data associated with the approved 
AXA ethics application and my PhD. The wider 
project was intended to generate algorithms 
linking participants’ Twitter behaviour to their 
self-reported psychological construct scores, 
which could then be exported to users with only 
logged Twitter behaviour. However, most of my 




1.3 Twitter Terms and Conditions 
The project is fully compliant with current Twitter Terms of Service. These were recently made 
more stringent in the USA and EU, in response to heightened privacy concerns and the 
introduction of the General Data Protection Regulation respectively (e.g. Henning, 2017; 
eugdpr.org). At the outset, both emphasise “Twitter is public, and Tweets are immediately 
viewable and searchable by anyone around the world” (twitter.com/en/tos). Then, they suggest 
that users can control the extent they publicly disclose contact information, demographics and 
their existing Twitter behaviour. The US version does not make further provisions, which may 
indemnify third parties from wrongdoing (iclg.com). The EU version, however, also states 
In addition to providing your public information to the world directly on Twitter, 
we also use technology like application programming interfaces (APIs) and embeds 
to make that information available to websites, apps, and others for their use - for 
example, displaying Tweets on a news website or analysing what people say on 
Twitter. We generally make this content available in limited quantities for free and 
charge licensing fees for large-scale access. We have standard terms that govern 
how this data can be used, and a compliance program to enforce these terms. But 
these individuals and companies are not affiliated with Twitter, and their offerings 
may not reflect updates you make on Twitter. 
The standard terms are separated into a Developer Agreement and Developer Policy 
(developer.twitter.com/en/developer-terms). Notably, the former sates that all personal data 
will be kept “… confidential and secure from unauthorized access…”. Then, the latter suggests 
that direct opt-in user consent is only required when storing non-public Twitter information. 
To my knowledge, the AXA project kept all Twitter data confidential and used exclusively 
public information. The EU Twitter policy is also the international default. 
1.4. Information and Consent 
In the PhD, I obtained fully informed consent for all participants. They gave both their Twitter 
behaviour and survey responses. In the opening paragraph, the information and consent sheet 
stated that: 
We are interested in understanding how we can predict people’s survey responses 
from their tweets. Then, I we are also interested in using these predictions to 
understand the factors that contribute to people’s happiness and well-being. To do 
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so, we are going to ask you to share your twitter user name with us so that we can 
look up your tweets and use them in our analyses. (p. 39)  
Then it also gave the standard assurances. For example, it stated that data would only be used 
to generate fully anonymous group-based insights for academic research purposes, disclosed 
other contributing entities (AXA Research Fund, Philometrics), briefly outlined data security 
protocols and reminded participants they could opt out of the study and/or request to have their 
data deleted at any time. In addition, it also gave more information about the algorithm 
generation procedure:  
As part of our project, we will be making use of historic Twitter data that 
Philometrics Inc. have purchased from Twitter (e.g. tweets, mentions, hashtags). 
This data will be used in the following way: When your Tweets map onto your 
survey responses, we will use the information you provide in this study to make 
algorithms that predict how the users in the purchased historic database of tweets 
would have responded to these same surveys. (p. 39)  
The project did not obtain explicit informed consent for participants in the larger Twitter 
database. The rationale provided in the ethics application was:  
In our view, since the data that is used to generate scores is publicly posted for 
anyone to see and use, and users of Twitter can be reasonably expected to 
understand this, it is not necessary to gain [explicit] consent for our application. 
Furthermore, we minimize any potential harm to the users through (a) 
anonymization of the data and (b) providing only forecasted scores which, as we 
describe below, are relatively inaccurate at the individual level. (p. 20) 
The technical reasons that individual-level predictions were relatively inaccurate included 
random errors that emerge when using any inferential statistical approach, and how those errors 
are compounded with survey measurement imprecision. In Chapter 3, I focus further on the 
inaccuracy of predicted psychological scores for specific individuals. 
1.4. Mitigating Conflicts of Interest  
Philometrics donated survey software, Twitter data and data storage for the project. Resources 
were all provided on an entirely pro bono basis. The ethics application stated that listed co-
applicants could handle raw Twitter data—principally to extract aggregate logged behaviour 
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for each user and link it to survey responses—when they were (a) interns at Philometrics; and, 
(b) working on encrypted and password protected company servers. So far as I know, only 
aggregated anonymous data was provided to listed co-applicants outside of this context. In 
accordance with these provisions, I undertook University-sanctioned Leave to Work Away at 
Philometrics’ San Francisco (USA) premises for six weeks in early 2017. My primary tasks 
were collecting data under the auspices of this ethics application and analysing the results for 
Chapter 3. To the best of my knowledge, I did not contribute to any of Philometrics’ 
commercial activities. All other procedures outlined in the PhD were conducted in a typical 
University format: I iteratively drafted content that the supervisor then reviewed.   
1.5. Data Used in the PhD  
My PhD is predominantly based on self-report survey data from the AXA project. Overall, 
there were approximately 40,000 participants from 33 different countries, who spoke 14 
different languages. I describe the full participants at length in Chapters 4 and 5. In addition, I 
also used consensually disclosed Twitter data—in the above-mentioned formats—from 
approximately 1,500 participants in the UK, USA and Canada. My PhD does not include any 
data from participants in the larger repository, who did not answer my surveys.  
1.6. Interim Conclusion 
In summary, all data from the project were obtained with ethics approval for exclusively 
academic research purposes. All data in my PhD were obtained with both prior ethics approval 
and informed consent. The wider project also obtained archived Twitter data for hundreds of 
millions of users. These data were originally purchased for commercial purposes—in 
compliance with Twitter terms of service—obtained by Philometrics and then donated free of 
charge to the project, along with additional survey software and data storage capabilities.   
1.7 AXA Sampling Procedure and Format 
The survey data described in this chapter are used throughout the PhD. Thus, I use this final 
section to give more detailed information about its sampling procedure and format. For full 
disclosure, Appendix 1.1. contains an abridged version of the ethics application. This abridged 
version excludes cover letters outlining updated revisions—which are already reflected in the 
attached document—co-applicant details for privacy, and appendices. Appendices were 
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excluded because they contained mainly standard information and consent protocols that are 
already quoted at some length in this chapter, and the original-copy grant application that is 
also explicated in the body of the ethics application. The appendices also contain extensive 
libraries of scales that were mostly not used in the project. I remind readers that the full, non-
abridged, version of this ethics application is available at the Cambridge School of Biological 
Sciences. Next, I surmise how the project was implemented. Of course, it was fully compliant 
with the approved ethics application. 
The initial primary sampling procedure focussed on using Twitter advertisements. They invited 
participants to answer a brief survey (e.g. a ten-item personality scale) and then get immediate 
feedback about their responses. However, Dr Kogan conducted pilot tests in the US and found 
that the advertisements received very few hits. He instructed me to proceed with the secondary 
sampling procedure: conventional surveys. There was also a provision of this in the approved 
ethics application.      
I was responsible for the day-to-day development and administration of the surveys. From the 
outset, the study was intended to be multinational. Initially, Dr Kogan and I identified a small 
set of geopolitically important countries—China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, UK and the 
USA—that it was a priority to assess. Then, I selected as diverse range of other countries that 
were (a) compatible with collaborator backgrounds, (b) financially feasible with the online 
survey panel partner ( US$2 per completed survey), and (c) projected to yield > 500 
participants. Collaborators were responsible for translating and back-translating surveys items 
into target languages—via the established protocol in psychology (Brislin, 1970)—when there 
was no existing high-quality translation, per the procedure described in Chapter 4. 
Where possible, collaborators were practising research psychologists who had a direct 
professional or personal (i.e. first-degree) relationship with a member of Dr Kogan’s 
Cambridge Prosociality and Well-Being Lab. On occasion, collaborators had looser 
connections to the Lab but worked in partnership on their assigned country wave with another 
first-degree collaborator. Then, I oversaw and managed the work of all the collaborators. I 
determined financial feasibility of each survey based on quotes from our partner: a San 
Francisco-based online survey panel aggregation company named Cint. Cint offered the 
cheapest prices I could find across most different countries where survey panels are common. 
I gained approval from the Cambridge Department of Psychology to use Cint as the exclusive 
3rd party survey panel service. Country sample size was projected using a Cint-developed 
17 
 
online tool, which factored in survey length and language requirements. Where there was 
surplus projected sampling size, I incrementally imposed quotas—for gender, then age, then 
geographical region—to make the sample as nationally representative as possible. In most 
cases, surveys were in an official national language. However, there were exceptions. For 
example, I administered the Finland wave of the survey in English. In such cases, I explicitly 
asked participants at the outset and in an official national language whether they: (a) were fully 
fluent in the survey language, and (b) consented to proceeding with the survey.  
The default target sample size for each country was N = 1,000. However, due to budget 
constraints and/or already strong country representation in a world region, such as for some 
countries in South America, the target was often reduced to N = 500. The only other exception 
was for the USA, where my target sample size was N = 2,000. That was because it was the first 
sample, and I wanted to guarantee sufficient power to pilot algorithms linking Twitter 
behaviour to survey responses. Final sample size in each country differed from its target sample 
size based on the final number of approved non-acquiescent responses, when precisely the 
survey link was terminated and, in one case (Bolivia), where it became clear that I was not 
going to reach the target. Criteria for selecting non-acquiescent cases and final sample size are 
in Chapter 5: Study 1, which is the first instance in the PhD where I use the entire sample.  
Finally, it is important to detail how the survey changed from country-to-country. In all cases, 
it was designed to be approximately 15-minutes long. I constructed all English-language 
surveys from the database of questions and scales in the approved ethics application, with 
oversight from Dr Kogan. It was intended to fulfil grant obligations by primarily assessing 
participants’ personality, health and well-being. I also designated mandatory questions that 
were administered to every country. They were sex, age, religiosity (no/yes), philanthropy 
(no/yes), social class, big five personality measured by the 120-item NEO-IPIP scale, at least 
two convergent measures concerning happiness—one was always satisfaction with life, and 
the other was usually the balanced measure of psychological needs—subjective health, exercise 
frequency and fruit and vegetable consumption. Default non-mandatory questions were about 
emotion experiences, political orientation and an additional convergent measure of big five 
personality. To incentivize collaborator translations, I invited them to replace non-mandatory 
questions with their preferred scales—for surveys in their assigned language—provided the 
scales received prior ethics approval, were compatible with grant objectives, and did not 
increase the length of the overall survey. Example scales were experiences of gender inequality, 
coping-style, mental health and right-wing authoritarian beliefs. The majority of items 
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completed by N > 10,000 participants are described Chapter 4 and/or Chapter 5. The only 
exceptions are for variables concerning political orientation—e.g. chances of voting in the next 
national election, right-wing authoritarianism tendencies, attitudes towards women’s rights—
that were unrelated to my research questions, as well as Twitter behaviour—usage frequency 
and whether it was participants’ primary social media platform—which I ultimately inferred in 
Chapter 3, directly from usage logs, and were irrelevant thereafter. Full details of the items 
administered to each country are in the project codebook. It is too large to append to this PhD. 
Nevertheless, it is available on request to the Department of Psychology, Dr Kogan or myself 
(matthew.j.samson@gmail.com).  
In summary, the AXA sampling procedure, and the survey format, aimed to meet grant 
obligations and collaborator interests, whilst also pragmatically sampling participants in a wide 
range of countries and language groups. Where possible, I used quotas to sample nationally 
representative adult participants. The mandatory section of each survey ensured a high degree 
of item convergence across countries. While it is unfeasible for the PhD document to disclose 
the full 300+ page ethics application, or every single survey item that listed in the codebook, 




Chapter 2  
General Introduction 
2.1. Abstract 
What are the personality traits robustly associated with SWB? This guiding empirical focus is 
predicated on a series of underlying assumptions, which the chapter defends. At the outset, I 
argue that personality and SWB are both valid and operationalizable psychological constructs. 
Then, I suggest that they are linked a priori by feasible processes. This increases my confidence 
in the non-spuriousness of existing associations. However, such associations are still often 
contradictory. To remedy, I suggest that research using high-powered samples and iterative 
computational analyses can help more definitively isolate the full set of personality traits that 
have robust, internally valid, associations with SWB.  
2.2. Introduction 
Who is happy? It is perhaps one of the most asked questions in history, occupying the likes of 
Aristotle, Hume, Freud and the Dalai Lama (White, 2008). It has fostered frameworks 
advocating everything from virtue, purposefulness and compassion to hedonism, self-
enhancement and total pluralism. Ranging perspectives might be galvanized, however, by the 
simple observation that some people experience happiness more readily than others (Lykken 
& Tellegen, 1996). This may be captured in personality, which is the default way people 
interact with the world (Allport, 1937). Personality was documented by the ancient Greeks as 
the balance of four fluids in the body, and later by psychoanalysts as histrionicism, narcissism 
and identification with innate human archetypes such as the ‘warrior’ and ‘mother’ (McAdams, 
1997). Contemporary accounts focus on the universal big five: particularly whether efficiency 
(conscientiousness) and wanting social harmony (agreeableness) are associated with 
purposefulness, and negative emotions (neuroticism) and engaging with the outside world 
(extraversion) are associated with joy (Ryan & Deci, 2001). The preference for novel 
experiences (openness) is occasionally associated with both purposefulness and joy (e.g. Bardi, 
Guerra & Ramdeny, 2009). The links between personality and subjectively (self-) appraised 
well-being (SWB)—the technical equivalent of happiness (Diener, 2000)—are increasingly 
20 
 
important to both policy makers seeking high-fidelity tailored interventions and post-baby 
boomer generations, who have a particularly strong desire to self-actualize (Diener, Diener & 
Diener, 2009; Holbrook, 2001).  
However, associations between personality and SWB are profligate. Meta-analyses highlight 
the importance of at least four of the big five, and patterns of effects differ depending on how 
SWB is operationalized (Lucas & Diener, 2015). Sub-factor (e.g. facet) level analyses are so 
fragmented—and comprise such interrelated constructs—that it is possible to find evidence for 
associations between almost every trait and SWB (e.g. Anglim & Grant, 2014). Put simply, 
research to-date fails to isolate a discrete set of robust personality trait associations. This 
problem is compounded by a possible lack of methodological rigor. The so-called “Replication 
Crisis” in social psychology (2011-) suggests that existing precedents—e.g. small sample sizes, 
idiosyncratic study designs and testing multiple ad hoc hypothesis—are ill-equipped to detect 
the often small and fluctuating associations that dominate the sub-field (Shrout & Rodgers, 
2018). Computational psychology may help reconcile these limitations. It is predicated partly 
on automated large-scale data collection and iteratively testing multiple versions of the same 
research question (Adjerid & Kelley, 2018). In doing so, it offers the potential for more precise 
effect estimates, fewer methods artefacts and superior statistical control (James, Witten, Hastie 
& Tibshirani, 2013). My PhD aims to use these emerging computational approaches to isolate 
the full but finite set of personality traits that are implicated in SWB.  
2.3. Key Constructs  
This section defends the core constructs used throughout the empirical chapters. At the outset, 
it is important to recognise that I am dealing with fuzzy psychological constructs that might 
only ever be approximated in data (James, 1890). Thus, it is essential to demonstrate that they 
are parsimonious—explaining sufficient additional variation in observed behaviour to justify 
their complexity (Epstein, 1984)—rather than objectively true. I thus show the merits of my 
preferred personality and SWB frameworks over plausible counterfactuals.  
2.3.1. Big Five Personality 
There is evidence for personality in written language. In their review, Costa and McCrae (2017) 
differentiate traits—dispositional styles of interacting with the environment—from 
characteristic adaptations, which are context-specific expressions of the same underlying trait. 
Both are also separate from abilities, which are learned skills (Goldberg, 1993). According to 
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the lexical hypothesis—which suggests that all important aspects of personality are encoded in 
language—researchers can extract traits by examining clusters of related words in a given 
language (De Raad & Mlačić, 2017). Such approaches typically decompose person descriptors 
from dictionaries into their grammatical (e.g. nouns, adjectives) and semantic (valence, 
interpersonal) properties, and then extract clusters that are used interchangeably (e.g. via 
exploratory factor analysis; EFA). In support, de Raad & Mlačić’s (2017) review found that 
words regularly clustered into extraversion, agreeableness and conscientiousness factors in 
Germanic, Slavic, wider Indo-European and non-Indo-European languages. These traits were 
often accompanied by other varying factors, such as neuroticism, openness, honesty/humility 
and integrity. Although there were inconsistencies, these may have emerged because not all 
factors are equally represented in a given language. This is problematic because techniques like 
EFA extract a greater number of more granular factors when word frequency increases (Wright, 
2017). To illustrate, neuroticism may not have emerged consistently because it is often 
represented with relatively few common words (e.g. ‘stress’), whilst honesty/humility may be 
an especially well-represented component of agreeableness (Ashton & Lee, 2018). 
Nevertheless, the lexical hypothesis supports the universality of at least three of the big five.   
The big five emerged by synthesizing existing personality research. Costa and McCrae’s (1976) 
original big three expanded upon Eysenck and Eysenck’s (1975) neuroticism-extraversion 
framework to also include openness. Openness was, until then, only captured in competing 
personality scales—notably the 16-PF and the California Q-Sort—through factors like 
absorption and imaginativeness. Unlike its competitors, however, the big three assumed traits 
were continuous and normally distributed; they did not necessarily form into either binary 
categories or discrete trait clusters (Costa & McCrae, 2017). Then, Costa, McRae and Dye 
(1991) used concurrent findings from the lexical hypothesis to add agreeableness and 
conscientiousness. The final big five was operationalized in the NEO-PI-R, which asked people 
to rate the extent that they in general agreed with 240 different pre-validated trait adjectives. 
Initial support found that the big five structure replicated across multinational populations, 
there was convergence in self- and informant-reported scores, and scores were mostly stable 
throughout the adult lifespan (McCrae & Costa, 1992). All these findings have since been 
extensively replicated in follow up research (for a review, see Allik & Realo, 2017). However, 
a limitation is that successful replications typically require orthogonal factors. That is, they 
discount potentially real inter-factor associations (Wright, 2017). In addition, there is no 
evidence that the big five comprehensively accounts for personality. Finally, selectively-
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experienced adult milestones (e.g. parenthood) may change putatively stable trait scores (Allik 
& Realo, 2017). Nevertheless, Goldberg (1990) found that personality scales derived from 
competing theories all converged on a big five structure, and not alternatives, when using 
standardized EFA protocols. Thus, the big five may be the least insufficient approximation for 
true, ecological, personality.  
The contemporary big five is hierarchical. Once the big five was established, many researchers 
relaxed the assumption of orthogonal factors. According to Wright (2017), this led to the 
discovery of superordinate single- and two-factor personality structures. Using two separate 
big five scales, Musek (2007) found that up to 50% of the total variation in item responses was 
attributable to a single meta-factor comprising responses to the more positively valanced pole 
of each trait. In his meta-analysis, Digman (1997) found that the big five conformed to a two-
factor model grouping extraversion and openness, and then the remaining three factors. Musek 
(2007) continued by finding that one-, two- and (big) five-factor solutions all incrementally 
increased model explanatory power, albeit with diminishing returns. There are also subordinate 
facets. Pooling items from multiple operationalisations of the big five, DeYoung, Quilty and 
Peterson (2007) found that each of the big five had two aspects (e.g. Neuroticism = Volatility 
& Withdrawal) that could be linked to underlying neuropsychological mechanisms. 
Conversely, the NEO-PI-R ultimately settled on six theoretically and/or lexical hypothesis 
derived facets in each factor (Costa & McCrae, 2017). While not always discretely nested in a 
single superordinate aspect, or fully exhaustive, facets still capture a wider plurality of factor 
components. Recently, Mõttus, McCrae, Allik, and Realo (2014) have also proposed nuances, 
which are distinguishable sub-facets. However, Costa and McCrae (2017) suggest that they 
still lack a clearly defined taxonomy. Ultimately then, multiple levels of the big five hierarchy 
may be appropriate to use in associative research.  
The recent emergence of aspects has challenged the parsimoniousness of facets. Using an 
American community sample, DeYoung et al.’s (2007) seminal study found that the 15 
different public-domain facets available for each factor collapsed into two correlated aspects. 
Then, in Canadian university students they found that each of the aspects could be measured 
using 10 items from the original public domain facet scales. Aspects from the final 100-item 
scale had common-sense intercorrelations (e.g. assertiveness and industriousness were 
positively correlated) and at least 8/10 corresponded to the factors that emerge when only 
heritable aspects of personality are factor analysed (first identified by Jang, Livesley, 
Angleitner, Riemann & Vernon, 2002). That is, most aspects have plausible genetic bases. 
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Then, DeYoung, Weisberg, Quilty and Peterson (2013) found that the aspects could explain 
most of the variation in the competing interpersonal circumplex model of personality, which 
characterises people on their warmth and dominance. More recently again, DeYoung, Carey, 
Krueger and Ross (2016) found that the same aspects were also construct valid in abnormal 
clinical contexts, and could thus be used to differentiate DSM-5 personality disorders. Overall, 
aspects may be a high-fidelity sub-factor structure of personality, which has plausible 
corresponding mechanisms and applies to multiple populations.  
Nevertheless, facets may still account for noteworthy variation over-and-above aspects. Early 
support was from Soto, John, Gosling and Potter (2011), who used a large cross-sectional 
sample of internet panellists to assess age trends in personality scores in over one million 
participants aged 10-65. They used facets from the big five inventory, which was developed to 
non-comprehensively but briefly sample two facets in each factor. At least 4 facets—
depression, anxiety, self-discipline and orderliness—of the 7/10 BFI facets that directly 
corresponded to the NEO-PI-R facets had different developmental trajectories. All seven 
trajectories were again different when results were also split by gender. Overall, results 
suggested distinct facet aetiologies and thus dissociable constructs. The big five facets are also 
supported by research on nuances. Mõttus et al. (2014) found that there was significant cross-
observer agreement on individual items after apportioning variance attributable to the 
superordinate facet. This indicates non-random item variation that may capture latent 
psychological constructs. Most recently, Seeboth & Mõttus (2018) found that such items 
increased the strength of personality associations—over and above the BFI facets—across 40 
sociodemographic and lifestyle outcomes, such as income and sleeping frequency. Together 
these findings suggest that real personality constructs continue to emerge as granularity 
increases, even to the level of individual items. Facets—the lowest level of the big five with an 
established taxonomy—may thus explain more variation in target outcomes than aspects.  
Facets have wide but not universal empirical support. In McCrae and Terracciano (2005), 
adults in 50 countries rated the big five using the NEO-PI-R—translated when appropriate—
for around 12,000 of their college student peers. After they made scores relative to participants’ 
countrymen, EFA found that the thirty facets collapsed into the orthogonal big five factors—
and no additional factors—to parsimoniously explain more response variation than an omnibus 
general factor. Further, the structure also replicated separately for participants in four different 
age strata and both genders. Overall, around 95% of the separate country loadings for each 
factor converged with concomitant, criterion-validity, loadings from an American community 
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sample. That is, most facets belonged to the same factor across cultures. Exceptions were from 
some less-industrialized populations. This was corroborated by Zecca et al. (2013), who failed 
to find any universal big five structure across four regions in Africa. In addition, using both 
self- and peer-reported big five scales in Bolivian farmer-foragers, Gurven, von Rueden, 
Massenkoff, Kaplan & Lero Vie (2013) only found support for two superordinate personality 
factors. Nevertheless, incongruent findings may be caused by the pragmatic need to assess 
traits through characteristic adaptations, particularly at the granular facet level (LeVine, 2018). 
Thus, incongruent findings may simply indicate measurement bias rather than culture-specific 
facets. In addition, a strength of McCrae and Terracciano (2005) is that the factor structure 
replicated so widely, even when the facets were free to coalesce into alternate structures. 
Finally, there is still-growing cross-cultural evidence for the NEO-PI-R facet structure. For 
example, it has been recently documented in both Indonesian and Romanian adults (Wibowo, 
Yudiana, Reswara & Jatmiko, 2017; Ispas, Iliescu, Ilie & Johnson, 2014). Overall, even 
universal personality structures will sometimes fail to replicate due to idiosyncratic 
circumstances. That said, conclusions could be tempered by the apparent increased replication 
failures in specific non-Western contexts. Thus, the big five facets may commonly, but perhaps 
not ubiquitously, characterise human personality.   
2.3.2. Subjective Well-Being 
I associate the granular big five personality facets with general SWB. This is to reconcile the 
tradeoff between bandwidth and specificity. High bandwidth approaches lead to general 
conclusions (e.g. Extraverts are happier; Costa & McCrae, 1980), while high specificity 
approaches lead to more precise conclusions (e.g. Adventurous people are more purposeful; 
Gavin, Keough, Abravanel, Moudrakovski & Mcbrearty, 2014). They are both important: for 
charting the parameters of a new field, and isolating associations that may be governed by 
single discrete mechanisms. Although high-bandwidth approaches are ultimately 
oversimplifications, there is also risk in prematurely adopting fully high-specificity 
approaches. According to Rozin (2001), these may neglect the most impactful sub-fields and/or 
increase the risk that outcomes are confounded by the greater preponderance of proxy 
variables. For this reason, intermediate investigations—comprising high bandwidth predictors 
or outcomes—can abridge the two approaches. I focus on high-bandwidth SWB for the simple 
reason that it has less definitive sublevels than personality. 
SWB originally concerned human flourishing. It emerged during the wider post-humanistic 
psychology trend to isolate discrete psychological constructs that transcended suffering 
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(Diener & Ryan, 2009). Diener’s (1984) seminal essay introduced both the construct—defined 
as an introspective (i.e. self-reported) assessment of life quality—and the concomitant tripartite 
model. The tripartite model suggests that SWB comprises feelings of positive and negative 
affect, and globally-assessed satisfaction with life. The tripartite model has since become 
synonymous with the pleasure-oriented, hedonic, approach to well-being (Busseri & Sadava, 
2011). In the most recent review, Diener, Lucas and Oishi (2018) noted that there were around 
170,000 SWB publications in the past 15 years. They have documented its (a) construct validity 
both within and across cultures, (b) possible genetic substrates, (c) cross-sectional and 
longitudinal associations with theoretically linked interpersonal, sociodemographic and other 
established psychological constructs, (d) environmental contingencies and (e) candidate 
mechanisms. Overall, SWB and the tripartite model have dominated the well-being literature.  
However, there is also countervailing psychological well-being. Ryff (1989) characterized it 
as a eudemonic approach comprising purposefulness, environmental mastery, positive 
relationships, growth, autonomy and self-acceptance. It deliberately ignores negative and 
positive affect. In the most recent meta-analysis, Weiss, Westerhof and Bohlmeijer (2016) 
documented 27 existing randomized control interventions that aimed to increase aspects of 
psychological well-being, with outcomes ranging from depressive symptomology to 
experiences of mindfulness. Results suggested moderate cross-sectional benefits, and small but 
still significant longitudinal benefits. Overall, researchers continue to distinguish between 
hedonic and eudemonic well-being. Although the SWB literature may be more substantial,1 
psychological well-being is still relevant in some applied (and likely other) domains.  
However, hedonic versus eudemonic well-being may be a false dichotomy. In a recent review, 
Heintzelman (2018) argued that both may be necessary preconditions for general well-being. 
Specifically, the author found that the constructs had r = .71 to r = .86 correlations. This is 
above the common r = .70 threshold for convergent validity, which is used to suggest scales 
capture aspects of the same underlying construct (Preston & Colman, 2000). In the most recent 
of these comparisons, Disabato, Goodman, Kashdan, Short and Jarden (2016) evaluated the 
extent hedonic and eudemonic well-being were differentially associated with various 
convergent SWB measures such as curiosity, meaning in life and grit. Using over 7,500 
participants—who were dispersed across 12 language groups and 7 different world regions—
they found that both scales had roughly equal effect sizes for 7/8 outcomes. Failure to find 
                                               
1 Ryff (2014) reported only around 350 existing articles on psychological well-being.  
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discriminant effects suggests that hedonic and eudemonic well-being may both belong to 
unitary SWB.  
Indeed, new scales are beginning to reconcile these perspectives. For example, the recently 
developed Scales of General Well-Being—which comprises 14 facets synopsising the entire 
SWB literature—has found hedonic feelings of happiness and vitality load positively alongside 
eudemonic feelings of purpose and connectedness (Longo, Coyne & Joseph, 2017). This has 
been replicated in the PERMA flourishing scale—comprising positive emotion and 
accomplishment, among other facets—which is especially popular in applied contexts (e.g. 
education; Kern, Waters, Adler & White, 2015). Therefore, putatively opposing hedonic and 
eudemonic theories—and concomitant scales—may capture the same underlying global 
construct. Thus, they might only differ in the extent they emphasise some (potentially 
unrepresentative) facets over others.  
These findings suggest that the prevailing tripartite model may be competing directly with 
psychological well-being and other emerging frameworks to explain the same SWB 
experience. Importantly, this highlights that the tripartite model is not synonymous with SWB 
and can thus be evaluated for its parsimony. When doing so, it is important to first classify 
SWB as a process model: it attempts to explain how discrete psychological constructs give rise 
to SWB (Rozin, 2001). Busseri & Sadava (2011) reviewed the existing literature and found 
there was a lack of consensus on whether its components—negative affect, positive affect and 
life satisfaction—were three orthogonal outcomes, facets of latent SWB, a pathway where 
affectivity caused life satisfaction, or a combination of the above. Reconciling using US 
nationally representative longitudinal data, Busseri (2015) found that sociodemographic 
variables (e.g. marital status, income) at time one explained the greatest variation in negative 
affect, positive affect and life satisfaction at time two when they kept the three variables 
separate, but also apportioned their shared variation into a fourth variable called ‘global SWB’. 
Jovanovic (2015) found this same structure best accounted for tripartite scale responses in two 
large cross-sectional samples of young Serbian adults. Together, results suggest that the 
tripartite model is organised into shared SWB and then the remaining unique variation 
attributable to its component constructs.  
However, this model is only the best of the alternatives tested. Studies all assume affectivity 
and life satisfaction are initially separate experiences that subsequently combine to inform 
SWB. Parallel streams of research suggest that cognitive appraisals of life satisfaction are 
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intrinsic to the formation of affect, and vice versa (Barrett, 2017). That is, they are not 
necessarily separate processes from the outset. They are also incomplete. For example, despite 
including both negatively and positively valanced affect, the tripartite model only includes 
positively valanced life satisfaction. It fails to account for how cognitive appraisals of life 
dissatisfaction may reduce SWB (e.g. Hoeyberghs et al., 2018). Overall, despite emerging 
consensus on the structure of the tripartite model, it may still lack ecological validity because 
it distinguishes between only partial candidate processes.  
There are few other established process models. As mentioned above, the Scales of General 
Well-Being was only recently developed to measure the full range of published SWB 
processes. Importantly, Longo et al. (2017) noted that trends in the literature meant only 1 of 
the 14 facets (negative affect) measured the absence of suffering, rather than flourishing 
beyond baseline. Moreover, existing facets may overemphasise the aspects of flourishing that 
have received greater research attention, other facets may emerge in the future, and the finalised 
constructs have little demonstrated external validity beyond the original study—either within 
socio-demographic strata or across cultures. Put simply, comprehensive process models of 
SWB are still in their infancy.  
In the interim, researchers wishing to evaluate SWB as a high-bandwidth outcome may prefer 
a domain-oriented approach. According to Rozin (2001), domain approaches simply describe 
the different aspects of life where individuals can experience SWB. For example, they can be 
either concrete (e.g. sleep, leisure) or motivational (e.g. relationships, achievement). A legacy 
of humanistic psychology is that the motivation domains are a well-established way of 
organising wide-ranging behaviours. Seminally, Maslow (1943) expressed them as the 
hierarchically organised needs for physiological sustenance, safety, love/belonging, esteem and 
self-actualization. Of course, its strict hierarchy and universality have now been debunked 
(McLeod, 2007). Nevertheless, Maslow’s hierarchy still gave rise to Herzberg’s (1966) 
Motivation-Hygiene Theory, which found that different sets of needs fulfilment protected 
against job dissatisfaction (e.g. status, comfort) and promoted job satisfaction (e.g. 
responsibility, growth). It also promoted other general theories of human motivation, such as 
McClelland’s (1965) Acquired Needs Theory, which identified the implicit (i.e. non-
conscious) needs for achievement, affiliation and power. These culminated in basic 
psychological needs theory.  
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Basic psychological needs theory is the canonical account of SWB motivation domains. It 
comprises the needs for competence, autonomy and relatedness that manifest in everyday life 
(Ryan & Deci, 2017). They can be either thwarted or satisfied (Gunnell, Crocker, Wilson, Mack 
& Zumbo, 2013). A consolidation of the mature needs literature, Ryan and Deci (2001) found 
other putatively different experiences—such as for self-esteem, meaning and growth—were 
emergent properties of fulfilling the basic needs. That is, they are comprehensive. The basic 
needs may also be robustly associated with various measures of SWB both within and across 
cultures (see Ryan & Deci, 2011), and with a variety of applied outcomes (e.g. van den Broeck, 
Ferris, Chang & Rosen, 2016). While Ryan & Deci (2001) also suggest the psychological needs 
foster feelings of intrinsic motivation that ultimately cause SWB, the issue of whether they are 
separate SWB predictors or outcomes is largely trivial. Provided they comprehensively account 
for the SWB substrates, aggregate psychological needs necessarily capture the overall construct 
regardless of whether its operationalisations are face valid. Rather, a contemporary area of 
contention is the extent that basic needs strength, which concerns individual differences in the 
benefits of fulfilling each need (Ryan & Deci, 2000). This was resolved by Chen et al. (2015), 
who used over 1,500 American, Belgian, Chinese and Peruvian participants to demonstrate that 
both effects for basic needs satisfaction and needs thwarting on SWB were not moderated by 
individual differences in needs strength. Instead, Rocchi, Pelletier, Cheung, Baxter and 
Beaudry (2017) found that needs strength was associated with the sensitivity that real-world 
events influenced psychological needs fulfilment. Therefore, needs strength may capture 
individual differences in thresholds for experiencing basic needs thwarting and satisfaction, 
rather than the phenomenon per se.   
2.4. Bivariate Associations  
The presence of two relatively established psychological phenomena does not guaranteed there 
will be bivariate associations. As such, I briefly review a priori mechanisms linking big five 
personality to SWB, and then discuss prevailing documented effects. The objective is not to 
show that effects are definitive, but simply that there are sufficient theoretical and empirical 
grounds for further associative research.  
2.4.1. Theoretical Processes  
There are at least three processes that might link personality to SWB. The first is that some 
traits capture stable sensitivities to directly experience components of SWB, irrespective of 
context. For example, Schimmack, Oishi, Furr and Funder (2004) found that trait depression 
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and cheerfulness—the propensities for negative and positive affect—were robustly associated 
with life satisfaction across cultures. Second, some facets may increase the frequency of 
extracting the substrates—or nutriments—of SWB from the environment. Evidence for the 
importance of the environment comes from large national differences in SWB, which tend to 
have greater variability than even individual differences (Morrison, Tay & Diener, 2011). They 
highlight that some contexts give drastically more SWB affordances than others. In further 
support, Prentice, Jayawickreme and Fleeson (2018) recruit whole trait theory to suggest that 
traits elicit distributions of states—via environment selection, selective attention and active 
interactions—that confer differing autonomy, competence and relatedness experiences. 
Finally, personality may impact the way people react to various circumstances. Seminally, 
Boyce and Wood (2011) tracked changes in life satisfaction in German participants from a 
larger panel who became legally disabled during the four-year sampling period. After a 
universal decline in SWB immediately post-disability, highly agreeable participants returned 
to their pre-disability SWB and highly disagreeable participants experienced further decreases. 
While mechanistic arguments are largely beyond the scope of this PhD, their feasibility still 
increases my confidence in the non-spuriousness of existing bivariate associations.  
2.4.2. Factor Effects  
Personality is also linked empirically to SWB. Steel, Schmidt & Shultz (2008) conducted the 
seminal meta-analysis using the big five. It comprised around 350 different samples and 
120,000 participants. They found an up to four-fold increase in effect sizes compared to the 
previous personality-SWB meta-analysis, which used inconsistent personality 
operationalizations (see DeNeve & Cooper, 1998). While effects for neuroticism and 
extraversion were largest, there were also associations across the entire big five for job 
satisfaction, happiness, life satisfaction, affect and life quality. Effects held after controlling 
for a range of methodological and demographic study differences. More recently, Strickhouser, 
Zell and Krizan (2017) conducted an empirical meta-synthesis of the 36 existing meta-analyses 
(> 500,000 participants) linking personality to various health outcomes. They found moderate 
combined effects for the big five (r  .40) on mental health outcomes—defined as non-physical 
negatively or positively valanced experiences—in non-clinical adult populations. Effects were 
largest for conscientiousness, agreeableness and neuroticism. Evidence from prospective 
longitudinal studies suggested that effects also held over time. Results may have diverged from 
Steel et al. (2008) because of different SWB definitions.  
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2.4.3. Facet Effects 
Although well-documented, factor associations with SWB are often too broad to be useful. 
Whilst they may be appropriate in many research contexts. Establishing a scalable framework 
for more granular constructs may help isolate discrete mechanisms. However, the hierarchical 
structure of the big five means that there are complex intercorrelations both within and across 
factors. This makes it difficult to fit controls a priori because confounds could differ according 
to both the facet and outcome in question (and perhaps also the population sampled). 
Problematically, fitting all 29 facets as controls is usually impossible because it suppresses real 
effects (Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, 2013). Stepwise regression, multiple regression and 
state-based effects are three documented solutions. 
Stepwise regression is when pre-defined superordinate predictors are allocated all the 
predictor-outcome covariation that they share with subsequent predictors (Cohen et al., 2013). 
Using stepwise regression, Schimmack et al. (2004) found that the exclusively affective 
facets—depression from neuroticism and cheerfulness from extraversion—were associated 
with SWB. Results were consistent using convergent measures of the big five, self- and 
informant-reported SWB, and heterogeneous student samples. There were no other facet 
associations across the entire big five. Similarly, Quevedo and Abella (2011) used stepwise 
regression to evaluate associations across all 30 facets among Spanish students and their friends 
and family. In partial support, depression and achievement-striving from agreeableness were 
the only two effects. Overall, stepwise approaches suggest that as few as 2 of the 30 big five 
personality facets—one being depression—are implicated in SWB. Thus, they may give a 
particularly narrow account of personality-SWB associations.  
Multiple regression is another alternative. Albuquerque, de Lima, Matos & Figueiredo (2012) 
evaluated the unique effects of each neuroticism, extraversion and conscientiousness facet on 
SWB after controlling for the other five facets in their factor. Four neuroticism facets, one 
extraversion facet and three conscientiousness facets emerged. Thus, results suggested that 
multiple traits impacted SWB. Similarly, Anglim and Grant (2016) examined all facet 
associations with SWB after controlling for the big five personality factors. Also, in partial 
support of Schimmack et al. (2004), they found effects for depression and self-consciousness 
from neuroticism, and cheerfulness from extraversion. Thus, results also supported the 
importance of trait affectivity. Although these studies had divergent results, they did suggest 
multiple regression yielded more facet associations than stepwise regression.  
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There are also a wide range of possible facet-SWB association in adjacent literatures. For 
example, according to the emotion regulation perspective, low SWB is rooted in negative 
phenomenological experiences (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema & Schweizer, 2010). As such, facets 
may be implicated when they cause intense negative emotions—such as in anxiety—or 
increase the frequency of experiencing discomfort, such as in vulnerability (Headey, Kelley, & 
Wearing, 1993; Steptoe, Hamer & Chida, 2007). Similarly, the inability to mitigate negative 
emotion elicitors may be captured in both facets associated with conflict management—such 
as gregariousness and cooperation (Antonioni, 1998)—and a general lack of agency—such as 
in low self-efficacy and self-discipline (Kim-Cohen et al., 2006). High SWB may be associated 
with facets that promote goal-oriented behaviour, such as self-efficacy, self-discipline and 
achievement-striving (Sheldon & Elliot, 1999). Further, friendliness, gregariousness and 
altruism may help leverage the benefits of social networks (Helliwell, 2006). Therefore, 
adjacent literatures suggest there may be a wide range of facet associations with SWB. 
2.5. The Problem 
The simple fact is that existing facet-level associations contradict one another. The only 
consensus is that depression from neuroticism is implicated, alongside between one and at least 
seven other facets from across four of the big five. There may be empirical justification to link 
most of the facets with SWB when also considering research from adjacent literatures. The 
problem appears to transcend any single study and might thus reflect the wider difficulty of 
conducting rigorous research in the field. As such, I first contextualise the problem using 
lessons from the recent ‘Replication Crisis’ in social psychology. Then I address more specific 
methodological limitations. 
2.5.1. The Replication Crisis  
The replication crisis—realization that prevailing social psychology methods may yield 
unacceptably high error rates—was precipitated by a rapid succession of tenuous findings. 
From 2010 to 2012, prominent researchers were caught fabricating data (e.g. Diederik Stapel; 
Levelt, Drenth, & Noort, 2012); there was a putatively gold-standard proof that humans could 
see into the future (Bem, 2011); and, a famous unconscious priming effect—subliminal elderly 
primes slowed walking speed—was debunked because it was highly contingent on the original, 
idiosyncratic, study context (Doyen, Klein, Pichon & Cleeremans, 2012). These events 
activated dormant concerns about artificially dichotomous p-values, underpowered studies and 
publication bias (e.g. Cumming & Calin-Jageman, 2016). They also ushered a period of intense 
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methodological scrutiny. New criticisms emerged about the pervasive multitude of ways that 
researchers (a) failed to weight results by their a priori plausibility (Bayesian inference; 
Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom & Van Der Maas, 2011), (b) artificially inflated both effect 
precision and magnitude (Szucs & Ioannidis, 2017), and (c) failed to corroborate existing 
findings (Everett & Earp, 2015). Early findings indicted the entire discipline. 
Then, large-scale collaborative studies investigated the true extent of replication failure. 
Prominently, Klein et al. (2014) attempted to replicate 13 published effects in psychology using 
over 6,000 participants in 33 different research labs (majority American). Ten of the findings 
replicated consistently, but there was substantial variability in even their effects across labs. 
Then, the Open Science Collaboration (2015) replicated 100 studies published in three 
prestigious psychology journals during 2008. Despite similar or larger samples than most of 
the original studies, there were only 36% successful replications. Aggregate observed effect 
magnitude was halved. It is difficult to determine the extent findings generalise to the entire 
field because replications were unrepresentative and conceptual, rather than direct, and/or used 
different populations. Nevertheless, findings did highlight that even seemingly robust 
psychological research often fails to clearly isolate target phenomena. 
Recent review articles have attempted to consolidate lessons from the replication crisis. Nelson, 
Simmons & Simonsohn (2018) highlight the fallibility of p-values, suggesting that statistical 
power is compromised every time researchers make design and/or analysis decisions based on 
partial data. In addition to full disclosure and open materials, they suggest study preregistration 
to commit researchers to their a priori defined protocols. Shrout and Rodgers (2018) also 
highlight the importance of distinguishing between exploratory and confirmatory research, 
evaluating the conservative bound of CIs, and fully accounting for statistical power and design 
features (e.g. self-report vs behavioural outcomes) in meta-analyses. Ideally, they suggest that 
effects are triangulated across populations of high-powered replication studies. However, these 
recommendations also implicitly recognise that genuine psychological effects are fickle. De 
Boeck and Jeon (2018) review existing meta-analyses to suggest that most effects explain 10-
25% predictor-outcome covariation. This is almost equivalent to the variation caused by both 
differences in within-population study designs and between-population moderators. Overall, I 
thus conclude that methods must improve to re-enforce the marginal superiority of real but 
fluctuating effects over their contingencies.  
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How does this lesson apply to facet-SWB associations? The multitude of facet IVs reduce the 
effect magnitude of any single association. Then, facet specificity introduces further 
measurement error because, by necessity, it assesses more discrete behaviours that are prone 
to being culture-specific characteristic adaptations (Costa & McCrae, 2017). Further, there are 
a lack of attempted replications. This limits the ability to explain inconsistent findings through 
discrete population-level moderators (e.g. collectivism). Although studies may have been 
sufficiently powered, their lower-bound CIs are often so negligibly beyond zero that effects 
could have disappeared in even slightly different testing conditions. Ultimately, these 
contingencies all jeopardise the already-small margin between genuine but changing 
population effects, and methodological artefacts. There are also more specific limitations. 
2.5.2. Facet Effect Limitations 
Existing facet-level research tends to use either stepwise or multiple regression to control for 
potentially confounding personality variables. In doing so, they make a priori decisions about 
whether personality facet covariation should be allocated to one facet over another, or 
completely apportioned from the analysis. This is reasonable provided: (a) there are a relatively 
small number of covarying facets that can be organised by theoretical precedence for stepwise 
regression, and/or (b) facets form a comprehensive set of plausible multiple regression controls 
that are not so exhaustive that they compromise the construct validity of the target. 
Problematically, these conditions are not met for the big five facets. Their complex structure 
means that any of the 29 non-target facets could confound associations with SWB.  
The safest strategy is to control for every facet. However, this grossly limits the extent that any 
facet can share a unique association with the outcome—over and above the other facets—due 
to multicollinearity. The alternative is to relax controls. However, this increases the likelihood 
of confounding. Existing stepwise approaches adhere to this tradeoff. Stepwise regression may 
be adept at finding (confounded) support for the variables with the strongest theoretical 
associations because they are given all the shared facet covariation (Thompson, 1995). 
However, other facets must then compete for proportionally little variance in the outcome. As 
this process is repeated across multiple steps, the burden of proof may become untenably high. 
Results become self-fulfilling: Variables arbitrarily assigned to the first step have the highest 
chance of emerging as significant. Had Schimmack et al. (2004) cited the importance of (e.g.) 
self-efficacy and self-discipline in SWB—which is certainly defensible (Duckworth, Peterson, 
Matthews & Kelly, 2007)— it is unclear whether depression and cheerfulness would have even 
emerged as robust predictors. Further, assuming all facets in the subsequent step have equal 
34 
 
predictive power, the ones least associated with the superordinate facet will be most strongly 
associated with the outcome. This may cause cascading arbitrary effects. Therefore, at best 
stepwise regression may artificially diminish the full range of facet predictors. At worst, it may 
mean that emergent facet-SWB associations are completely spurious.  
Multiple regression approaches are equally fraught. Controlling for just intra-factor facets does 
not mitigate the likelihood of confounding from facets in other factors. Alternatively, 
controlling for the big five factors completely removes any covariance the facet shares with its 
own superordinate factor. This is especially problematic because the factor and facet are, by 
definition, intended to measure overlapping aspects of the same global personality trait. 
Further, circumplex approaches suggest that any single facet can be conceptualised as a 
constellation of other facets (Saucier & Ostendorf, 1999). For example, friendliness might 
comprise high trust and gregariousness. Thus, fitting even a moderate number of controls can 
remove components of the target facet that are intrinsic to the very underlying construct it is 
intended to measure. Put simply, multiple regression compromises facet construct validity. 
This could be another reason for the fluctuating associations reported to date.  
Contrastingly, state-based effects are so fragmented that there is little cross-study equivalence. 
Put another way, studies comprise largely different samples, variables and variable 
operationalizations. Thus, it is difficult to disambiguate real and artefactual effects. For 
example, findings could (a) be obfuscated by legitimate population contingencies; (b) proxy 
for other facet effects that are either uncontrolled or unaccounted for in the manipulation check; 
(c) be specific to partial operationalizations of SWB; and/or, (d) use scales/manipulations that 
have different intensities, thus compromising effect size estimates. Indeed, the extent of these 
inconsistencies means that it is feasible to find ‘a priori’ evidence linking almost every facet 
to SWB. Thus, results simply affirm factor-level findings that implicate most traits. Over time, 
cross-study equivalence might be increased through meta-analyses, which fit many of these 
design contingencies as moderators. However, this relies on the kind of critical mass of studies 
that only accumulates over a long period of research and with sufficient expenditure. Even 
then, it is unclear whether states capture the omnibus facet. They may instead capture specific 
nuances, and thus have limited applicability to any current, definitive, trait taxonomy.  Overall, 
research on states suggests wider ranging facet effects, but findings are only ever preliminary.  
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2.6 Computational Psychology 
Emergent computational methods may offer a solution. Although replication crisis reviews 
focus on increasing power, pre-planning analysis and conducting more replications, they also 
briefly examine the potential for new technologies. For example, Nelson et al., (2018) suggest 
making comprehensive study materials open access online. Shrout and Rodgers (2018) 
highlight that iteratively analysing sub-samples of participants can help stabilize effect 
estimates. However, there may be wider-ranging benefits. Lazer et al. (2010) introduced 
Computational Social Science as “The capacity to collect and analyse massive amounts of data” 
(p. 721). They highlighted the potentials of live GPS-based person tracking, automatically 
imposing structure on complex sources of information (e.g. videos, natural language) and 
making inferences from online behaviour. Of these, sampling and iterative testing strategies 
may be particularly adept at reconciling facet associations with SWB.  
One noteworthy benefit of the computational paradigm is cheap large samples. This is 
highlighted by both online panel and algorithmic sampling strategies. Publicly available online 
survey panels have dramatically reduced the cost of collecting data. Buhrmester, Kwang and 
Gosling (2011) evaluated data quality on Amazon’s pioneering Mechanical Turk platform. 
They found scale internal consistency and intercorrelations across multiple testing occasions 
were comparable to offline methods, and that compensation rates as low as US$0.02 only 
marginally reduced data quality. Results were recently questioned by Matherly (2018), who 
found that panel members with the same ‘reputation’—the metric used to determine their level 
of pay—produced highly-variable data quality. However, this can usually be remedied by post-
test filtering for atypical response patterns (e.g. acquiescence, manipulation check items; 
Cohen et al., 2013). Moreover, Walter, Seibert, Goering and O’Boyle (2018) conducted a meta-
analysis of online panel internal consistencies and effect sizes, which comprised 90 different 
samples and over 30,000 participants. Internal consistencies were all within the credibility 
bounds of their offline equivalents—which were taken from existing meta-analyses—most 
effect-size estimates overlapped, and there were no differences in aggregated overall effects. 
Therefore, it may be possible for individual research teams to collect large survey data, even 
after adjusting results from the above studies for price inflation.  
The algorithmic approach was popularized using social media data. Kosinski et al. (2013) used 
Facebook page likes for over 58,000 participants to predict their self-reported 
sociodemographic (e.g. sexuality, religion) characteristics and big five personality. This was 
consolidated by Youyou, Stillwell and Kosinski (2015), who found that predictions were more 
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accurate than most ‘classical’ informant reports. Recent research has even found that single 
Facebook Likes and single online dating profile images can predict personality and sexual 
orientation respectively (Wang & Kosinski, 2017; Matz, Kosinski, Nave & Stillwell, 2017). 
The implication is that algorithms can also generate predictions for people who do not also give 
self-reports. It opens the possibility that individual research teams could either borrow or create 
algorithms developed using a relatively small sample of participants and apply them to massive 
databases of online behaviour. Online panel and algorithmic approaches may render p-values 
and even confidence intervals—which are also predicated on the SE and thus sample size 
(Cohen et al., 2013)—redundant. That is, they might isolate extremely precise effect patterns 
in the population sampled, at least presuming the scales measured are construct valid.  
Automated iterative analyses—also referred to as machine learning—are characterized by 
resampling and parameter tuning. Resampling involves evaluating the same research question 
in multiple subsamples (James et al., 2013). Two prominent examples are bootstrapping and 
k-fold cross-validation. Both involve aggregating results from an entire population of models 
to increase robustness. I also extend resampling to include any other analysis that iteratively 
uses different participant and/or variable subsamples, as well as simulations (Adjerid & Kelley, 
2018). For example, different subsamples could ask the same research question across varying 
sociodemographic strata or across multiple construct operationalizations. Simulations are when 
each constituent subsample is generated according to a different (defensible) permutation of 
assumptions (James et al., 2013). For example, I might assume that two variables are normally 
distributed and have a moderate (e.g. r = .30) correlation. The primary benefits of resampling 
are triangulating results across multiple variable operationalizations, and increasing the 
information about the conditions that give rise to especially weak and strong effects.  
Parameter tuning varies the statistical analyses. Ridge and LASSO regression are perhaps the 
most prominent examples in psychology. They both systematically vary individual effect 
estimates to maximize the explanatory power of the entire model (Zou & Hastie, 2005). 
Another example is participant weights, which might be used to test models on subsets of 
participants with different characteristics. Weights could be used to select participants with the 
same covariates, or to test the extent results generalise to different populations. Overall, 
iterative approaches are thus concerned with isolating particularly robust effect estimates.  
These computational approaches can mitigate fickle facet effects. For example, large sample 
size gives unprecedented power to evaluate patterns of effect sizes without conflating Type 1 
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error. They are so economical that it is often feasible to increase survey length, which allows 
researchers to evaluate the same hypothesis with multiple converging IVs and DVs. An 
auxiliary benefit is that both online panels and logged internet behaviour give additional access 
to non-WEIRD (western, educated, industrialised, rich, democratic) participants with little 
extra effort and often at reduced cost (Henrich, Heine & Norenzayan, 2010). During 
resampling, relatively large effects may indicate that certain variable operationalizations 
capture extremely robust effects. They may also show that results are not simply artefacts of 
idiosyncratic, singular, measurement choices. Averaging results across models with iteratively 
sampled partial controls may increase internal validity without causing multicollinear effects. 
In many cases, parameter tuning can help extract more ecologically valid associations between 
variables, ensuring the statistics are optimized to account for true real-world phenomena (James 
et al., 2013). Overall, computational psychology offers a battery of possible solutions.  
2.7. Present Studies 
The empirical chapters revisit bivariate associations between big five personality and SWB 
using a computational psychology paradigm. Throughout the General Introduction, I argued 
that the big five facets are the most granular—robustly-supported—level of personality. Then 
I suggested that it is premature to define SWB as a series of discrete psychological processes.  
Instead, it can be viewed as the combined feelings of autonomy, competence and relatedness. 
The existence of plausible processes linking personality to SWB is corroborated by existing 
bivariate associations. However, isolating specific effects, and effect patterns, is more difficult. 
The replication crisis in social psychology highlighted that effects may be contingent on 
unergeralizable sampling decisions, study designs and analyses. Computational psychology—
which leverages huge samples and iterative analyses—mitigates these limitations by increasing 
sample heterogeneity and power, systematically accounting for methodological artefacts and 
increasing statistical control. Next, I document my general methods decisions and then briefly 
surmise the empirical chapters. 
2.7.1 Methodological Decisions 
There are some methods decisions that span the empirical chapters. I focussed on personality 
and SWB because they were relatively incontrovertible psychological constructs that I assessed 
in most country waves of the AXA study. They have widely established cross-cultural validity. 
They were also expediently translatable into multiple languages—when an existing translation 
did not exist—and could be assessed using self-report. Chapter 1 contains transparent 
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disclosure of the AXA study sampling procedure and the concomitant survey format. Specific 
sample characteristics and key variables are described in Chapter 5, which is the first instance 
that I use the full AXA study data. Personality-SWB associations—whilst interesting in their 
own right—are also a use-case for my documented battery of methods interventions. The 
primary data to hand is a cross-sectional dataset of  36,000 participants ( 40,000 prior to 
removing acquiescent responses) spanning all 6 permanently inhabited continents, 14 different 
language groups and 33 countries. Psychological construct scores were relative to participants’ 
countrymen. This meant I controlled for all country-level effect contingencies (Aguinis, 
Gottfredson & Culpepper, 2013). Although I often had intuitions about effects, I refrained from 
proposing specific directional hypotheses because the literature often supports multiple 
conflicting perspectives.  
Of course, my computational approaches involve performing far more statistical models than 
conventional alternatives. However, they may not lead to excess Type 1 error because they 
avoid using parameter estimates. For instance, they ignore t- and p-values. Instead, they take 
either the overall model explanatory power and/or effect estimate for that specific sample 
without making normative inferences (James et al., 2013). Such inferences are instead made at 
a second-step, using the bootstrapped population of results from across changing models. In 
most instances, multiple effects can thus be consolidated into single parametric inferences.   
It was appropriate to use the prevailing power analysis method in social psychology. 
Throughout the PhD, I evaluate associations within the big five factors and facets, and also 
within convergent measures of SWB. Then, I of course evaluate associations between the thirty 
big five facets and my two primary SWB outcomes, which capture suffering and flourishing. I 
use a power analysis predicted on the very dichotomous p-values I criticized above (Cohen, 
1992). To explain, such power analysis is advocated in widely influential instructional texts 
(most notably “The New Statistics”; Cumming, 2013), alongside increased focus on confidence 
intervals. Further, large sample sizes yield precise effect estimates because they are predicated 
on the standard error. That means the bounds of even extremely conservative confidence 
intervals often converge with the point estimate. The putatively dichotomous power calculation 
may, in the present study context, apply almost equally to the entire range of plausible effects. 
Finally, it is only a provisional metric. I further mitigate the likelihood of spurious findings 
throughout the PhD by only evaluating (a) effects with noteworthy magnitudes, and/or (b) the 
consistency of whole patterns of effects, which are far less likely to be caused by Type 1 error 
(Murayama, Pekrun & Fielder, 2014). Overall, such a power analysis was appropriate because 
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of existing precedents (and thus also familiarity in the field), the large sample size and its use 
as a provisional tool alongside other approaches that were intended to mitigate spuriousness.  
Indeed, confidence intervals are often calculated from the standard error or point-estimate 
effects from 500+ bootstrapped resamples (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). Both have high levels of 
convergence with point estimates when there is extremely large survey data, such as in the 
present PhD (Cohn & Becker, 2003). Thus, assessing the probability that effects of a pre-
specified magnitude truly exist in the population is almost the equivalent of assessing the 
probability that the same target effect adjusted for its conservative plausible magnitude (i.e. the 
CI bound nearest zero) also exists the population. Finally, power analyses focus on effects that 
are large enough to be theoretically important (e.g. r = .10, which is the magnitude that often 
corresponds to a ‘small’ effect in social psychology; Cohen, 1992). Thus, I replace the absolute 
null hypothesis (i.e. no effects whatsoever) with a more parsimonious threshold.  
There was ample study power. I targeted at least 99% chance of detecting real effects in the 
population. Even assuming I perform 1,000 inferential statistical tests using the conservative 
Bonferroni-corrected p-value significance threshold of .001 (i.e. .001/1,000), I have sufficient 
power to detect correlations as small as r = .04.  That is, given 1,000 tests of effects around r = 
.04, there is 99% probability that at most 1 is a false positive. There is a virtually perfect chance 
I detect all exclusively real effects r > .10. Standard error is inversely proportional to sample 
size, and thus point estimates and confidence intervals often converge. This means I can isolate 
effects very precisely and contrast their magnitudes. Importantly, there is also still surplus 
power for the planned analysis, which can offset any additional sources of statistical error. 
2.7.2 Empirical Chapters  
The following chapters use computational psychology approaches to sequentially reappraise 
components of the research process, as they pertain to the cross-sectional study of personality 
associations with SWB. Full comprehensiveness is beyond the scope of any single PhD, and I 
thus focus on especially topical and/or empirically relevant issues. Chapters 3 and 4 are on 
univariate measurement, and then Chapters 5 and 6 are on bivariate associations.  
In univariate measurement, I focus on variable operationalization. Chapter 3 begins by 
evaluating the feasibility of examining psychological characteristics online. Emergent research 
suggests that logged online behaviour can be used to predict personality. I evaluated the 
veracity of this claim by quantifying the extent prediction algorithms—which are normative—
apply to specific individuals. I found individual predictions are negligibly above chance for 
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even hypothetically accurate algorithms that are beyond the scope of current technologies. This 
suggests that predicted personality may be safe to use for normative analyses without 
compromising individual privacy. Chapter 4 continued with the dependent variable group: 
SWB. I evaluated the extent a prominent self-report operationalization of the basic 
psychological needs could be repurposed to measure global SWB. I found consistent evidence 
for separate needs thwarting and satisfaction factors. They were disproportionately associated 
with subjective ill- and well-being respectively, captured more transitive SWB than life 
satisfaction, and additional explained unique variation in real world outcomes. Thus, needs 
thwarting and needs satisfaction were the primary outcomes for the subsequent two chapters. 
In bivariate associations, I focussed on internal validity. Chapter 5 evaluated bivariate 
associations between all 30 big five facets and SWB. I increased internal validity by iteratively 
extracting pairs of participants who had similar covarying facets but differed on the target facet. 
Observed effect patterns were more accurate than both conventional multiple regression and 
even advanced machine learning alternatives. Thus, they may help better identify the most 
promising effects for further analysis. Finally, Chapter 6 found the most robust, internally valid, 
personality-SWB associations. Specifically, I evaluated the facets that were consistently 
associated with extreme SWB across the full range of changing intrapersonal trait contexts. I 
initially found that plausibly real-world individuals with extreme SWB had personality profiles 
that (differentially) deviated from the population mean on most facets. Then, I found that 
hypothetical simulated individuals—who were free to have both likely and unlikely patterns of 
facet scores—deviated from the population mean on a total of only 9/30 facets. These were the 
best-candidates to be internally valid effects because prevalences were robust regardless of 
individuals’ wider personality. That is, they were not simply piggybacking on the covarying 
facet effects most prevalent in the population. Overall, I found first evidence for the 





Can Researchers Predict Psychological Characteristics 
for Specific Individuals from Their Online Data? 
3.1. Abstract  
A recent wave of research has found that online social media behaviour can be used to generate 
prediction algorithms about peoples’ psychological characteristics from their online behaviour. 
Findings are robust at the group level: there are ‘statistically significant’ associations between 
Facebook, Instagram and Twitter logs, and self-reported psychological construct scores. 
Effects also regularly exceed r = .30, which is large by social psychology standards. That 
means they explain more than the typically observed amount of predictor-outcome covariation. 
As such, existing research might reasonably conclude that patterns of online behaviour reflect 
psychological characteristics, on average and in the population/s sampled. However, many of 
these studies extrapolate from their group-based insights to claim that algorithm-predicted 
scores are also highly accurate for specific individuals. This claim does not necessarily follow 
from the existing data. The ecologically fallacy suggests that sample-level trends only weakly 
manifest at more granular levels, such as for specific individuals. The problem may be 
exacerbated for predicted psychological characteristics, because sample-level performance 
metrics are relative and not absolute. To reconcile, I directly evaluated the veracity of these 
extrapolations. I predicted big five personality using a combination of simulated (N = 10,000) 
and real-world survey data (N = 3,132,610), and machine learning with multifaceted Twitter 
data (N = 1,471) at realistic and hypothetical future accuracies. I found that scores were usually 
too imprecise to capture specific individuals’ self-reported personality, differentiate between 
individuals with varying levels of each trait, or correctly assign individuals to low, medium, 
and high categories. Results confirm that even highly robust and relatively large group trends 
are only marginally prevalent in specific individuals. Overall, I conclude that predicted 
psychological characteristics can be used for normative cross-sectional research—of the kind 
featured throughout my PhD—without violating individual privacy. It is highly unlikely, 




Academics, policy makers, the private sector, and the wider public are all interested in the 
potential of emerging large-scale data and computational approaches to improve daily life. For 
example, entire genomes can be processed to isolate hereditary illnesses (Adams, 2015), 
Google searches can track the spread of civil unrest (Manrique, Morgenstern, Velasquez & 
Johnson, 2013), and past Amazon purchases can improve future product recommendations 
(Chen, Chiang & Storey, 2012). Such technologies might also completely change the ways 
humans interact with the physical world. For example, 3D printing can encode and then 
recreate the structure of even complex objects (Rengier et al., 2010), self-driving cars operate 
on live-stream real world data (Yang & Coughlin, 2014), and virtual reality utilizes 
multifaceted biomechanical feedback (Burdea & Coiffet, 2003). There are corresponding 
advancements in social psychology. Prominently, social media information may be used to 
generate unique psychological characteristic profiles for individual users (Golbeck, Robles, 
Edmondson & Turner, 2011; Kosinski et al., 2013). The technology may outperform 
predictions made by work colleagues, close friends, and even family (Youyou et al., 2015). 
Researchers have even set up one-click tests that claim to give accurate profiles (Cambridge 
Psychometrics Centre; applymagicsauce.com). Overall, proponents claim that online predicted 
psychological characteristics may usher in a new era of exceptionally precise research. 
However, such research may be derailed by concerns that predicted psychological 
characteristics, such as personality, violate individual privacy. Existing research invites this 
concern, by claiming that the technology is highly accurate for specific individuals (e.g. see 
the ‘Discussion’ sections for Kosinski et al., 2013 & Youyou et al., 2015). Subsequently, there 
was public outcry that social media-based predictions were used to target individual voting 
behaviour in the 2016 US presidential election (e.g. Davies, 2015; Grassegger & Krogerus, 
2017; Lapowsky, 2017). Prominent figures with access to social media data—such as Facebook 
founder and CEO Mark Zuckerberg and Cambridge psychologist Dr Aleksandr Kogan—then 
both testified about their practises in front of US congress and UK parliament (Watson, 2018; 
Lomas, 2018). Adjacently, there were landmark legal cases where the plaintiff won the right to 
be forgotten online (Grierson & Quinn, 2018; Mantelero, 2013). In May 2018, the EU’s 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) also came into effect. It  drastically increases 
individual privacy safeguards (Burgess, 2018). Overall, researchers, policy makers and the 
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public all assume that social-media predicted psychological characteristics apply to specific 
people. This may have spurred the broad global trend towards protecting privacy rights online.  
3.2.1. The Problem  
The algorithm technology in question can, feasibly, predict any psychological characteristic 
that is stable enough to manifest in logged online behaviour. Concerns are not specific to 
personality. Nevertheless, personality has to date been the focus of both proof-of-concept 
research and public outcry. There are no rigorous tests of the extent psychological 
characteristics—as demonstrated through personality—apply to specific individuals. 
Investigating this will help clarify the privacy implications of using algorithm-predicted 
construct scores throughout the remainder of my PhD.  
I contend that it is inappropriate to use any predicted psychological information that is highly 
accurate for specific individuals without their explicit prior consent. Thus, I am in the unusual 
position of suggesting that prediction algorithms are only useful for psychological research if 
they are sufficiently inaccurate. There are a priori reasons that this might be the case. The 
ecological fallacy suggests that aggregate-level trends—for example, that personality is nested 
in online behaviour—do not necessarily manifest in sub-levels of the data, such as for specific 
individuals (Robinson, 1950). Further, prediction accuracy has to date been evaluated using 
correlations (e.g. Pearson’s R) and variance explained (e.g. R2). These metrics are relative and 
not absolute, which means that effect sizes are interpreted with reference to arbitrary yardsticks 
(e.g. r = .30—or 9% explained variation in the DV—may be a ‘medium’ effect). Thus, they 
may further mask the true extent of the ecological fallacy. To remedy, I switch to absolute 
prediction error, which is a person-specific measure of inaccuracy (Kelley, 2007). It is less 
common in psychology because it obfuscates the general population trend. It is more common 
in applied disciplines because it gives practicable estimates about how much the overall effect 
manifests in specific cases. With it, I aim to evaluate the full extent that psychological 
characteristics predicted from existing logged (e.g. online social media) behaviour, and 
expressed in terms of personality, apply to specific individuals.   
3.2.2. Everyday Personality Expression 
Personality is the constellation of stable ways that people interact with the world. The most 
robust conception is the big five, which comprises neuroticism, extraversion, openness, 
agreeableness, and conscientiousness (John & Srivastava, 1999). Although exact 
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manifestations of personality may be context dependent, they may also have some underlying 
commonalities (Allik, 2002). For example, extraverts may almost always prefer socialising 
with a wider range of people than introverts. This opens the possibility that people may leave 
constant and thus recognizable traces of their behaviour. Gosling, Ko, Mannarelli and Morris 
(2002) suggested that such traces can be reverse-engineered to reconstruct aspects of 
individuals’ personality. For example, they suggested photos of foreign places might convey 
high openness, and an ordered desk might be the residue of high conscientiousness. Then, they 
also found evidence that there were convergent observer ratings of personality from office 
spaces and bedrooms, and that ratings were positively associated with self- and peer-reported 
personality. Personality may also leave constant, interpretable, physical traces.  
Personality expression may also behave similarly in non-physical mediums. For example, 
Rentfrow and Gosling (2003) found four music preference dimensions that were differentially 
related to participants’ personality profiles. Then, Bonneville-Roussy, Rentfrow, Xu, and 
Potter (2013) found that music preference expression was constant across ethnicities, ages and 
countries. Convergently, Gerber, Huber, Doherty, & Dowling (2011) found that researchers 
could infer the big five from people’s political expressions. Then, Hirsh, DeYoung, Xu, & 
Peterson (2010) found universal associations between political conservatism-liberalism and the 
big five. In the context of computer-modulated personality, Nass and Lee (2001) found that 
participants could differentiate between standardized digital voices that had similar and 
dissimilar personality profiles. Finally, Alam and Riccardi (2014) used machine learning to 
infer personality from only traces of non-descript spoken conversations. Therefore, personality 
might also be inferred from immaterial expressions and even computerized speech.    
3.2.3. Online Personality Predictions 
Social media may be another medium that leaves reliable traces of personality. Gosling, 
Gaddis, and Vazire (2007) found convergent observer ratings of participants’ personality from 
their Facebook and MySpace profiles, which were then also positively associated with both 
existing self- and peer-reported personality. Then, Gosling, Augustine, Vazire, Holtzman, and 
Gaddis (2011) found that the underlying properties of personality expression were constant 
across online and offline contexts. For example, extraverts engaged in more social interactions 
on both mediums. Across 89 different countries, Sumner, Byers, Boochever and Park (2012) 
found that psychopathic, Machiavellian, and narcissistic personality traits were expressed in 
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approximately the same way offline and on Twitter. Overall, personality may thus be expressed 
consistently in offline and online contexts, and in similar ways across cultures.  
Personality may also be automatically inferred from social media data. Golbeck et al. (2011) 
found that individuals’ entire Twitter profiles explained 11% to 18% of the variation in self-
reported personality. Then, Kosinski et al. (2013) found that just Facebook Likes predicted 8% 
to 16% variation in self-reported personality. In a follow up study, Youyou et al. (2015) found 
that computer personality predictions outperformed friends when participants had just 65 
Likes, and outperformed family when participants had 125 Likes. Predictions were forecast to 
outperform even romantic partner ratings when there were around 275 Likes. Thus, online 
personality predictions may outperform even human raters as the volume of data increases.  
Personality predictions may also improve with increased data heterogeneity. Heterogeneity is 
important because personality is the average way people interact with the world across a 
variety of different contexts (Paunonen & Ashton, 2001). In support, Skowron, Tkalčič, 
Ferwerda & Schedl (2016) found that user data from both Twitter and Instagram produced 
more accurate personality predictions than data from either platform in isolation. Ongoing 
technological advancements promise even more heterogeneity. For example, Volkova, 
Bachrach, Armstrong and Sharma (2015) predicted personality from natural language in 
participants’ Tweets. Wang and Kosinki (2017) demonstrated that big data technologies could 
even infer psychodemographic information—homosexuality—exclusively from users’ online 
dating profile pictures. Overall, personality predictions may thus become even more accurate 
as user data is continuously logged, quantified and then linked across different online 
mediums—for example, with the assistance of singular user IP addresses and universal logins.  
3.2.4. The Ecological Fallacy 
However, the ecological fallacy suggests there may be a ceiling accuracy of these predictions 
that precludes making inferences about specific individuals. It is the faulty assumption that 
model predictions apply equally to all cases in a population (Brewer & Venaik, 2014). It was 
first demonstrated by Robinson (1950), who found that nationwide difference in literacy 
between African Americans and Caucasian Americans were the result of varying regional 
differences. Moreover, a range of different regional effects could have produced the same 
aggregate results. Then, Freedman (1999) demonstrated that the plausible bounds—or 
confidence intervals—of specific region effects were generally too broad to yield conclusions 
that applied specifically to those regions. Gerhart (2009) gave a contextualised example: 
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despite the well-established differences in individualism-collectivism between countries, 
institutional individual-collectivism varied far more within than between countries. Overall, 
the ecological fallacy is thus the failure to recognise that sub-level effects are free to vary in a 
wide range of ways that deviate from the aggregate effect.  
Psychological research also suffers from the ecological fallacy. Like regions within a country, 
individuals in a sample can show different patterns of covariance that produce the same 
aggregate result (Eisenhauer, 2008). This is supported by the ubiquity of residuals across 
typical psychological models, such as linear regression. To elaborate, even highly accurate 
effects can tolerate discrepant and unaccounted for sub-level patterns of behaviour, which 
manifest as unexplained variation in the DV (James et al., 2013). These may have negligible 
impact on the magnitude or robustness of the overall trend, especially when (a) they are 
cancelled out by discrepant patterns of behaviour in the opposite direction (almost guaranteed 
when there is sufficient power, because of central limit theorem), and (b) sample size is large 
enough to offset any increases in model uncertainty that are introduced by especially large or 
frequent residuals. Overall, the ecological fallacy suggests that research to-date only speaks to 
the group-level effectiveness of using logged online behaviour to predict personality.  
3.2.5. Shifting to Inaccuracy 
The ecological fallacy may also be exacerbated by relative and not absolute effect estimates. 
Researchers use Pearson’s R correlations and R2 to conclude that are non-trivial relationships—
e.g. between internet behaviour and personality—and thus evidence the phenomenon exists in 
the population. However, precise definitions of non-triviality differ. In social psychology, 
common heuristics for small (r = .1; R2 = 1%), medium (r = .3; R2 = 9%) and large (r = .5; R2 
= 25%) effects allow for at least 75% of covariation between the predictors and the outcome to 
remain unexplained (Cohen et al., 2013). These benchmarks are sensible when studying 
population trends: most social phenomena have multiple underlying factors working together 
to shape behaviour, and thus no one factor can account for a substantial proportion of the total 
variance in the outcome. Social psychology effects may dilute whatever remaining 
correspondence there is between the aggregate effect and its sub-level effects—in objectively 
high-accuracy models from other fields—because they often fail to explain the absolute 
majority of variation in the DV. Our most common interpretation heuristics obfuscate this fact.  
There is an alternative way to interpret predicted scores. Any single person’s predicted 
personality may be best seen to exist in a normal distribution of feasible personalities (this idea 
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was first introduced by Fleiss, 1971). To clarify, any predicted score that uses a partial sample 
of online behaviour is a potentially-biased point estimate. Researchers may only know that the 
actual score lies within a wider range of plausible values surrounding the estimate (i.e. a 
confidence interval). I illustrate with 1000 hypothetical people who have all been predicted to 
be a 7 out of 10 on a measure of extraversion. Central limit theorem suggests a histogram of 
their true extraversion scores would be normally distributed with a mean of seven, and with a 
standard deviation that is inversely proportional to the prediction accuracy (James et al., 2013). 
That is, as accuracy increases the standard deviation decreases and there is greater convergence 
between true and predicted scores. In the absence of any additional information, I must assume 
every individual true score lies somewhere in the distribution, but not necessarily on seven. To 
date, researchers have not evaluated the extent these distributions yield predicted scores that 
on average differ, in qualitatively meaningful ways, from individuals’ true scores. My intuition 
is that prediction errors for even ‘large’ social psychology effect sizes (r > .5; unexplained 
variation < 75%) are substantial. If true, I may have only marginal confidence in predicted 
scores for any specific individual. 
These limitations may also apply to the future hypothetical limits of big data predictions. 
Indeed, increasingly comprehensive data on specific individuals has diminishing returns. When 
using Facebook to predict personality, Kosinski et al. (2013) found accuracies plateaued at 
around 300 Likes. Of course, combining multiple sources of big data might prolong the onset 
of diminishing returns. However, this is predicated on every new source of data (a) being at 
least partially distinct from all other existing sources, and (b) creating models that generalize 
to an entire population of people and do not simply reflect the idiosyncratic usage patterns of 
the sub-group sampled (i.e. the problem of overfitting; James et al., 2013). Even then, any 
degree of non-distinctiveness will still result in at least some diminishing returns. For example, 
Skowron et al. (2016) explained 32% of variation in personality predictions using Twitter data, 
but only an additional 14% using Twitter and Instagram data combined—despite both sources 
containing wide-ranging and comprehensive user behaviour logs. Thus, even increasingly 
comprehensive and heterogeneous data might reach an imperfect ceiling level of accuracy.  
These problems are not negated by simply using more participants. All else being equal, large 
sample size increases the certainty that even negligibly explanatory variable effects are non-
spurious (i.e. p-values are contingent on sample size; Loken & Gelman, 2017). However, 
increased sample size has no bearing on effect size because predictors still explain the same 
amount of total variation in the outcome (Fraley & Vazire, 2014). Thus, high powered studies 
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might only help researchers evaluate subtle phenomena or the same phenomenon in multiple 
different sub-populations. This constraint also applies to cutting-edge machine learning. The 
most complex approaches—such as elastic nets, random forests and deep neural networks—
certainly do benefit from more participants. However, that is only because it improves the 
participant-to-predictor ratio, which allows models to capture more complex non-linear 
relationships (James et al., 2013). They—like all forms of machine learning—suffer equally 
from the problems of diminishing returns and overfitting because they also depend on the 
richness and generalizability of the original data.  
3.2.6. Measuring Accuracy for Specific Individuals 
The accuracy of predicted personality scores may be overstated because it is typically measured 
using correlations (r) and variance explained (R2). R famously does not have a clear 
interpretation beyond merely suggesting negative or positive covariance (Bosco, Aguinis, 
Singh, Field & Pierce, 2015). Classically, Ozer (1985) argued that R2 differs depending on 
whether shared covariation is attributed to just the nominated predictor or outcome, whether it 
accounts for overlapping variance from multiple predictors, and whether it is calculated as a 
percentage of total outcome (or predictor) variation versus partial unexplained variation. Put 
simply, although highly useful because of their sometimes-standardized nature, these metrics 
still lack unambiguous natural units that people can reference to daily experiences. Thus, 
researchers, practitioners and the general public may be left to accept that a ‘large effect’ (r = 
.5) is indeed objectively large, and that it signifies a highly accurate prediction. Fortunately, 
there are other methods for measuring accuracy at the individual level, which are more intuitive 
and lend themselves to idiographic interpretations. I use three in this chapter:   
3.2.6.1. Mean Absolute Error 
Mean absolute error (MAE) is one of the simplest possible measures of accuracy. It captures 
the average difference between predicted and actual scores for each participant in the original 
units of the measurement scale. For example, if I predicted Joe is 27 years old when he is 30, 
then the error is 3 years. Then, if I predict Sally is 36 years old when she is 31, the error is 5 
years. In this case, MAE for the sample (Joe and Sally) is 4 years.  
3.2.6.2. Classification Accuracy by Category Assignment  
Alternatively, I can assign true and predicted scores to categories and evaluate how often they 
match. The simplest approach is to create ‘low’ and ‘high’ categories via a median split. 
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However, three categories may be minimally viable because they mitigate the limitations of 
imposing a false dichotomy on the data by also accounting for relatively neutral cases (Maxwell 
& Delaney, 1993). Thus, I might assign each person into low, medium, and high (e.g.) 
extraversion categories by dividing the continuous range of possible extraversion scores into 
thirds. The three minimally viable categories increase the likelihood of accurate predictions—
compared to using additional categories—because (a) prediction errors are only possible in one 
direction for two of the three categories, and (b) there are no within-category prediction errors. 
Then, accuracy is simply how often the true and predicted categories match. Given even 
categories, pure chance is 50% for median splits, 33% for three categories, 25% for four 
categories, and so forth.  
3.2.6.3. Correctly Ranking Pairs of Cases  
Finally, I can evaluate the extent predicted scores correctly rank randomly drawn pairs of 
participants. This is an analogue to area under the curve (AUC), which evaluates prediction 
accuracy in experiments with two conditions—control and treatment—and is also commonly 
used in other social media prediction studies (e.g. Wang & Kosinski, 2017). AUC is the 
percentage of participants—one randomly sampled from the control, the other from the 
treatment—who are then correctly classified back into their respective conditions based on 
their predicted scores (Hanley & McNeil, 1982). The interpretation changes slightly when 
using continuous variables: large discrepancies between true and predicted scores decrease the 
probability of obtaining matching rank orders. This may mean correct rankings are only 
marginally above 50/50 chance, at least until prediction accuracies are very high.  
3.2.7. Present Studies 
My primary aim in this chapter was to demonstrate the accuracy of predicted psychological 
characteristic scores for specific individuals using algorithms that are statistically robust, and 
highly accurate, at the group level. I did this through the prism of personality (1) because of its 
topicality in the public domain, (2) to converge with the exiting literature on online 
psychological characteristic predictions, and (3) because I was directly interested in the privacy 
implications of using predicted personality throughout the remainder of my PhD. Nevertheless, 
results can be translated so that they apply equally to any normally distributed variable, via a 
simple linear transformation.  
The three approaches—MAE, classification accuracy, and correctly ranking pairs of cases—
yielded at least seven unique demonstrations: the extent (1) aggregate-level correlations 
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translate into individual prediction errors; (2) predicted scores for individuals with different 
true scores overlap; (3) predicted score MAEs for people with middling true scores are more 
accurate than those for people with extreme true scores; (4) prediction errors increase when 
they are corrected to have realistic and not artificially condensed model SDs; (5) outlier 
predictions are classified more accurately than middling predictions; (6) individuals are 
correctly classified across multiple characteristics; and, (7) pairs of cases are correctly ranked 
based on their predicted scores.  
To achieve these aims, I used combinations of simulated and real-world data. Monte carlo 
simulations—which are predicted on randomly generated and normally distributed numbers—
helped to evaluate even extreme best-case prediction accuracies that are largely beyond the 
scope of current technologies. They meant I could focus on three prediction accuracy 
benchmarks—‘Best-case’ (r = .90), ‘Demographic’ (r = .60) and ‘Personality’ (r = .30)—that 
were, to varying extents, grounded in combinations of real-world and simulated data. They 
were deliberately larger than typical social psychological benchmarks (e.g. r = .50, .30, .10; 
Cohen et al., 2013) to offer a more rigorous test of the overarching question. Best-case is a 
hypothetical upper-bound of future prediction technologies, of the kind that integrates data 
across platforms and uses advanced machine learning. Whilst difficult to accurately project, I 
settled on this imperfect upper bound because of diminishing returns from new forms of data 
and the likelihood that at least a small portion human behaviour (i.e.  19%) will never be 
logged. Further, it also meant that Pearson’s R differences were kept constant between 
benchmarks. Demographic is the prediction accuracy researchers might expect using a single, 
reliable, source of online data to predict sociodemographic characteristics such as age, 
education level and political orientation (Youyou et al., 2015). It might be considered the 
plausible upper limit of current technologies. Finally, Personality is the prediction accuracy 
researchers might expect using a similar source data to predict any of the big five personality 
traits (e.g. Kosinski et al., 2013). It also coincides with a ‘medium’ effect in social psychology. 
As I mentioned above, findings apply equally any normally distributed trait. As such, we 
interpret omnibus psychological characteristics through the prism of personality. It is possible 
to use this same logic to make results even more intuitive. Personality traits are often scored on 
unintuitive ordinal scales (e.g. from one to five). Ordinal scales are those where a value of zero 
only has meaning relative other scores in the sample. For example, I can only conclude that 
someone scoring 3/5 on extraversion has more of the trait than someone scoring 2/5, but not 
that they are neutral or extraverted per se. It is difficult to understand how these individual 
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scores translate into different real-world behaviours. Ordinal scales can be contrasted with ratio 
scales, where zero has an intrinsic meaning. For example, something with a height of zero is 
entirely flat and a person aged zero is a new-born. They are far easier to interpret. Thus, I 
linearly transformed (i.e. multiplied and added a constant) ordinal true and predicted 
personality so that scores could be interpreted as ratio age. I settled on age because it is perhaps 
the most consistently understood and interpreted ratio scale across cultures. I stress that results 
could be transformed back to personality, or indeed any other continuous psychological 
characteristic, at any time. Thus, I fully preserved the integrity of the original scores whilst also 
making them more digestible to a wide range of researchers and practitioners.  
3.3. Study 1 
In Study 1, I applied the seven approaches to fully simulated true and predicted personality. 
Thus, I evaluated effects independent of idiosyncratic variable distributions and unique 
statistical/machine learning models. It meant that errors were completely random—which is a 
precondition of all unbiased prediction algorithms—and that true and predicted scores were 
both normally distributed. I thus simulated predictions that met general linear model (and other 
model) assumptions for extremely high robustness.  
3.3.1. Method 
3.3.1.1. Simulations 
There were 10,000 simulated cases with normally-distributed personality (M = 3; SD = 1), 
which I then linearly transformed into age (M = 35; SD = 18). Age converged with what 
researchers might obtain from a typical community sample of US residents (e.g. in the 
American Community Survey). I called these values ‘true’ because they were designed to 
proxy for original self-report scores. I truncated true ages outside 0-80 to fit this range.  
3.3.1.2. Procedure 
Predicted scores were derived from true scores. Specifically, I generated predicted scores by 
iteratively adding random noise sampled from a normal distribution (M = 0; SD = 0.05 X SD 
of true age) to true age to down-regulate their convergence, until I reached their target 
correlation. Then, I corrected predictions so that they had the same mean, minimum and 
maximum as trues scores. This code to generate predicted scores is in Appendix 3.1. 
Importantly, as normative statistical model accuracy decreases, it relies more on the predictive 
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power of the intercept term—which assumes everyone has the same baseline score—over the 
coefficients (James et al., 2013). As such, I corrected the predicted score SDs, so that they were 
proportional to the target correlation. For example, the target r = .60 yielded predicted scores 
with 60% of the true age SD. Finally, I repeated this entire simulation protocol ten times to 
increase the stability of my estimates. Then, I created MAE by taking the average of the 
absolute difference between true and predicted scores for each case. MAE is a more liberal 
estimate of model accuracy than either RMSE or R-squared—other popular contextualized 
metrics of inaccuracy—giving the ecological fallacy, and thus my intuitions, the maximum 
chance of failing.  
3.3.2. Results 
I demonstrated all proofs statistically using prediction accuracies from r = .01 to r = .99, 
increasing in increments of r = .01 (i.e. N = 99). Then, I focussed on the three prediction 
accuracy benchmarks—best-case (r = .90), demographic (r = .60), and personality (r = .30)—
where I concretely interpreted results in terms of analogous age. For every accuracy, I 
aggregated MAE for each of the ten monte carlo simulations. Despite large statistical power, I 
still used 95% CIs—which I defined as 2.5th and 97.5th percentile absolute errors—because 
they offered narrower distributions of prediction errors than more conservative CIs, thus again 
increasing the chances that my intuitions were wrong.  
3.3.2.1. MAE by Prediction Accuracy  
Approach one evaluated whether predicted scores were too imprecise to make inferences about 
specific individuals, even at high training accuracies. There was a negative quadratic (inverted 
u-shaped) relationship between prediction accuracy and MAE (B = -10.78, CI = (-11.51, -
10.06), t(96) = -29.61, p < .001). Results are in Figure 3.1. Prediction errors only decreased 
rapidly for very extreme accuracies. However, even at the best-case benchmark they may have 
already been too big to be useful (MAE = 6.15; CI = 0.24, 17.14). They on average mistook a 
17-year-old for an 11-year-old middle schooler or a 23-year-old. At the demographic 
benchmark, MAE = 11.28 (CI = 0.45, 30.91). They on average mistook the 17-year-old for a 
6-year-old infant or a 28-year-old. At the personality benchmark, MAE = 13.50 (CI = 0.54, 
36.41). They on average mistook the 17-year-old for a 3-year-old toddler or a 31-year-old. At 
the personality benchmark, MAE was negligibly better than simply assuming everyone was 
average (MAE = 14.23; CI = 0.51, 35.13). Thus, in my view, such predictions were too 
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imprecise to make inferences about specific individuals at every benchmark, and negligibly 
better than assuming everyone was average at the personality benchmark.   
 
 
Figure 3.1. MAE as a function of training accuracy for psychological characteristics. Prediction accuracy is the 
Pearson’s R correlation between simulated true and predicted scores. True scores were simulated normally 
distributed variables that proxied for self-reported personality but reported in terms of age. I generated predicted 
scores by incrementally adding random noise to true scores until I reached the target correlation (R = .01 to .99, 
by R = .01). Mean absolute error (MAE) was the mean of the absolute difference between true and predicted 
scores for each case. ‘Personality’, ‘Demographic’ and ‘Best Case’ reflect R = .30, R = .60 and R = .90 true-
predicted score correlation benchmarks, respectively. The dashed line is MAE when R = .99. 
 
3.3.2.2. Overlapping Predictions for Divergent True Scores 
Approach two evaluated the percentage of predicted scores that were shared between extreme 
cases. To this end, I retained the bottom and top 20% of true ages. Descriptive statistics are in 
Table 3.1. Then, I evaluated the extent that their predicted score distributions overlapped when 
accuracy increased from r = .01 to r = .99. Training accuracy positively moderated the mean 
difference between bottom vs top 20% predicted scores (B = 49.71, CI = (49.56, 49.86), 
t(395996) = 669.72, p < .001). Put another way, both groups’ mean age converged on the full 
sample mean as training accuracy decreased. While group differences may have remained 
significant for each benchmark, the average difference in true ages (49.58 years; SD = 9.91) 
was only 40.35 years (SD = 11.38) for best-case, 17.79 (SD = 10.91) years for demographic, 
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and 4.43 (SD = 6.92) years for personality benchmarks. At the personality benchmark, I on 
average predicted 60-year-olds were only 5 years older than 10-year-olds. 
 
Table 3.1. 




Bottom 20% Top 20% 
Best-case (r = .90) 15.34 (7.07) 55.7 (8.97) 40.35 (11.38) 
Demographic (r = .60) 26.66 (6.92) 44.46 (8.44) 17.79 (10.91) 
Personality (r = .30) 32.98 (4.63) 37.41 (5.1) 4.43 (6.92) 
True 10.48 (6.34) 60.05 (7.77) 49.58 (9.91) 
Notes. M-DIFF = Mean difference. Cases were allocated to bottom and 
top 20% based on their true age.  
 
Then, I evaluated the overlap between predicted score distributions from the bottom and top 
20% cases. They are in Figure 3.2. Predicted score overlap was 2% for best-case, 28% for 
demographic, and 63% for personality benchmarks. At the personality benchmark, there was a 
2/3 chance that any given 10-year-old’s predicted score was drawn from the predicted-score 
distribution of a 60-year-old, and vice versa. Therefore, I found that even when predicted scores 
differentiated between extreme cases, they (a) underestimated the true magnitude of the 
differences, and (b) yielded predictions that could feasibly belong to either very young or very 
old cases, especially at the more realistic prediction benchmarks.  
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Figure 3.2. Predicted score distributions for participants with bottom 20% and top 20% age. Age in the graph can 
proxy for any normally distributed variable (via a linear transformation); in this case it proxies for personality. 
Predicted age was generated from simulated true age by adding random error. There were three true-predicted 
score correlation benchmarks: Best-Case (R = .90), Demographic (R = .60) and Personality (R = .30). The shaded 
regions reflect the number of cases for each value of predicted age (i.e. the density), at each correlation benchmark. 
The darker shading reflects cases with bottom 20% true ages, and lighter shading reflects cases with top 20% true 
ages. Where shading overlaps, there is shared predicted score density between bottom and top 20% true age. This 
shared density was 2% for Best-Case, 28% for Demographic and 63% for personality.  
 
3.3.2.3. MAE at Different Values of Original Scores 
Approach three explored how prediction accuracy changed according to the magnitude of true 
scores. I evaluated MAE by true score decile for r = .01 to r = .99. MAE for the 1st, 5th, 6th and 
10th deciles are in Table 3.2. The quadratic effect for decile on MAE became less positive as 
accuracy increased (B = -365.43, CI = (-376.01, -354.85), t(984) = -67.79, p < .001). Results 
are in Figure 3.3. That is, at low accuracies, errors were disproportionately large for the 
extreme-most deciles (i.e. 1st and 10th, then 2nd and 9th, etc.). Then as accuracy improved, these 
extreme deciles also had the largest decreases in MAE. There were also small accompanying 
fluctuations in MAE for the middle deciles, as prediction accuracy increased. This may have 
been because prediction models with lower accuracies relied more on the assumption that 
everyone was average (i.e. they relied on the intercept term). Thus, they were 
disproportionately accurate for those cases with true ages closest to the average, and 




Mean predicted age for the bottom 20% and top 20% of 
true ages at different prediction accuracies 
Decile 1st 5th 6th 10th 
Personality (r = .30) 27.73 4.52 4.78 28.31 
Demographic (r = .60) 20.64 7.47 7.83 19.78 
Best-case (r = .90) 7.56 5.68 5.65 7.21 
Assuming average 29.93 2.51 1.94 31.18 
Note. Decile = True age rank. 
 
For the 1st and 10th deciles, MAE = 7.38 years (CI = 0.31, 19.12) for best-case, MAE = 20.21 
years (CI= 6.50, 37.20) for demographic, and MAE = 28.02 years (CI = 16,33, 42.94) for 
personality benchmarks. For the personality benchmark, this was the equivalent of mistaking 
a 66-year-old for a 38-year-old or a 94-year-old. Predictions were more precise for 5th and 6th 
deciles across all benchmarks, fluctuating between MAE = 5.66 (CI = 0.23, 15.90) for best-
case, MAE = 7.65 (CI = 0.33, 19.33) for demographic and MAE = 4.65 (CI = 0.22, 11.60) for 
personality. However, in every instance, it was at least twice as accurate to simply assume all 
cases in the 5th and 6th deciles were the average (MAE = 2.22, CI = 0.20, 4.42). Thus, 
predictions for extreme cases were impractically large at every benchmark, while for middling 





Figure 3.3. Predicted score MAE by true age decile at different training accuracies. True score decile 
is the rank-order magnitude of the true scores. True scores proxy for self-report survey responses. Mean 
absolute error (MAE) is the mean of the absolute difference between true and predicted scores for each 
case. MAE is reported here in terms of age. It can be linearly transformed to reflect any continuous 
variable. ‘Personality’, ‘Demographic’ and ‘Best Case’ benchmark lines reflect MAE by decile at R = 
.30, R = .60 and R = .90 true-predicted score correlations respectively. 
 
3.3.2.4. Adjusting for Realistic SDs 
Approach four evaluated how MAE changed as I adjusted the SDs for predicted scores to 
realistic magnitudes. Although there were 18% children (< 18 years) in true age, predicted 
score SD shrinkage meant there were 16% children at best-case, only 2% at demographic and 
< 1% at personality benchmarks. In real world use cases, such shrinkage would not be 
practicable. Thus, I corrected for SD shrinkage by artificially spreading out predicted scores 
until they had the same SD as the true scores, for prediction accuracies from r = .01 to r = .99. 
There was a negative quadratic association between prediction accuracy and MAE (B = -7.85, 
CI = (-8.56, -7.15), t(96) = -22.02, p < .001). Results are in Figure 3.4. While SD-corrected 
prediction errors for best-case were relatively stable (MAE = 6.29; CI = 0.25, 17.63), they 
increased rapidly for demographic (MAE = 12.58; CI = 0.49, 35.07) and personality (MAE = 
16.66, CI = 0.66, 46.41) benchmarks. In fact, MAE for personality was larger than MAE for 
simply assuming everyone was average (MAE = 14.23). It mistook a 17-year-old for a new-
born or a 34-year-old. The minimum prediction accuracy where a full SD correction did not 
58 
 
push MAE beyond this threshold was r = .49. This threshold is above the vast proportion of 
documented personality predictions to date.  
 
 
Figure 3.4. MAE as a function of training accuracy for psychological characteristics, when predicted score SDs 
are corrected to match true score SDs. Correction is necessary because predicted score SDs are proportional to 
training accuracy. This reflects the increasing importance of the constant intercept term at low accuracies. 
Prediction accuracy is the Pearson’s R correlation between simulated true and predicted scores. True scores were 
simulated normally distributed variables that proxied for self-reported personality but reported in terms of age. I 
generated predicted scores by incrementally adding random noise to true scores until I reached the target 
correlation (R = .01 to .99, by R = .01). Mean absolute error (MAE) was the mean of absolute difference between 
true and predicted scores for each case. ‘Personality’, ‘Demographic’ and ‘Best Case’ reflect R = .30, R = .60 and 
R = .90 true-predicted score correlation benchmarks respectively. The dashed line in MAE is when R = .99. 
 
Inflating SDs exposed the tendency for predicted scores to cluster randomly around the sample 
mean. This was reflected in large discrepancies in the rank order of participants’ predicted 
scores. Ranking error for the 10,000 cases was MAE = 989.61 places (CI = 29.49, 3132.76) for 
best-case, MAE = 2014.57 places (CI = 65.00, 5915.07) for demographic and MAE = 2723.15 
(CI = 95.09, 7588.49) places for personality benchmarks. For comparison, across 100 iterations 
of randomly assigning ‘predicted’ values of true age, chance ranking error was MAE = 3333.82 
(CI = 125.56, 8419.65). Therefore, as prediction accuracy decreased, SD corrections may have 
inflated MAE because the rank order of participants increasingly converged with completely 
random predicted scores. 
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3.3.2.5. Classification Accuracy by Category Assignment  
Approach five was whether I classified extreme predicted scores into low, medium and high 
categories more accurately than I classified middling predicted scores. As a preliminary step, I 
evaluated classification accuracy for all 10,000 cases. Correct classification for best-case 
(75%), demographic (55%) and personality (43%) benchmarks moved progressively towards 
baseline chance (33%). Then, I also used confusion matrices to evaluate whether there were 
any biases in category assignment (e.g. middle third true scores were disproportionately 
misclassified into the bottom compared to top third). Results are in Appendix 3.2. Overall, 
results suggested that classifications were equally accurate—across all four performance 
metrics that are commonly calculated from the confusion matrix—for bottom and top third true 
scores at each benchmark. Classification accuracy was consistently lower for middle third true 
scores, because errors could occur in two directions. Overall, there was no evidence of 
classification bias, meaning I could evaluate classification accuracy for bottom and top 
percentile cases together in the same models. 
Next, I evaluated whether classification accuracies varied as predicted score values changed. 
To this end, every case was assigned a rating based on the extremeness—or deviation from the 
mean—of their predicted scores (1 = “least extreme”, 100 = “most extreme”). Thus, the least 
extreme cases had 49.50th to 50.50th percentile predicted scores, and the most extreme cases 
had the bottom and top 0.50th percentile predicted scores. Then, I evaluated classification 
accuracy—which was the percentage of time true scores were classified into the same third as 
predicted scores—as a function of extremeness. I focused on the cases where there was a more 
than 50/50 chance of obtaining correct classifications.    
I evaluated classification accuracy as a function of predicted score extremeness for training 
accuracies ranging from r = .01 to r = .99.  The quadratic effect for extremeness on correct 
classification was positively moderated by training accuracy (b = 8.79; CI = 8.39, 9.19; t(9894) 
= 42.81; p < .001). Results are in Figure 3.5. Put more simply, as training accuracy progressed 
from extreme hypothetical to more realistic, only increasingly extreme cases were classified at 
above 50/50 chance. To illustrate, best-case classification accuracy was mostly above 50% 
across extremeness scores. However, it was still only 45% at the threshold of two different 
predicted score categories (i.e. extremeness = 34). That is, best-case accuracy failed to reliably 
differentiate between the edge cases from two different categories.  For the demographic 
benchmark, just under half the cases—those with the most middling predicted scores 
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(extremeness < 45)—were incorrectly classified more than 50% of the time. For the personality 
benchmark, more than the 2/3 of cases with the least extreme predicted scores (extremeness < 
68) were incorrectly classified over 50% of the time. Therefore, at realistic accuracies only 
extreme—or increasingly outlier—predicted scores could be classified into the correct age third 
at more than 50/50 chance. For the personality benchmark, this was the equivalent of only 
classifying participants aged below 16.50 and above 52.82 correctly more than 50% of the time. 
Thus, attempts to mitigate MAE by classifying participants into one of three age buckets were 
ultimately ineffective for a large proportion of cases with middling predicted scores.  
 
Figure 3.5. Percentage of cases correctly classified by the extremeness of their predicted scores. Extremeness was 
calculated by percentile. The 1st percentile were the 1% absolute predicted scores closest to the mean. The 100th 
percentile were the 1% absolute predicted scores furthest from the mean. ‘Correct’ is the percentage of cases 
correctly bucketed into equal-sized ‘low’, ‘medium’ and ‘high’ thirds for cases in each percentile. ‘Personality’, 
‘Demographic’ and ‘Best Case’ benchmark lines reflect classification accuracy as a function of extremeness at R 
= .30, R = .60 and R = .90 true-predicted score correlations respectively. The dashed line reflects the 33% random 
chance of bucketing each case correctly.  
 
However, even classification accuracy for cases with extreme scores—putatively the easiest to 
put into buckets because classification errors could only occur in one direction—had ceiling 
effects that converged with 50/50 chance as they progressed to realistic training accuracies. For 
extremeness > 80—when cases had predicted scores that were in the bottom and top 10%—
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classification accuracy was 99% for best-case and 74% for demographic benchmarks, but still 
only 51% for the personality benchmark. These classification ceilings further diminished when 
I increased the number of buckets to create more homogenous—and thus practicable—groups 
of predicted ages. When there were four age buckets, correct classification for extremeness > 
80 was 96% for the best-case benchmark, but only 62% for demographic and 40% for 
personality benchmarks. With five buckets—which is the minimum number needed to create a 
separate category comprising mostly children (> 18)—correct classification was 92% for the 
best-case benchmark, but only 54% for demographic and 33% for personality benchmarks. 
Therefore, progression from best-case to realistic training accuracies meant I increasingly 
misclassified even the most extreme cases. Indeed, classification accuracy was so poor for the 
personality benchmark—despite the relative ease of classifying these extreme scores—that 
even it was still only around 50% when using three categories. Classification accuracy also got 
progressively worse—falling below 50/50 chance—when attempting to put cases into four or 
five buckets at realistic training accuracies.  
3.3.2.6. Multiple Classifications 
Approach six investigated the extent errors were compounded when I attempted to classify the 
entire big five into low, medium, and high buckets. I simulated predicted scores from r = .01 
to r = .99 for five different orthogonal sets of age—which each proxied for a big five factor. 
Correct classification for at least 1/5 factors was > 99% for best-case, 98% for demographic 
and 94% for personality. The quadratic association between training accuracy and percentage 
correct became more positive as the number of correct classifications increased (b = .54; CI = 
.41, .67; t(364) = 8.39; p < .001). Results are in Figure 3.6. Put another way, as prediction 
accuracy decreased, classification accuracy for multiple traits also decreased. Across the entire 
big five, there was > 50% chance of correctly classifying 4/5 factors at best-case, 3/5 factors at 
demographic and 2/5 factors at personality benchmarks. Thus, at the best-case benchmark I 
generated mostly but not fully correct personality profiles at above 50/50 chance. As I 
progressed to the realistic benchmarks, it was increasingly likely to categorize more than half 




Figure 3.6. Cumulative percentage of correctly classifying one to all five big five personality traits. Prediction 
accuracy is the Pearson’s R correlation between simulated true and predicted scores, which I generated by 
incrementally adding random noise to true scores until I reached the target correlation (R = .01 to .99, by R = .01). 
The dashed vertical lines reflect ‘Personality’ (r = .30), ‘Demographic’ (r = .60) and ‘Best Case’ (r = .90) 
benchmark correlations. Correct is the percentage of cases correctly classified into their true score bucket at each 
prediction accuracy. Cum. Correct lines are the cumulative percentage correct when bucketing 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 4/5 
and 5/5 psychological characteristics. The horizontal dashed line is 50/50 chance of classifying the target number 
of characteristics correctly.  
 
Then, I evaluated the extent simulations classified big five traits 100% correctly compared to 
100% incorrectly. For best-case accuracy, 24% of cases were totally correct and < 1% were 
totally incorrect. Despite this large ratio, approximately 3/4 of cases were wrongly classified 
on at least one trait. At demographic accuracy, 5% of cases were totally correct, and 2% of 
cases were totally incorrect. At personality accuracy, 1% of cases were totally correct, and 6% 
of cases were totally incorrect. Thus, as simulations progressed to the personality benchmark, 
it became more than four times as parsimonious to assume classifications were totally incorrect 
rather than totally correct. The minimum accuracy where predictions were more likely to be 
totally correct than totally incorrect was r = .51—which is beyond the limits of most current 
social media personality predictions. Finally, it was unfeasible to create a comprehensive big 




3.3.2.7. Correctly Ranking Participant Dyads 
Finally, approach seven evaluated the extent predicted scores correctly ranked random pairs of 
participants. For every training accuracy from r = .01 to r = .99, I randomly split participants 
into halves 100 times. Thus, each random split created 5,000 pairs. The mean true age 
difference in pairings was M = 20.00 years (SD = 14.73). Then, I determined the extent that 
true score rank matched predicted score rank. There was a positive linear association between 
training accuracy and the percentage of pairs that were ranked correctly (b = .41; CI = .40, .42; 
t(97) = 72.67; p < .001). Results are in Figure 3.7. Correct ranking was 86% for best-case, 71% 
for demographic and 60% for personality benchmarks (random guessing would have resulted 
in 50% accuracy). Despite these putatively large percentages, correct rankings for demographic 
and personality benchmarks were still nearer to chance than being 100% correct. The first 
training accuracy where correct classification was > 75% was r = .70. Thus, even when I 
progressed from the best-case to the demographic benchmark—the top end of realistic 
prediction accuracies—it was already more parsimonious to assume predictions could not 
differentiate between participants at all above chance, than to assume it differentiated between 





Figure 3.7. Percentage of random pairs of cases that were correctly ranked using their predicted scores. Prediction 
accuracy is the Pearson’s R correlation between simulated true and predicted scores, from r = .01 to r = .99 and 
increasing in increments of r = .01. Correct is the proportion of pairs where true score order matched predicted 
score order. ‘Personality’, ‘Demographic’ and ‘Best Case’ reflect R = .30, R = .60 and R = .90 true-predicted 
score correlation benchmarks, respectively. The bottom dashed line is 50% correct, which is the accuracy obtained 
by random chance. The top dashed line is the proportion correct when the correlation between true and predicted 
scores is R = .99.  
3.4. Study 2 
Study 2 aimed to confirm whether simulated results also applied to real world self-reported age 
for more than three million participants. Specifically, I evaluated (a) whether results held with 
true scores that were not perfectly normally distributed, and (b) the extent very big data changed 
the conclusions from Study 1. Again, I created predicted scores by adding random noise to real 
existing true scores. As per Study 1, simulated errors were normally distributed and random. 
Thus, I again evaluated prediction errors from general linear models that met all assumptions 
for high robustness. I focused exclusively on simulated prediction accuracies for best-case (r = 
.90), demographic (r = .60) and personality (r = .30) benchmarks.  
3.4.1. Method 
3.4.1.1. Participants and Procedure   
I used publicly available demographic data from 2014 American Community Survey (N = 
3,132,610; United States Census Bureau, 2016). Mean age was 40.82 (SD = 23.55) and there 
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were 51% women. I repeated the simulation procedure from Study 1 (the simulation code is in 
Appendix 3.1). Thus, I simulated predicted scores by iteratively adding random noise sampled 
from a normal distribution (M = 0; SD = 0.05 X SD of age) until I reached the benchmark 
accuracies. I again truncated predicted ages outside the true age range (0-96), equalised true 
and predicted score means and adjusted predicted score standard deviations to have realistic 
shrinkage. I also repeated each simulation 10 times to increase effect stability. Throughout the 
results, I again used aggregate means and 2.5 and 97.5 percentile CIs. Table 3.3 compares key 
results across studies. 
 
Table 3.3. 
Key results for all seven approaches across the three studies 
  S1 (M= 35, SD = 18) S2 (M = 41, SD = 24) S3 (M= 35, SD = 18) 
Benchmark (r =)   .90 .60 .30 .90 .60 .30 .90 .60 .30 
MAE A1 6.15 11.28 13.50 8.21 15.39 18.94 6.09 11.30 13.56 
Overlap extreme quintiles A2 2% 28% 63% 1% 28% 64% 2% 28% 62% 
MAE Extreme deciles A3 7.38 20.21 28.02 9.26 25.19 34.77 8.79 20.81 27.97 
SD Corrected MAE A4 6.29 12.58 16.66 8.39 16.69 22.24 5.96 12.11 16.10 
Buckets – 1 trait A5 75% 55% 43% 77% 55% 43% 76% 55% 42% 
Buckets – 5 traits A6 24% 5% 2% 27% 5% 1% 24% 4% 1% 
AUC A7 86% 71% 60% 85% 70% 59% 86% 71% 60% 
Notes. A1-7 = Approaches 1-7. S1-3 = Studies 1-3 (M = Mean age in sample, SD = Age SD in sample). S1 = 
Full simulations. S2 = Mixed real-world data and simulations. S3 = Real world online data and machine 
learning. MAE = Mean absolute error. Buckets = Correct classification into low, medium and high categories. 
AUC = Area under curve. Only point estimate descriptives provided for expedience. 
 
3.4.2. Results 
Approach 1 evaluated whether predicted scores were too imprecise to make inferences about 
specific individuals, even at high training accuracies. Best-case MAE = 8.21 (CI = 0.32, 23.11), 
demographic MAE = 15.39 (CI = 0.65, 40.36), and personality MAE = 18.94 (CI = 0.91, 
44.44). For the personality benchmark, predictions were again negligibly better than assuming 
everyone was average (MAE = 20.20, CI = 1.18, 43.18). At all benchmarks, predictions were 
in my view too imprecise to make inferences about specific individuals.  
Approach 2 evaluated the percentage of plausible predicted scores that were shared between 
the bottom and top 20% of cases. Mean age was 8.42 (SD = 4.89) for the bottom 20% and 
73.57 (SD = 8.04) for the top 20%. While the mean difference in true scores was thus 65.16 
years (SD = 9.14), it was only 52.42 (SD = 13.44) for best-case, 23.00 (SD = 14.48) for 
demographic and 5.75 (SD = 9.27) for personality benchmarks. This corresponded to overlap 
in the predicted score distributions between the bottom and top 20% of 1% for best-case, 28% 
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for demographic and 64% for personality benchmarks. For personality, the average 74-year-
old was predicted to be only 6 years older than the average 8-year-old, and there was 
approximately 2/3 chance that predicted scores from one group were drawn from the predicted 
scores of the other group. Therefore, at realistic training accuracies it was unlikely to 
adequately differentiate even opposing extreme cases based on their predicted scores. 
Approach 3 explored how prediction accuracy changed according to true score decile. For true 
age, the 1st decile mostly comprised infants (M = 4.19; SD = 2.59), the 5th (M = 37.25; SD = 
2.55) and 6th (M = 45.60; SD = 2.26) deciles mostly comprised middle-aged adults, and the 
10th decile mostly retirees (M = 80.09, SD = 6.15). For the 1st and 10th deciles, MAE = 9.26 
(CI = 0.38, 25.20) for best-case, MAE = 25.19 (CI = 9.18, 48.25) for demographic, and MAE 
= 34.77 (CI = 21.78, 51.27) for personality benchmarks. Although best-case accuracy was 
superior to the other two benchmarks, even it was still too imprecise to predict age for specific 
individuals. Errors again fluctuated for the 5th and 6th deciles, such that MAE = 7.86 (CI = 0.31, 
22.06) for best-case, MAE = 10.57 (CI = 0.45, 26.37) for demographic, and MAE = 6.71 (CI 
= 0.28, 17.08) for personality benchmarks. Although relatively precise, it was still more than 
1.5 times as accurate to simply assume all these participants were average (MAE = 4.21, CI = 
0.18, 8.18). Thus, training accuracy may not have improved enough to make best-case 
predictions for the extreme deciles practicable, and it was again more accurate to simply 
assume all middling cases were average regardless of the benchmark.  
Approach 4 evaluated how MAE changed as I adjusted the SDs for predicted scores to realistic 
magnitudes. Although there were 21% children in true age, there were 18% children at best-
case, only 1% at demographic and < 1% at personality benchmarks. When predicted age SDs 
were corrected to match true age, MAE = 8.39 (CI = 0.32, 23.87) for best-case, MAE = 16.69 
(CI = 0.63, 47.81) for demographic, and MAE = 22.24 (CI = 0.85, 61.88) for personality 
benchmarks. Thus, correcting for realistic SDs made predictions increasingly redundant. At the 
personality benchmark they were again worse than assuming everyone was average. 
Approach 5 evaluated whether classification accuracy—into low, medium, and high buckets—
differed by predicted score extremeness. Overall, correct classification was 77% for best-case, 
55% for demographic, and 43% for personality benchmarks (33% is chance). Then, I scored 
predicted age by extremeness (1 = “least extreme”, 100 = “most extreme”). Best-case 
classifications were mostly above 50% across extremeness scores, but were again at or below 
50% for edge cases (extremeness = 33 to 34). Prediction accuracy was only > 50% for 
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increasingly extreme cases at demographic (extremeness = 41) and personality (extremeness = 
87) benchmarks. For the personality benchmark, this was the equivalent of only classifying 
infants aged under 2.25 and the elderly aged over 76.00 more than 50% correctly. When 
extremeness > 80, classification accuracy was 98% for best-case and 72% for demographic 
benchmarks, but still only 51% for the personality benchmark. When there were four 
categories, classification accuracy when extremeness > 80 was 92% for best-case, 59% for 
demographic and only 40% for personality. When there were five categories, it was 85% for 
best-case, 50% for demographic and only 33% for personality. Therefore, as simulations 
progressed to realistic accuracies, and/or I increased the number of categories, even extreme 
predictions were incorrect for more than 50% of cases.  
Approach 6 investigated the extent classification errors were compounded when I attempted to 
put the entire big five into buckets. Simulations classified at least one of the five factors 
correctly for > 99% of cases at best-case, 98% of cases at demographic, and 94% of cases at 
personality benchmarks. To find cumulative accuracy, I raised the percent correct for at least 
1/5 big five traits to the powers of two, three, four and five. Correct classification was again > 
50% for only a maximum 4/5 factors for best-case, 3/5 for demographic, and 2/5 for personality 
benchmarks. The likelihood of classifying all 5 factors correctly was 27% for best-case, 5% for 
demographic and 1% for personality benchmarks. By contrast, the likelihood of classifying all 
cases incorrectly was < 1% for best-case, 2% for demographic and 6% for personality. Thus, it 
was unlikely that simulations classified the entire big five correctly at any benchmark. As 
simulations progressed to more realistic accuracies it was more likely that they classified the 
entire big five incorrectly, rather than correctly.  
Finally, approach 7 evaluated the extent that simulations correctly ranked random pairs of 
participants based on their predicted scores. At every benchmark, I evaluated the extent true 
and predicted score ranks matched for 100 random split-half pairings. The mean true age 
difference in pairings was M = 27.11 years (SD = 19.34). Correct classification was 85% for 
best-case, 70% for demographic, and 59% for personality benchmarks. For demographic and 
personality benchmarks, correct classification was nearer to 50/50 chance than 100% correct. 
Thus, it was more parsimonious to conclude prediction models could not differentiate between 
participants at all despite large mean age differences, than to conclude they did so perfectly.  
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3.5. Study 3 
In Study 3, I evaluated whether results also applied to real-world machine learning personality 
predictions from social media data. Real-world prediction model accuracy depends partly on 
sample size, sampling variance, the precise forms of social media data available, and the choice 
of machine learning models. Thus, to increase the generalisability of results, I iteratively 
removed random error from predicted scores until they reached best-case (r = .90), 
demographic (r = .60) and personality (r = .30) benchmarks. Randomly removing errors 
preserved original model robustness and allowed me to evaluate whether predicted score 
accuracies converged across all three studies. 
3.5.1. Method 
3.5.1.1. Participants 
I recruited 1,471 American, British, and Canadian participants. They were retained from an 
original sample of 3,579 participants—who all took part in the first wave of the wider AXA 
study—because they volunteered their Twitter data. This first wave was a convenience sample 
of online survey panel participants from the most easily accessible English-speaking countries. 
It was indented to (a) give preliminary indication of differences in survey response styles 
between even countries with relatively similar cultures; and, (b) be large enough to build robust 
algorithms liking participants’ Twitter behaviour to their survey responses. The full survey 
procedure is in Chapter 1. There were 74% women and the mean age was 36.17 (SD = 13.72).  
3.5.1.2. Materials 
I assessed big five personality using the 120-item IPIP-NEO personality inventory (Johnson, 
2014), which was administered to this and all subsequent waves of AXA participants. Each 
factor was the average of 24 items rated from 1 = “strongly disagree” to 5 = “strongly agree”. 
I used Twitter (a) mentions of other user accounts, and (b) content words (bag of words) and 
(c) phrases (word vector index) from tweets as the model inputs. For each type of Twitter data, 
I created a matrix where each unique behaviour—e.g. a specific account mentioned—had a 
separate column. Then, every participant scored 1 if they engaged in that behaviour and 0 if 
they did not. To mitigate sparsity, I collapsed each form of data into 100 factors using principal 
components analysis. This yielded a total of 300 factors. Then, I converted all factors to z-




3.5.1.3. Procedure   
Many prevailing machine learning approaches use either LASSO or ridge regression to 
mitigate spurious coefficients (e.g. Kosinski et al., 2013). Thus, I used elastic net regression—
which combines the two—to optimize predictions. It is at least as accurate as either approach 
in isolation (Zou & Hastie, 2005). I evaluated model accuracy using 25 different combinations 
of elastic net regression parameters. Then, I repeated this process using 10-fold cross 
validation, which (1) randomly assigns participants to ten groups, (2) creates an exhaustive set 
of models using 9/10 of the groups, and (3) evaluates accuracy by correlating true and predicted 
scores in the excluded group. Overall, this procedure means model accuracy is never artificially 
inflated by using the same participants in model development and evaluation. Each final model 
was the combination of elastic net parameters that had the highest average accuracy across 10-
fold cross validation.  
3.5.1.4. Big Wide Data Saturation  
First, I evaluated the extent the Twitter variables were sufficiently comprehensive to maximize 
raw prediction accuracy. To this end, I used the full sample to generate 10-fold cross validated 
elastic net predictions with an increasing number of Twitter variables. I iteratively generated 
models using just the 1st to all 100 factors from each type of data. Thus, the number of 
predictors increased from 3 to 300, in increments of 3. Total prediction accuracy—with all 300 
predictors—was r = .23 for neuroticism, r = .20 for extraversion, r = .35 for openness, r = .26 
for agreeableness, and r = .21 for conscientiousness. Then, I focussed on average prediction 
accuracy across the big five (r = .25). There was a positive logarithmic association between the 
number of twitter variables and prediction accuracy (b = .05; CI = .04, .05; t(97) = 20.22, p < 
.001). Results are in Figure 3.8. Put another way, accuracy increased rapidly but then plateaued 
at around 80 variables. Thus, adding additional qualitatively similar Twitter variables was 




Figure 3.8. Big five personality prediction accuracy with increasing predictors. Number of predictors is the 
number of different Twitter variables used. There were three categories: mentions of other user accounts, word 
vectors and bags of words. Each category had behaviours that were collapsed into 100 variables using principle 
components analysis. The first variable explained the most total variation in observed behaviours, and so forth. I 
incrementally added variables in threes—one at a time from each category—using the most explanatory variable 
still available. Prediction accuracy was the correlation between true and predicted scores for models with 
incrementally increasing predictors. I averaged accuracy across the entire big five. There was some variability in 
accuracy between adjacent predictor numbers, and thus I show both individual points and the loess line. 
 
3.5.1.5. Big Long Data Saturation  
Then, I evaluated the extent that the sample size was large enough to maximize predication 
accuracy. To this end, I again generated 10-fold cross validated elastic net regression models, 
this time with an increasing number of randomly sampled participants for each of the big five. 
I began with models generated from 350 randomly selected participants, and then incrementally 
increased sample size by 10 until I utilized the entire sample. I repeated this entire procedure 
10 times to increase the stability of the estimates at each increment. There was a positive linear 
association between sample size and prediction accuracy (b < .01; CI = < .01, <.01; t(682) = 
7.86, p < .01). Results are in Figure 3.9. However, inspection of the loess line suggested there 
was also preliminary evidence for a positive logarithmic trend, where accuracy increased 
steeply and then stabilized. However, overall sample size was too small to show this trend in 
full. Thus, sample size was large enough to find reliable evidence that Twitter data contained 




Figure 3.9. Big five personality prediction accuracy as a function of sample size. Sample size was from 350 to 
1,471, increasing in increments of 10. Prediction accuracy was the Pearson’s R correlation between true and 
predicted scores—generated from all 300 Twitter variables—at each sample size, which was then averaged across 
(a) the entire big five and (b) 10 iterations of each model, which each had different randomly selected training 
participants. There was some variability in accuracy between adjacent sample sizes, and thus I show both 
individual points, and the overall loess line trend. The bottom and top lines reflect the minimum and maximum 
average training accuracies observed for any single sample size.   
 
3.5.1.6. Final Predictions  
Finally, I corrected the predictions upwards so that they reached best-case (r = .90), 
demographic (r = .60) and personality (r = .30) benchmarks. To this end, I iteratively removed 
random noise from predicted scores. To this end, I first combined predictions for the entire big 
five. Then, to avoid inflated correlations, I adjusted true score means and SDs for each of the 
big five to match the average (M = 3.37; SD = 0.64). I repeated this process for predicted scores 
(M = 3.37; SD = 0.31). Then, I found the residuals from the correlation between true and 
predicted scores. I randomly removed between 0% and 1% of each residual from its 
corresponding predicted score. I repeated this process until I reached each of the benchmarks, 
and then repeated the entire process 10 times to increase the stability of the estimates. The 
exception was openness for the personality benchmark, which I kept at its raw training accuracy 
(r = .35). To preserve ecological validity, I also increased predicted score SDs so that they 
remained proportional to the magnitude of the upward prediction accuracy adjustment. Thus, 
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they realistically converged with true score SDs. This simulation code is in Appendix 3.3. The 
ratio of predicted to true score SDs was .80 for best-case, .52 for demographic, and .25 for 
personality benchmarks. Thus, they converged with the ratios used in Study 1 and Study 2. 
Finally,  I linearly transformed true personality to match age from Study 1 (M = 35; SD = 18), 
and transformed predicted personality using the coefficients from the true score transformation, 
to aid interpretability. I truncated all true and predicted scores so the range was again 0-80.    
3.5.2. Results  
To preserve original true and predicted score distributions, I generated evidence for 
Approaches 1-7 separately for each big five factor, training accuracy, and iteration. Then, I 
aggregated their MAEs, confidence intervals, and classification accuracies. Thus, I report mean 
MAE, and mean 2.5th and 97.5th percentile confidence intervals for the absolute errors. 
Classification accuracy was the mean percentage correct. Throughout the results, I continue to 
use data linearly transformed to age to enhance interpretability. Nevertheless, the underlying 
data were predicted personality, and thus conclusions apply equally to the big five. Conclusion 
also apply equally to any normally distributed psychology characteristic, with the appropriate 
linear transformation. Table 3.3 (in the Study 2 methods) compares results to studies 1 and 2.  
Approach 1 evaluated whether predicted scores were too imprecise to make inferences about 
specific individuals, even at high training accuracies. Supporting Studies 1 and 2, MAE = 6.09 
(CI = .18, 17.70) for best-case, MAE = 11.30 (CI = .50, 30.86) for demographic, and MAE = 
13.56 (CI = .53, 35.75) for personality benchmarks. For the personality benchmark, I on 
average mistook a 17-year old for a 3-year-old toddler or a 31-year-old. As models progressed 
to realistic accuracies, predictions were again negligibly better than assuming everyone was 
average (MAE = 14.29, CI = 0.63, 35.32). Overall, they were again too imprecise to make 
inferences about specific individuals, at every benchmark. 
Approach 2 evaluated the percentage of plausible predicted scores that were shared between 
the bottom and top 20% of cases. The mean difference in true age between these groups was 
49.42 (SD = 9.60). However, the mean difference was 35.74 (SD = 11.38) for best-case, 15.56 
(SD = 11.05) for demographic and 3.82 (SD = 6.13) for personality benchmarks. Thus, 
differences shrunk when progressing to realistic benchmarks. This corresponded to 2% 
predicted score overlap for best-case, 28% for demographic and 62% for personality 
benchmarks. Overall, at realistic benchmarks the difference in predicted scores between 
extreme cases was negligible, and distributions increasingly overlapped.   
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Approach 3 explored how prediction accuracy changed according to the decile of the original 
score. For the 1st and 10th deciles, MAE = 8.79 (CI = 0.00, 20.27) for best-case, MAE = 20.81 
(CI = 4.83, 36.26) for demographic, and MAE = 27.97 (CI = 16.51, 40.60) for personality 
benchmarks. Although best-case accuracy was superior to the other benchmarks, even it may 
have still been too imprecise to accurately predict specific ages. For the 5th and 6th deciles, 
MAE = 4.69 (CI = 0.20, 14.65) for best-case, MAE = 5.73 (CI = 0.21, 17.65) for demographic, 
and MAE = 3.74 (CI = 0.15, 10.97) for personality benchmarks. Although these were relatively 
precise, it was still at least 1.5 times more accurate to simply assume all participants were 
average. Thus, training accuracy may not have improved enough to make best-case predictions 
for the extreme deciles practical, and it was again more accurate to assume that all middling 
cases were simply the average, regardless of benchmark.  
Approach 4 evaluated how MAE changed as I adjusted the SDs for predicted scores to realistic 
magnitudes. Although there were 18% children in true age, predicted score SD shrinkage meant 
there were 12% children at best-case, 3% at demographic and < 1% at personality benchmarks. 
When predicted age SDs were corrected to match true age, MAE = 5.96 (CI = 0.21, 18.21) for 
best-case, MAE = 12.11 (CI = 0.46, 36.18) for demographic, and MAE = 16.10 (CI = 0.63, 
47.05) for personality benchmarks. For personality, MAE was again worse than assuming 
everyone was average (MAE = 14.29). Thus, correcting for realistic SDs made predictions 
increasingly redundant.   
Approach 5 evaluated whether classification accuracy—into low, medium and high buckets—
differed by predicted score extremeness. Overall, correct classification was 76% for best-case, 
55% for demographic and 42% for personality benchmarks. Then, I ranked predicted scores by 
their extremeness (1 = “least extreme”, 100 = “most extreme”). Best-case classifications were 
mostly above 50/50 chance across extremeness scores, but were again at or below 50% for 
edge cases (extremeness = 33 to 36). Prediction accuracy was only > 50% for increasingly 
extreme cases at demographic (extremeness = 52) and personality (extremeness = 62) 
benchmarks. For personality, this was the equivalent of only classifying cases under 18.54 and 
over 51.15 years more than 50% correctly. When extremeness > 80, classification accuracy 
was 97% for best-case and 76% for demographic benchmarks, but still only 54% for the 
personality benchmark. When there were four categories, it was 95% for best-case, 68% for 
demographic and 45% for personality. When there were five categories it was 91% for best-
case, 60% for demographic and only 38% for personality. Thus, as models progressed to 
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realistic accuracies, even extreme predictions were increasingly difficult to classify correctly, 
especially into more than three categories.  
Approach 6 investigated the extent classification errors were compounded when I attempted to 
classify the entire big five into low, medium and high buckets. For this approach, I treated each 
of the big five from my dataset separately and did not transform them into age. I classified at 
least one of the five factors correctly for > 99% of cases at best-case, 98% at demographic, and 
94% at personality. However, again I only classified > 50% of cases correctly for 4/5 factors 
at best-case, 3/5 at demographic, and 2/5 at personality benchmarks. The likelihood of 
classifying all 5 factors correctly was 24% for best-case, 4% for demographic and 1% for 
personality benchmarks. The likelihood of classifying all cases incorrectly was < 1% for best-
case, 2% for demographic and 6% for personality. Thus, it was unlikely that models classified 
the entire big five correctly at any benchmark, and it was again more likely that they classified 
the big five entirely incorrectly than entirely correctly at the personality benchmark.  
Finally, approach 7 evaluated the extent I correctly ranked random pairs of participants based 
on their predicted scores. At every benchmark, models evaluated the extent true score ranks 
matched predicted score ranks for 100 random split-half pairings. The mean true age difference 
in pairings was M = 19.98 years (SD = 14.67). Correct classification was 86% for best-case, 
71% for demographic, and 60% for personality benchmarks. For demographic and personality 
benchmarks, correct classification was again nearer to chance than being 100% correct. Thus, 
it was more parsimonious to conclude prediction models could not differentiate between 
participants, despite their large mean age difference, than conclude they did so perfectly.  
3.6. Discussion 
Until now, scientists, practitioners and the broader public have assumed that predicted 
psychological characteristics, especially those derived from algorithms using online behaviour, 
are highly accurate for specific individuals (e.g. Golbeck et al., 2011; Kosinski et al., 2013; 
Youyou et a., 2015; Grassegger & Krogerus, 2017). My aim was to directly evaluate the 
veracity of this claim. Although results apply equally to any normally distributed variable, 
interpretations were through the prism of personality because of its topicality and focus in the 
research literature to date, and to evaluate the privacy implications of using predicted 
personality throughout the remainder of this PhD. In three studies, I found fully convergent 
evidence that, at realistic accuracies, individual predictions are only marginally better than 
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chance at capturing specific individuals’ big five personality, differentiating between cases 
with different true scores and correctly bucketing cases into low, medium and high thirds.  
In approach one, I iteratively simulated predicted scores that had almost zero to almost perfect 
associations with true scores. At the best-case hypothetical prediction accuracy—of the kind 
researchers and practitioners might reach sometime in the future—models on average mistook 
a high school senior for a middle schooler or a late college graduate. At the upper limit of 
current demographic predictions, models mistook them for an elementary schooler or a 28-
year-old. At realistic accuracy for current personality predictions, models on average mistook 
them for an infant or a thirty-something. Thus, predictions at all benchmarks may have had 
average errors that were too large to meaningfully correspond to individuals’ true scores. 
In approaches two and three, I found that predicted scores artificially converged on the full 
sample mean. In approach two, I evaluated the distributions of predicted scores for cases with 
the bottom and top 20% of true scores. At the best-case benchmark, there was only 2% overlap 
between predicted scores across the two groups. However, there was greater overlap at 
demographic and personality benchmarks. This resulted in up to a 2/3 chance that predicted 
scores drawn from the bottom 20% also belonged to the distribution of predicted scores from 
the top 20%. Put another way, at realistic accuracies, mean difference between predicted scores 
decreased to the extent that the average retiree was predicted to be only around 5 years older 
than the average primary schooler. In approach three, I evaluated prediction accuracy by true 
score decile. At the best-case benchmark, prediction errors were uniformly inaccurate across 
deciles, by around six years. As accuracy decreased, predictions remained equally inaccurate 
for true scores around the mean. Thus, regardless of benchmark it was at least 1.5 times more 
effective to simply assume all middling cases were the average. However, errors were also 
more inaccurate at the extreme deciles. At demographic and personality benchmarks, MAE 
was 20 and 28 years respectively. Thus, accuracy was driven by reductions in extreme 
prediction errors that—while noteworthy—were again too large to be practicable.  
In approach four, I found that attempts to make predicted scores more realistic also increased 
prediction errors. Imperfect predictions increasingly cluster around the mean, thus undermining 
their capacity to identify real world thresholds—e.g. between children and adults, or non-
extraverts and extraverts. To restore these thresholds, I increased predicted score variation to 
match true score variation. However, this caused error inflation to the point—for the 
personality benchmark—that models on average mistook a 17-year-old for a new borne. At 
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realistic prediction accuracies, corrected scores were in fact worse than simply assuming 
everyone was average. This exposed the tendency for predictions to cluster randomly around 
the mean, which thus obfuscated participants’ true rank order and the subsequent corrections.  
Considering these constraints, researchers might attempt to retroactively categorize predicted 
scores. However, in approaches five and six I found that classifications were usually nearer 
50/50 chance than perfectly correct. In approach five, I found that at realistic accuracies only 
cases with extreme predicted scores were correctly categorized into thirds more than 50% of 
the time. Models also almost perfectly classified the 20% most extreme cases, regardless of 
whether there were three, four or five buckets. However, as they progressed to the personality 
benchmark, there was less than 50% chance of classifying cases between adolescence and late 
middle age—i.e. cases with the middle 2/3 of predicted scores—into their correct thirds. 
Moreover, correct classifications at the personality benchmark plateaued for even the extreme 
cases—which were the easiest to classify because models could only make classification errors 
in one direction—such that the ceiling accuracy was still only marginally better than 50/50 
chance. Correct classifications dropped even more sharply when attempting to use more than 
the minimally viable three categories. Then, approach six found that classification errors were 
compounded across multiple predicted traits. Even for the best-case benchmark, there was only 
a 1/4 chance that models classified the entire big five correctly. Chance fell to 1/20 for the 
demographic benchmark. At the personality benchmark, models were up to 6 times more likely 
to classify individuals’ big five 100% incorrectly than 100% correctly.  
Finally, in approach 7, I found that random pairs’ predicted score ranks were more likely to be 
caused by random chance than perfectly accurate. Although models were nearer perfect rank-
ordering (i.e. > 75% correct classifications) for best-case accuracy, this pattern was inverted at 
demographic and personality benchmarks. At the realistic accuracies, predicted scores 
regularly failed to differentiate between cases that were actually different by 20 years, on 
average. At these accuracies, it was usually more reasonable to assume that predicted score 
rankings were no better than chance than to assume they were perfectly accurate. 
3.6.1. Predicted Big Five Personality 
Best-case predictions—the kind researchers and practitioners might hypothetically achieve in 
the future—(a) reliably differentiate between opposite extreme cases, (b) are almost equally 
efficacious for participants across the entire spectrum of true scores, (c) can be corrected to 
capture some real-world thresholds, (d) can be accurately categorized into thirds on a single 
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variable, especially at extreme values, and (e) are likely to correctly rank randomly drawn pairs 
of participants. Even so, they may still be incorrect to the extent that they miss important 
thresholds, which coincide with qualitative behaviour changes, and cannot be used to reliably 
classify cases across multiple traits. Thus, even this extreme benchmark may only allow some 
restricted conclusions about specific individuals, and only then on a small subset of traits rather 
than their entire psychological profiles. At demographic and personality prediction accuracy 
benchmarks—the best researchers might expect given emergent and current technologies—
scores may have been too imprecise to be practicable, unable to be transformed to capture 
realistic thresholds, and unable to be classified or ranked meaningfully above chance for a large 
portion of cases. At the personality benchmark—which coincides with a ‘medium’ effect in 
social psychology—it was often more parsimonious to conclude predictions were no better 
than assuming everyone was average, rather than to conclude they were totally correct.  
Results highlight that theoretically significant trends—such as that humans leave traces of their 
psychological characteristics like personality online (Golbeck et al., 2011)—are exclusively 
normative. By switching from correlations to absolute prediction error, I found that even 
putatively ‘accurate’ models may not yield informative predictions for specific individuals. 
This may, counter-intuitively, benefit researchers in social psychology. They might use the 
small kernels of accuracy in predictions to evaluate group-level effects without jeopardising 
individual privacy, provided prediction errors are both fully random and offset by increased 
sample power.  
3.6.2. Practical Implications 
This chapter explored the extent online predicted psychological characteristics apply to specific 
individuals, at various feasible and hypothetical future accuracies. I intended for it to help make 
a more informed decision about the appropriateness of using non-consensually obtained 
predicted psychological scores for the upcoming chapters. Overall, my findings suggested that 
they were not intrusive, and might thus be appropriate for further research without obtaining 
explicit consent. Such predicted scores may be especially useful for generating such large data 
that I could (a) test extremely subtle effects for personality on SWB, and (b) quantify the 
average personality of participants’ social networks, local regions, states and countries—to 
examine how social contexts change individual-level effects. However, my PhD evolved as I 
developed this chapter. My focus was increasingly on the more fundamental and still largely 
unanswered question ‘what facet-level personality traits are robustly associated with SWB?’. 
It was possible to begin addressing this question with exclusively AXA self-report data. A 
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benefit was that, unlike algorithm-predicted scores, self-report data only suffers from 
measurement error and not compounded measurement and prediction errors. Nevertheless, 
findings suggest that future research could use online-predicted personality to replicate and 
then extend results throughout the remainder of my PhD, without serious privacy ramifications. 
3.6.3. Wider Privacy Considerations  
Although results ultimately did not inform the direction of subsequent chapters, topics raised 
herein may still have practical implications outside the PhD. I find it important to broach some 
of these implications here—even when they are not the primary focus of the results section—
because of both the topicality of the research area, and the allegations raised against my former 
PhD supervisor.   
First, internet users do not normally have the time or expertise to understand the full 
implications of their consent (Tam et al., 2015). Thus, they must trust that terms and conditions 
converge with their own privacy expectations. Regardless of algorithm precision, a prevailing 
expectation may be that it is only appropriate to use individual-level predictions to market 
consumer products (Custers, van der Hof & Schermer, 2014). Domains like political decision 
making may be sacrosanct. It is imperative to educate the public on the true informativeness of 
predicted scores, and then also obtain explicit informed consent when there is any possible real 
or perceived breach of privacy expectations.  
I must also distinguish between openly disclosed social media information and predicted 
private traits. The former comprises everything from (e.g.) indicating gender on Facebook, to 
buying a blender on Amazon or rating a TV series on Netflix. This information is used by 
recommender systems to suggest either similar products and services—or products and services 
used by similar people—that individuals have a higher-than-chance probability of liking 
(Gomez-Uribe & Hunt, 2016). In some circumstances, these recommendations may be 
extremely accurate (Koutrika, 2018). However, they typically bypass predicted psychological 
characteristics—like personality—which introduce another level of inferential analysis and 
thus cause compounded statistical errors. Instead, to-date the most prominent use of predicted 
private traits is to generate bespoke advertisements for existing recommendations (Sun, Li & 
Zha, 2017). Considering results from the present studies, correct bespoke advertisements may 
occur at slightly better than chance across one or a small number of traits. Notably, any 
marginal benefit must also be offset by the potentially asymmetrical consequences of 
incorrectly targeted ads.   
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Importantly, psychological characteristic predictions may also have optimum fidelity when 
they use relatively few, maximally informative, sources of information. This speaks to the 
phenomenon of overfitting, which is when predictions are idiosyncratic to the specific sample 
and not generalisable to the entire population (James et al., 2013). Relatively uninformative 
social media behaviour may only help predict private traits when it adds more new 
information—over and above other consensually disclosed (e.g.) concrete demographic 
information—than it adds superfluous model complexity. One putative remedy is elastic net. 
It is the prevailing machine learning approach that mitigates overfitting because it extracts 
clusters of related predictors (Zou & Hastie, 2005). However, this means stronger and weaker 
predictors are clustered together, which compromises the fidelity of the stronger predictors 
(Hu, Singh & Scalettar, 2017). Put more simply, it may be preferable to fit only the stronger 
predictors at the outset. In online contexts, the stronger predictors may be openly disclosed and 
face valid demographic variables (e.g. checking a box that one is ‘female’), rather than 
comparatively transitive and ambiguous (e.g.) Facebook Likes. Overall, even when online 
behaviour contains traces of true personality, it may still be useless during modelling.  
Group-level privacy is at least as pressing a concern. In some cases, social media information 
might be used to improve the chances that individuals respond favourably to bespoke 
advertisements for individual recommendations. This is especially relevant in at least two 
cases: sensitive domains in the general adult population, and at-risk groups. A prominent 
sensitive domain is partisan political decision making. Political campaigns will inevitably 
attempt to persuade voters using battery of strategies that transcend officially-stated policy. 
However, there may be consensus that certain types of attempted persuasion are, functionally, 
indistinct from widely rebuked malpractices—such as defamation or coercion—and thus 
unethical. Prominent at-risk groups include children and various adult populations. Such 
groups may have compromised decision-making capacity and thus heightened susceptibility to 
persuasion interventions. In such cases, such targeted interventions may always be unethical.  
3.6.4. Limitations and Future Directions 
There are at least five limitations in the present chapter. First, prediction error magnitude will 
change from study to study depending on the variables/transformations (e.g. age vs income). 
Researchers might reduce absolute error by increasing sample homogeneity. While this may 
cause restriction of range and thus compromise external validity, it may also create some 
instances where numeric predictions are more practicable.  Second, results were based on the 
kind of normally distributed prediction errors typical in general linear models. Although I 
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expect at least some universal support for my conclusions, some findings—e.g. relatively large 
prediction inaccuracy for extreme cases—may be less generalisable to other error distributions. 
The third limitation concerns the analogical use of age to illustrate prediction inaccuracy. 
Meaningful age thresholds (e.g. between children and adults) may not correspond to 
meaningful personality thresholds (e.g. between extraverts and non-extraverts). As such, it may 
be appropriate triangulate across multiple concrete ratio scales. Fourth, allowing unequal 
bucket sizes may have improved categorisation accuracy. For example, disproportionately 
allocating participants to middling buckets may have reduced the likelihood of extreme 
bucketing errors. Finally, prediction accuracies using our Twitter data were lower than those 
observed with other social media data (e.g. Youyou et al., 2015). This may be because of the 
relatively small sample size, sampling variability, or insufficient data heterogeneity. Thus, I 
corrected predictions upwards by removing random noise. Although corrections preserved 
ecological validity because they did not introduce any additional sources of bias, they only 
replicated the results from the other studies using partially real-world data.  
Future research could extend findings to other empirical domains where the individual is the 
unit of analysis. While I demonstrated model inaccuracy for online personality predictions, it 
ought to apply (a) to any normally distributed variable, and (b) in any domain that uses 
normative statistics. Results might hold even when those statistics are used to make inferences 
about internal processes, such as in cognitive neuroscience. It may be especially usefully to 
apply the seven approaches to practical domains, where researchers are interested in both 
validating theory and evaluating practical implications. For example, they could help better 
understand the extent a specific form of intelligence impacts job performance, and the 
effectiveness of targeted advertising on actual voting behaviour. Where the outcome refers to 
an intangible psychological construct—or whenever else a score of zero has no intrinsic 
meaning—researchers might improve comprehension by using concrete and well-known 
analogies, such as age, height, weight, and income. Finally, there could be increased attempts 
to quantify all sources of prediction inaccuracy. For example, measurement imprecision, self-
report bias and legitimate changes in both predictors and outcomes over time may all further 
undermine predicted score accuracies. They might combine with algorithm predictions to 
create multiple, propagating, errors.  
3.6.5. Conclusion  
Emerging computational approaches have the potential to help us live longer, more peacefully, 
and in greater abundance. They can also help augment the ways people interact with the world, 
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potentially enriching their social and intellectual lives. However, realization of these potentials 
might depend on the extent that big data intrudes on individual privacy. Across three studies, I 
found consistent support that predicting psychological characteristics from online behaviour at 
realistic and even best-case future hypothetical accuracies yields insights that are usually too 
imprecise to apply to specific individuals. Results exposed the discrepancy between 
theoretically relevant and individually practicable research. Put another way, people’s 
psychological characteristics may indeed manifest in their quantifiable internet behaviour, 
whilst they simultaneously remain largely unknowable.  
Short of actively disclosing private information (e.g. Facebook Liking the US Republican Party 
or registering for a homosexual dating website)—researchers might only ever extract fuzzy and 
imprecise psychological information that is, at best, marginally better than chance guessing. If 
one was to make a binary assessment about the fidelity of social media algorithm predictions 
using current technology, they would likely conclude it yields zero new psychological insights 
for specific individuals rather than totally accurate insights. Thus, researchers and practitioners 
might place renewed focus on the appropriateness of using predicted variables to evaluate 
group trends. This opens the possibility of building algorithms that unlock the psychological 
profiles of entire databases, for exclusively normative analyses.  
Predicted psychological characteristic scores may still be especially useful during the 
exploratory research phase. Multiple algorithms can be used to construct comprehensive 
private trait profiles for individuals in a database. It is still possible to use error-prone individual 
predicted psychological characteristic scores to find effects between clusters of related 
variables (e.g. via structural equation modelling). Using millions of people from social media 
also means there is likely sufficient statistical power to evaluate very subtle and/or complicated 
effects. Finally, variables can also be averaged upwards to find context-level psychological 
characteristics, where individual prediction errors would cancel each other out. This opens the 
possibility of investigating the extent individual-level effects change across contexts.   
Ultimately, however, I did not proceed with online-predicted psychological scores in the 
remaining PhD. As research for this chapter progressed, I became more interested in addressing 
the fundamental question ‘what personality facets are robustly associated with SWB?’. The 
questions I was beginning to ask could all be addressed with the large self-report database of 
personality scores described in Chapter 1, at least in the first instance. These scores only 
suffered from measurement error, and not combined algorithm prediction and measurement 
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error. Thus, they were better approximations for the target underlying psychological constructs, 
which meant higher fidelity effect size estimates and less risk of confounding due to added 







Rescoring the Balanced Measure of Psychological Needs 
(BMPN) to Capture Subjective Well-Being   
4.1. Abstract 
In the present chapter, I evaluated whether the 18-item balanced measure of psychological 
needs (BMPN)—originally intended to measure the separate feelings of autonomy, 
competence and relatedness—could be rescored to measure overall SWB. To this end, I 
assessed the BMPN, other SWB scales and sociodemographic variables in 28,000+ adult 
participants from between 28 and 33 countries. Using EFA (Study 1), I found consistent 
evidence for two separate factors, which comprised needs satisfaction and needs thwarting. In 
Study 2, I then found that (a) both factor scores converged with other measures of SWB, (b) 
needs satisfaction and needs thwarting disproportionately measured positively and negatively 
valanced SWB respectively, and (c) results replicated across different countries and 
demographic strata (e.g. just women). Then, I found that both needs satisfaction and thwarting 
(d) captured more transitive SWB than the criterion satisfaction with life scale, and (e) 
explained additional unique variation in lifestyle outcomes such as physical health and 
relationship status. Results were not artefacts of response bias or differently worded BMPN 
items. Therefore, I concluded that the BMPN successfully collapsed into needs satisfaction and 
thwarting factors measuring overall SWB. 
4.2. Introduction 
The previous chapter focussed on the feasibility of using online predictions to measure the 
predictor-group—big five personality—which I focus on throughout the remainder of the PhD. 
The present chapter continues this univariate focus by switching to SWB, which is the 
outcome-group. SWB involves self-appraised feelings of suffering and flourishing (Diener, 
1984). To date, its operationalisations include emotion experiences, cognitive reflections and 
the sense of purposefulness (Diener et al., 2017). SWB is a meaningful outcome: there is 
convergent evidence, from such measures and others, that individuals often prioritize 
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maximizing their SWB over their objective well-being (Ryan & Deci, 2001). They may also 
use their SWB to inform contemporaneous religious, purchasing and political decisions 
(Ellison, 1991; Baumeister, 2002; Bok, 2010). Further, SWB may partly cause other important 
individual outcomes, such as professional success, strong relationships and longevity 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1997; Daley, Burge & Hammen, 2000; Diener & Chan, 2011). At the 
aggregate level, both government and private institutions are increasingly monitoring SWB—
as they do GDP and education attainment—and attempting to both mitigate low SWB in 
specific populations and correct for forecasted aggregate-level changes (e.g. The World 
Happiness Report; Helliwell, Layard & Sachs, 2018). Appropriate measurement is essential for 
assessing personality facet associations with an unbiased and comprehensive measure of SWB.  
As I outlined in the General Introduction, however, there may be a lack of scales that unbiasedly 
capture overall SWB. For example, the prevailing tripartite model—comprising negative 
affect, positive affect and life satisfaction—captures an arbitrary subset of only three SWB 
facets. Contrastingly, Ryff’s (1989) psychological well-being framework deliberately ignores 
affect. While more comprehensive scales are emerging—such as the Scales of General Well-
Being (Longo et al., 2017)—these are not yet widely replicated, may overweight facets from 
established sub-fields and disproportionately focus on positively valanced SWB. An alternative 
is to appropriate scales from the mature field of human motivation (Robbins, 2008). 
Specifically, basic psychological needs theory—a component of the hugely influential self-
determination theory (SDT; Ryan & Deci, 2000)—suggests that the combined feelings of 
autonomy, competence and relatedness needs exhaustively cause omnibus SWB. Measuring 
these domains may negate the need to use incomplete, process-oriented, measures. Thus, I aim 
to evaluate whether one prominent operationalization of basic psychological needs theory—
the balanced measure of psychological needs (BMPN)—captures overall SWB.  
4.2.1. BMPN Development and Validation 
The BMPN measures the SDT concept of psychological needs satisfaction. According to SDT, 
all three psychological needs—feeling autonomous, competent and related—are necessary for 
SWB (Ryan & La Guardia, 2000). As such, the psychological needs are most often 
conceptualized as separate mechanisms that explain the benefits of different types of goal 
satisfaction. The 18-item BMPN was originally developed to supersede the existing domain-
general (rather than context-specific; e.g. workplace) measure of psychological needs 
satisfaction (Sheldon & Hilpert, 2012). There are six unambiguously worded items—three 
positively and three negatively valanced—measuring each need. Using confirmatory factor 
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analysis, Sheldon and Hilpert (2012) found evidence for three separate need factors, which 
each had nested facets for feelings of thwarting and satisfaction. Then, they found the three 
factors were positively associated with a composite measure of tripartite SWB. Therefore, there 
was preliminary support that the BMPN captured the three different psychological needs.  
The original BMPN factor structure has since been replicated. Using German university and 
young adult community samples, Neubauer and Voss (2016a, 2016b) used confirmatory 
structural equation modelling to replicate the prevailing BMPN factor and facet structure. 
Then, they also found that its scales were positively associated with life satisfaction and 
negatively associated with depression. Convergently, Chen et al. (2015) administered a 24-
item adaptation of the BMPN—the balanced psychological needs satisfaction and frustration 
scale—to university students from four separate countries, which each spoke a different 
language. Using facet-level analysis, they found that the each of the three needs satisfaction 
facets had positive associations with life satisfaction and vitality, and that each of the three 
needs thwarting facets were positively associated with depression. Results applied equally to 
each country sample. Finally, there is consistent evidence for positive associations between the 
BMPN needs factors and SWB in American, UK and Chilean community populations, as well 
as in heterogeneous multinational students (Martela & Ryan, 2016; Unanue, Dittmar, Vignoles 
& Vansteenkiste, 2014; Yang, Zhang & Sheldon, 2017). Thus, there is further support for the 
robustness of the BMPN across a variety of different research and cultural contexts.  
4.2.2. Alternative Structures in the BMPN 
However, the BMPN may have multiple construct valid structures. The above studies used 
confirmatory factor analytic approaches to find evidence for the superior explanatory power of 
the three-factor solution. However, most of the explained variation in item responses may still 
be accounted for by one or two latent superordinate factors. It is unclear whether the tradeoff 
between increased explanatory power and the increased complexity of their factor structure is 
always worthwhile, especially in research contexts that do not explicitly differentiate between 
two or all three of the psychological needs. Further, the same convergent SWB scales were 
typically used to demonstrate the validity of all three BMPN factors. This may suggest either 
that each scale captures separate aspects of latent SWB, or alternatively that variance shared 
between scales captures a single shared SWB construct. Finally, the main validation studies—
in America and Germany—used young adults. Young adults may experience more asymmetric 
needs satisfaction because they tend to be financially dependent on their family, yoked to 
tertiary training programs or disproportionately motivated to fulfil relatedness and/or autonomy 
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needs (Schulenberg, Sameroff & Cicchetti, 2004). Thus, they may experience greater 
affordances to fulfil just one or two needs, which exaggerates the multi-factor BMPN structure. 
4.2.3. Superordinate Psychological Needs Factors  
SDT provides rationale for a one-factor BMPN solution. It suggests that people are intrinsically 
motivated to fulfil all three of their psychological needs (Ryan & Deci, 2000). While there may 
be differences in need strength—that is, some needs have a higher threshold for fulfilment than 
others—all three are still prerequisites for SWB (Sheldon, Elliot, Kim & Kasser, 2001). For 
example, Reis, Sheldon, Gable, Roscoe and Ryan (2000) found that the combined feelings of 
autonomy, competence and relatedness explained daily fluctuations in positive and negative 
affect, subjective vitality and signs of physical illness. Similarly, Newman, Tay and Diener 
(2014) found that leisure activities enhanced SWB when they activated all the needs pathways, 
alongside feelings of escape and meaning. Even though the psychological needs are 
qualitatively distinct, their satisfaction may still be relatively constant.  
Alternatively, the BMPN may comprise two separate SWB factors. Negatively coded BMPN 
items focus on needs thwarting rather than the mere absence of needs satisfaction. For example, 
relatedness needs thwarting might involve feeling lonely rather than simply not feeling 
connected with close others. Such a two-factor structure—with additional feelings of 
suffering—aligns with the founding premise of positive psychology: that subjective ill- and 
well-being are qualitatively distinct phenomena, rather than simply opposite ends of a single 
continuum (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2014). This was support by Ryff et al. (2006), who 
examined the biological correlates of subjective ill-being and SWB. Averaging across multiple 
measures—e.g. depressive symptoms and trait anxiety, and eudemonia and hedonia—they 
found differences in the extent SWB variables were associated with salivary cortisol, systolic 
blood pressure and cholesterol. Most recently, Vanhove-Meriaux, Martinent and Ferrand 
(2018) evaluated this distinction directly in geriatric participants. They found that omnibus 
needs thwarting was uniquely related to negative affect, and omnibus needs satisfaction was 
uniquely related to positive affect, eudemonia and a sense of vitality. Thus, the basic 
psychological needs may, alternatively, collapse into two superordinate factors.        
4.2.4. Incremental Validity 
To have practical utility, the BMPN must outperform the criterion satisfaction with life scale 
(SLS), which measures general cognitive appraisals of SWB. In the General Introduction, I 
argued that SLS has portions of variation that are both facet-specific and shared with feelings 
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of negative and positive affect. However, Busseri & Sadava’s (2011) review also argues that 
an alternate, prevailing, structure suggests negative and positive affect cause changes in SLS. 
Thus, SLS may be the most central (i.e. mediational) of the three tripartite constructs to overall 
SWB. There are also practical reasons for viewing SLS as the single criterion measure. Life 
satisfaction and affectivity are measured with different surveys. For example, SLS involves 
rating global abstract statements (e.g. “I am satisfied with my life”; Diener, Emmons, Larsen 
& Griffin, 1985). Contrastingly, positive and negative affect may be measured using responses 
about the frequency of emotion experiences (e.g. “Excited”) in specific windows of time (e.g. 
“… the last few weeks”; Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988). Thus, aggregated SWB scores may 
be confounded by differential scale instructions, item wording and/or response options.  
Lucas and Diener’s (2015) review gives further support for the precedence of SLS over positive 
and negative affect. First, they concede a weakness in global retrospective measures of life 
satisfaction: they are either assessed heuristically—quickly, using implicit rules of thumb—or 
require extremely onerous cognitive appraisals about multiple life domains. Nevertheless, they 
also suggest a lack of definitive evidence for moderating variables. They illustrate by citing 
Schwarz & Clore’s (1983) famous finding that weather (sunshine vs rain) changed self-
reported SWB, and that moderation effects were marginal and only replicated in certain 
contexts. Thus, Lucas and Diener (2015) conclude that any more transient effects for affect on 
SWB would manifest as random error rather than systematic confounds. Finally, they suggest 
measures of affect may be more fraught because they are partly determined by extraneous 
factors—many of which are only weakly related to objective life circumstances (e.g. diet, 
current medicines)—multiple reports are needed to establish the central tendency of affect 
experiences and new responses may be especially biased by previous response patterns. 
Overall, SLS may thus be the least imperfect of the tripartite model SWB scales. 
The BMPN may outperform criterion SLS in many ways. It may more unbiasedly capture entire 
SWB because it comprises an equal balance of negatively and positively valanced items. 
Individual items also comprise a more ecologically valid combination of cognitive and 
affective appraisals, rather than artificially delineating the constructs. In addition, BMPN may 
also capture more transitive SWB. The BMPN comprises items that reference contemporary 
experiences (e.g. “… successfully completing difficult tasks and projects”). Thus, any 
extraneous variable must covary with both the potentially stable predictor and the more 
transitive outcome to offer a plausible alternative explanation. This reduces the absolute 
number of possible confounds, thus increasing our confidence in non-spurious effects. By 
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contrast, SLS may be largely determined by features that are relatively stable. In support, 
Diener et al. (2017) found large structural differences in average life satisfaction between 
countries, ethnicities and social classes. Further, Schimmack et al. (2004) found that people 
who are predisposed to experience high cheerfulness (a facet of extraversion) and low 
depression (a facet of neuroticism) may experience particularly high life satisfaction, even after 
accounting for a range of demographic factors. Thus, life satisfaction may itself be a kind of 
stable character trait, at least during adulthood. This makes it especially vulnerable to 
confounding when used as an outcome variable; there are likely a range of covarying stable 
variables—like socio-economic status, education attainment and personality—that cannot all 
be controlled because they would explain away most of the variation in life satisfaction (Heller, 
Judge & Watson, 2002). Thus, they can act as confounders. Overall, such features suggest that 
BMPN may have predictive utility over-and-above SLS, in a variety of research contexts. 
4.2.5. Computational Psychometrics  
For simplicity, I define ‘computational’ as any approach that uses large-scale data to perform 
analyses using automatically changing parameters, which thus yields full patterns of results. 
Most relevant to the present chapter, this includes bootstrapping—i.e. repeatedly generating 
statistical models using random sub-samples—and evaluating relative effect magnitudes for an 
exhaustive combination of variable pairs. Iterative methods, in particular, can enhance existing 
psychometrics. Psychometrics examines whether scales measure their intended psychological 
constructs. At the outset, performing bootstrapped EFA—which evaluates the items that covary 
most together—allows researchers to quantify the extent observed patterns are due to sampling 
error, and adjust confidence in the results accordingly (Hox, Moerbeek & van de Schoot, 2017). 
Iterative approaches may also be especially useful when evaluating discriminant validity, 
which is when theoretically unrelated variables have weak associations. Importantly, weak 
associations may still be significant due to high statistical power, common method variance 
and/or positive manifold (Murayama et al., 2014). Thus, it may be useful to iteratively evaluate 
the relative magnitude of exhaustive convergent (theoretically related) vs discriminant 
associations. Overall, computational psychometric approaches may thus help increase  
confidence in the construct validity of the rescored BMPN.  
4.2.6. Present Studies 
My overall aim was to determine whether BMPN sub-scales could be combined into one or 
two superordinate factors that captured overall SWB. Thus, I used EFA to determine whether 
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there were superordinate factor structures in the BMPN. Then, I evaluated the psychometric 
properties of the emergent factor/s. Specifically, (a) convergent validity was the extent of 
associations with other measures of SWB, in the intuitive directions; (b) discriminant validity 
was the extent associations were larger when variables both captured flourishing or both 
captured suffering; (c) external validity was the extent (a) and (b) held when using deliberately 
unrepresentative sub-samples; (d) pragmatic validity was the extent that BMPN factor/s were 
more associated with transitive convergent measures of SWB than SLS; and, (e) incremental 
validity was when the emergent factors were robustly associated with real-world outcomes 
after controlling for sociodemographic factors, response bias and SLS.  
4.3. Study 1 
Study 1 evaluated the BMPN structure that explained the most variation in individual item 
responses. I theorized that items would collapse into either one factor measuring overall needs 
satisfaction, or two factors measuring needs satisfaction and thwarting. I evaluated all BMPN 
effects relative only to participants’ countrymen. This was because I was interested in 
evaluating BMPN independent of the structural factors that cause country-level differences. I 
used EFA, which meant I could find the endemic structure of BMPN items rather than having 
to pick from a pre-defined structure (as in confirmatory factor analysis). To increase 
objectivity, I used three a priori triangulated criteria to decide how many factors to retain. A 
robust solution was when the metrics converged to suggest the same number of factors.  
4.3.1. Method 
4.3.1.1. Participants  
Participants were the internet panellists who took part in my large multinational AXA survey 
project. The full survey procedure is in Chapter 1. The BMPN was administered in 28/33 
countries. This yielded a subsample of 28,952 participants from the total retained N = 36,498. 
Participants were retained (89%; SDCountry = 5%) because they took > 5 minutes to complete 
the survey, had > 70% non-missing responses and had > .25 response variance in the 
ubiquitously administered NEO-IPIP-120 (Johnson, 2014). Overall, there were 53% men and 
the mean age was 34.42 (SD = 11.70). Participant demographics by country are in Table 4.1. 
There were between 164 and 1,438 participants in each country, of which between 35% and 




4.3.1.2. Materials  
All scales—including the BMPN—were originally developed in English. I used established 
scale translations where possible. The remainder were translated and then back translated to 
English by two expert-language speakers, using the established protocol in cross-cultural 
psychology (Brislin, 1970). When the back-translation failed to converge with the original 
English version, the translators reached consensus on the final wording. Then, a trained social 
psychologist reviewed and approved each final back-translated scale.    
 
Table 4.1 
Participant demographics in countries that were administered the BMPN 
ISO Country Language N % Retained % Male Age (SD) 
ARG Argentina Spanish 1,106 88% 50% 36.24 (12.27) 
AUS Australia English 1,149 90% 47% 40.19 (12.77) 
AUT Austria German 1,240 93% 45% 39.89 (12.62) 
BOL Bolivia Spanish 164 79% 55% 33.19 (12.06) 
CAN Canada English 1,295 91% 38% 35.98 (13.85) 
CHL Chile Spanish 1,121 89% 50% 33.58 (11.14) 
CHN China Mandarin 960 86% 57% 32.93 (8.78) 
COL Colombia Spanish 1,083 94% 66% 30.55 (9.43) 
DEU Germany German 1,128 94% 55% 37.53 (13.42) 
ECU Ecuador Spanish 1,148 84% 47% 34.17 (11.8) 
ESP Spain Spanish 1,014 94% 63% 33.82 (9.7) 
FIN Finland English 1,028 91% 48% 38.36 (12.46) 
GBR United Kingdom English 1,438 92% 35% 35.08 (12.93) 
IND India English 980 91% 78% 30.57 (9.4) 
ITA Italy Italian 1,108 92% 49% 34.68 (10.78) 
JPN Japan Japanese 458 83% 48% 42.11 (12.17) 
KOR South Korea Korean 493 91% 48% 36.92 (11.11) 
MEX Mexico Spanish 1,185 96% 59% 30.09 (9.13) 
PER Peru Spanish 1,078 89% 61% 29.72 (9.64) 
POL Poland Polish 970 89% 66% 30.9 (11.23) 
PRY Paraguay Spanish 980 80% 47% 29.86 (9.04) 
RUS Russia Russian 1,149 94% 46% 36.85 (11.86) 
THA Thailand Thai 1,079 89% 49% 33.95 (9.14) 
TUR Turkey Turkish 1,106 81% 72% 30.56 (9.48) 
TWN Taiwan Mandarin 1,025 84% 50% 34.22 (10.62) 
URY Uruguay Spanish 1,214 85% 45% 35.89 (12.27) 
VEN Venezuela Spanish 1,092 94% 61% 32.41 (10.95) 
ZAF South Africa English  1,161 90% 47% 35.35 (11.44) 
Total 28,952 89% 53% 34.42 (11.70) 
Notes. N = Total number of participants who were retained in each country. 
 
4.3.1.2.1. BMPN  
Of the eligible participants, I retained the 98% who completed every BMPN item. I did not 
impute missing item scores because this may have artificially inflated any emergent factor 
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structure (Siddique, de Chavez, Howe, Cruden, & Brown, 2018). Thus, the final sample size 
was 28,372. There were six items for each psychological need (autonomy, competence, 
relatedness), which were each rated on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = “Strongly disagree”, 5 = 
“Strongly agree”). Three items were reverse coded in each subscale. For the present study, I 
converted items from their original past-tense to present tense, so that they captured current 
appraisals of SWB.  Descriptive statistics, scale intercorrelations and associations with life 
satisfaction are in Table 4.2. This table also includes the intra-class correlation coefficient 
(ICC), which is the proportion of score variation attributable to participants’ country (Aguinis 
et al., 2013). All three original BMPN factor scores were normally distributed, there was no 
evidence for floor or ceiling effects and varied mostly at the individual level. However, internal 
consistency was also below the conventional threshold (α = .70) for inferring that each subscale 
measured a single construct. This was first evidence that an alternate structure may be more 
appropriate. Bivariate associations with satisfaction with life—the established criterion 
measure of SWB in the data—were all positive and approximately the same magnitude. Finally, 
subscale intercorrelations were all also positive and approximately equal magnitude. Notably, 
they were also approximately as large as the internal consistencies. This suggested equal 
magnitude correlations within and between the needs factors. All BMPN items are reported in 
Table 4.3, which is in the Results section.   
 
Table 4.2 
Descriptive statistics for the BMPN relatedness, competence and autonomy subscales  
Subscale Mean (SD) α ICC RSLS (99% CI) RREL (99% CI) RCOM (99% CI) 
Relatedness 3.61 (0.69) .62 5% 0.42 (0.41, 0.44) - - 
Competence 3.44 (0.69) .65 7% 0.43 (0.42, 0.44) 0.56 (0.55, 0.57) - 
Autonomy 3.45 (0.69) .64 6% 0.46 (0.45, 0.47) 0.58 (0.57, 0.59) 0.59 (0.58, 0.6) 
Notes. SLS = Satisfaction with life scale, which was the prevailing criterion measure of SWB. REL 






4.3.1.3.1. Variable Transformations 
I performed three a priori variable transformations prior to the analysis. Within each country, 
I log transformed those continuous variables where skew/SE(skew) > |1|. This helped ensure 
that the regression assumption of normally distributed residuals was met for each separate 
country, and by extension the sample at-large. Also within countries, I converted all BMPN 
items to z-scores (M = 0; SD = 1). This meant that scores were relative to participants’ 
countrymen, rather than absolute. An advantage of z-scores is that they eliminate the need to 
control for country-level main effects because there is no actual variation in country means for 
each BMPN item.2 In support, after z-scoring all ICCs were approximately zero. Finally, 
another benefit was that z-scores held item effect interpretations constant. A unit change always 
equated to an SD change, relative to participants’ countrymen. As a final step, I then also z-
scored BMPN items again, this time across countries. This ensured that they all had exactly 
equal influence when they were summed to create the emergent factor scores. This was 
appropriate because BMPN items were designed to capture different sub-components of SWB. 
If some items had more variability than others, they would have been overrepresented in any 
emergent, aggregate, scores. 
4.3.1.3.2. Exploratory Factor Analysis  
I also selected the EFA approach a priori. It was intended to minimise residuals—rather than 
prioritize fit for certain subgroups of items—because I was interested in the solution that 
explained the maximum variation in the BMPN. I optimized the factor solution using oblique 
rotation because it allows emergent factors to be correlated.3 It is convention to use principal 
components analysis (PCA) to determine the optimum number of factors, and then switch to 
the chosen factor analytic method for the primary analysis. However, PCA factors are always 
orthogonal and may thus fail to converge with a non-orthogonal factor analytic solution (Hox 
et al., 2017). I thus used the specified EFA to both determine the optimum number of factors, 
and to evaluate the final solution.  
  
                                               
2 While it was possible that individual*country level interactions still had effects on SWB, I discounted them 
because (a) they were likely very small, and (b) I was primarily focussed on the individual-level phenomena.  
3 If the factors are uncorrelated, oblique rotation is identical to ‘Varimax’ rotation.  
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4.3.1.3.3. Optimum Factor Structure  
There is no gold-standard method to evaluate the optimum number of BMPN factors. Thus, I 
triangulated Kaiser’s eigenvalue criterion, Cattell’s scree plot criterion and Velicer’s minimum 
average partial (MAP) test (Cohen et al., 2013).4 Kaiser’s and Cattell’s criteria are predicated 
on eigenvalues, which are the extent that using emergent factor weights to aggregate item 
responses explains total variation in their scores, proportional to unweighted aggregation. Thus, 
eigenvalues > 1 explain more item covariation than a factor where all items have weights of 
|1|. The first factor has the highest eigenvalue, followed by the second factor, and so forth.  
The three techniques applied different rules to determine the optimum number of factors. 
Kaiser’s criterion is to simply select the factors with eigenvalues > 1. Thus, it only introduces 
added complexity when there is also added explanatory power. Cattell’s criterion for inspecting 
the scree plot is to select only factors to the left of the inflection point—or the point where the 
trend between factor number (IV) and eigenvalue (DV) changes from steeply negative to 
shallowly negative. Cattell’s criterion thus identifies the superordinate factors that explain 
much more item covariation than the remaining factors. For the present study, I defined the 
inflection point as the first factor where the upper bound 99% CI eigenvalue was < 20% of the 
lower bound 99% CI of the eigenvalue from the first factor. Finally, I also used Velicer’s MAP 
test. It fits separate models for each possible factor solution. Then, it calculates all bivariate 
item correlations after removing variance explained by the emergent factors. It selects the 
factor solution that yields the smallest average squared value of these correlations. As such, it 
suggests the solution where the residuals are most unrelated to one another, and thus unlikely 
to belong to another unaccounted-for latent factor. Overall, all three techniques used different 
criteria to find the most parsimonious emergent factor structure in the BMPN.  
4.3.1.3.4. Bootstrapped Factor Solution 
Like other parametric statistical approaches, EFA is also subject to sampling error. To quantify 
the error around each of my eigenvalue and MAP estimates, as well as my final factor loadings, 
I evaluated the optimum factor structure in 1,000 bootstrapped samples of participants. In each 
iteration, participants were randomly sampled with replacement to match the total sample size. 
                                               
4 I opted not to perform parallel analysis—another prevailing method to determine the optimal EFA solution—
because it defined non-spurious factors as those that had larger eigenvalues than the upper-bound CI of the 
eigenvalue for the corresponding factor in a dataset comprising random simulated and uncorrelated item 
responses. My sample size was so large that the upper bound CI and point estimate random eigenvalues converged 
even when using even stringent 99% CIs. Thus, parallel analysis was likely to yield spurious BMPN factors 
because even factors with marginal eigenvalues were retained.  
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Bootstrapping has been shown to generate accurate error margins across a variety of factor 
analytic and multiple regression approaches (Larsen & Warne, 2010). One thousand samples 
is sufficient to activate central limit theorem, which almost guarantees that results are normally 
distributed and can thus be summarized by the mean (Abranovic, 1997). My 99% CIs were 
0.5th and 99.5th percentile bootstrapped factor loadings. As such, bootstrapping meant I could 
evaluate the plausible range of true population estimates.  
4.3.2. Results 
I used factor analysis to establish the emergent structure of the BMPN. When evaluating scales 
derived from a pre-existing theory—such as the BMPN from SDT—researchers often use 
confirmatory factor analysis because it seeks evidence for a predetermined structure over and 
above plausible alternatives. However, I switched to EFA to evaluate the emergent structure 
of the BMPN. This meant items were free to cluster together into one, two or other alternative 
superordinate SWB factors. I used a triangulated approach to determine the optimum number 
of factors, and then evaluated factor loadings. Overall, I determined the factor solution that 
accounted for the largest possible variation in items that did not also introduce additional, 
unnecessary, factors.  
4.3.2.1. Optimum Number of Factors  
I evaluated the optimum number of factors using Kaiser’s Criterion, Cattell’s criterion and 
Velicer’s MAP test. They were all derived from bootstrapped EFA that minimized residuals 
and allowed factors to be correlated. Plots of the eigenvalues and MAP values are in Figures 
4.1a and 4.1b respectively. According to Kaiser’s criterion, only the eigenvalues for factors 
one (M = 4.00; CI = 3.92, 4.09) and two (M = 2.14; CI = 2.07, 2.21) were greater than the 
threshold of one. According to Cattell’s criterion, only the variation explained by the second 
factor as a proportion of the first factor (59%) was greater than 1/5. Variation explained by the 
third (17%), fourth (11%), fifth (6%) and remaining factors decreased progressively, below the 
20% threshold. Finally, Velicer’s MAP test also yielded a two-factor solution. Both the point 
estimate MAP correlation and its CI (MAP = .012; CI = .012, .012) were smaller than the next-
best, three factor, solution (MAP = .014; CI = .014, .014). As such, the triangulated results all 
converged to suggest that the two-factor solution (a) explained more item covariation than a 
default single factor, (b) explained substantially more item covariation than subsequent factors, 




Figure 4.1a. Eigenvalues for each exploratory BMPN factor. Factor is the number of 
designated factors using oblimin factor analysis—which allows for correlated factors—
with minimized residuals. Eigenvlaues are the added explanatory power of using the 
weights from each pre-defined factor number solution, proportional to the unweighted 
solution. The dashed line is Kaiser’s Criterion, suggesting factors are only retained when 
values > 1. 
 
 
Figure 4.1b. Velicer’s MAP test to determine the optimum number of BMPN factors. 
Factor is the number of designated factors using oblimin factor analysis—which allows for 
correlated factors—with minimized residuals. Average squared bivariate partial 
correlations are the absolute R-values after removing all item variation attributable to the 
designated factors. The dashed line reflects zero partial item correlations, which meant that 





4.3.2.2. Exploratory Factor Analysis Solution  
In the two-factor solution, I theorized that BMPN items would cluster together to measure 
psychological needs satisfaction and thwarting. To this end, I performed the final bootstrapped 
EFA again, specifying two factors. Results are in Table 4.3. All items that measured the 
presence of needs satisfaction loaded positively onto the first factor and negatively onto the 
second factor. Each factor one loading was larger—in absolute terms—than the corresponding 
factor two loading. Eight of the nine items that measured the presence of needs thwarting 
loaded negatively onto the first factor and positively onto the second factor. The only exception 
was “I am struggling doing something I should be good at”, which had a negligible positive 
loading on the first factor and a strong positive loading on the second factor. Thus, it still 
unambiguously loaded onto only the second factor. Each needs thwarting factor two item 
loading was larger—in absolute terms—than the corresponding factor one loading. Thus, they 
showed the exact inverse pattern of loadings. When I set the threshold loading for item retention 
to |0.40|, all items measuring needs satisfaction were retained in factor 1 and all items 
measuring needs thwarting were retained in factor 2. Overall, item loadings thus suggested that 
the first factor exclusively captured needs satisfaction, and the second exclusively captured 
needs thwarting. Differences in loading magnitude suggested that each item measured only one 
of the constructs, rather than both.  
 
Table 4.3 
EFA loadings for each BMPN item 
BMPN Item F1: Satisfaction F2: Thwarting 
I feel a sense of contact with people who care for me… 0.58 (0.56, 0.59) -0.16 (-0.17, -0.14) 
I am lonely. -0.3 (-0.32, -0.29) 0.62 (0.6, 0.63) 
I feel close … with other people who are important to me. 0.6 (0.59, 0.62) -0.2 (-0.22, -0.18) 
I feel unappreciated by one or more important people. -0.18 (-0.19, -0.16) 0.62 (0.6, 0.63) 
I feel … intimacy with the people I spend time with. 0.44 (0.42, 0.46) -0.01 (-0.03, 0.01) 
I have … conflicts with people I usually get along with. -0.06 (-0.08, -0.05) 0.51 (0.49, 0.52) 
I am successfully completing difficult tasks and projects. 0.69 (0.67, 0.7) -0.22 (-0.24, -0.2) 
I am experiencing … failure … at something. -0.28 (-0.3, -0.27) 0.68 (0.67, 0.69) 
I take on and master hard challenges. 0.69 (0.67, 0.7) -0.16 (-0.18, -0.15) 
I do some stupid things that make me feel incompetent. -0.22 (-0.24, -0.21) 0.63 (0.62, 0.65) 
I do well even at hard things. 0.67 (0.65, 0.68) -0.18 (-0.2, -0.16) 
I am struggling doing something I should be good at. 0.04 (0.02, 0.06) 0.42 (0.4, 0.43) 
I am free to do things my own way. 0.54 (0.53, 0.56) -0.23 (-0.24, -0.21) 
I have a lot of pressures I could do without. -0.1 (-0.12, -0.08) 0.58 (0.57, 0.59) 
My choices express my "true self". 0.59 (0.57, 0.6) -0.16 (-0.17, -0.14) 
There are people telling me what I have to do. -0.1 (-0.12, -0.09) 0.54 (0.52, 0.55) 
I am really doing what interests me. 0.6 (0.58, 0.61) -0.25 (-0.26, -0.23) 
I have to do things against my will. -0.17 (-0.19, -0.15) 0.59 (0.58, 0.61) 
Notes. BMPN = Balanced measure of psychological needs  
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4.4. Study 2 
In Study 1, I found support for two separate BMPN factors comprising psychological needs 
satisfaction and thwarting. In Study 2, I evaluated their construct validity. At the outset, I was 
interested in the simple direction of linear regression effects. Then, I switched to examine the 
differential magnitudes of associations between the emergent BMPN factors and various other 
SWB outcomes. Doing so better isolated the different underlying SWB components that needs 
satisfaction and thwarting captured, such as valence and transitiveness. An additional benefit 
was that I could also rule out the possibility that needs thwarting—which fully comprised items 
originally intended to be reverse scored—was not simply a methodological artefact.  
4.4.1. Method 
Construct validity was evaluated using the same participants as Study 1. Participant 
characteristics—other than sex and age—relevant to the present study were binary variables 
about ethnic minority (N = 17,452; 18%; ICC = 11%) and heterosexuality (N = 27,982; 87%; 
ICC = 2%). I used sex, age, ethnicity and sexuality to evaluate the construct validity of needs 
satisfaction and thwarting in specific biased sub-populations, which were taken from the larger 
sample. In addition to the BMPN, I used SLS and all other partial SWB variables completed 
by at least 10,000 participants. In some cases, variables may have been administered to 
participants from a subsample of countries that were unrepresentative of the entire population 
sampled. Nevertheless, I mitigated the risk of confounding by evaluating convergent effects 
from variables in different subsamples.  
4.4.1.1. Materials 
There were six categories of scales: BMPN, life satisfaction, other SWB scales, structural 
markers, lifestyle markers and response bias. Descriptive statistics and associations with 
criterion SLS are in Table 4.4. All continuous scores were normally distributed and there was 
no evidence for floor or ceiling effects. Internal consistency was always above α = .70. Both 
binary variables—religiosity and relationship status—had at least 38% of cases in the smallest 
category. All continuous and binary variables also mostly varied at the individual level. Thus, 






Descriptive statistics for SLS, other SWB scales, structural markers, lifestyle markers and response bias  
Category Variable C N Mean (SD) α ICC RSLS (99% CI) 
Life Satisfaction Satisfaction with life  28 28,089 4.39 (1.43) .87 9% - 
Convergent Scales Positive affect 14 13,406 3.41 (0.78) .91 12% 0.37 (0.35, 0.39) 
Negative affect 14 13,406 2.33 (0.86) .90 6% -0.21 (-0.23, -0.19) 
Cheerfulness  28 28,372 5.22 (1.19) .79 15% 0.54 (0.53, 0.55) 
Depression 28 28,372 3.14 (1.35) .76 8% -0.47 (-0.48, -0.45) 
Happiness 12 11,138 4.69 (1.25) .75 9% 0.61 (0.59, 0.63) 
Structural Marker Social Class 28 27,743 41.52 (22.6) - 10% 0.29 (0.27, 0.3) 
Religiosity 28 27,694 40% - 15% 0.15 (0.14, 0.17) 
Varying Marker Physical Health 28 27,913 63.55 (23.8) - 7% 0.34 (0.33, 0.36) 
Fruit and Veggies 28 27,864 67.71 (23.97) - 4% 0.18 (0.17, 0.2) 
Exercise Frequency 28 27,860 48.79 (31.11) - 6% 0.22 (0.2, 0.23) 
Household Income 17 17,061 39.7 (23.42) - 2% 0.28 (0.26, 0.3) 
Relationship Status 28 27,498 62%  - 2% 0.16 (0.15, 0.18) 
Response Bias 28 28,372 4.18 (0.47) - 7% 0.18 (0.17, 0.2) 
Notes. C = Number of Countries. ICC = Intraclass Correlation Coefficient. SLS = Satisfaction with life scale. 
Fruit and veggies = Fruit and vegetable consumption.  
 
4.4.1.1.1. Needs Satisfaction and Thwarting  
I summed the nine items from the BMPN that were retained in each of the emergent factors. 
Both needs satisfaction (α = .83) and needs deprivation (α = .82) factors had good internal 
consistency. For comparison, I used the Spearman-Brown correction to evaluate the projected 
internal consistency when the three originally six-item BMPN subscales were expanded to have 
nine items. Corrected internal consistency was still markedly lower for autonomy (α = .73), 
competence (α = .74) and relatedness (α = .71). Thus, newly-obtained needs satisfaction and 
thwarting from Study 1 may have more consistently captured their respective underlying SWB 
factors, compared to the existing factor structure. I further evaluate this claim in Chapter 5, 
using multigroup confirmatory factor analysis. Both needs satisfaction (M = 0; SD = 0.66; ICC 
< .01) and thwarting (M = 0; SD = 0.64; ICC < .01) were normally distributed, showed no 
evidence of floor or ceiling effects and varied exclusively at the individual level.5 The two 
factors had a robust small to moderate negative association (R = -.22; CI = -.24, -.21; T(28,370) 
= -38.89; p < .001). This suggested that people experiencing more needs satisfaction also 
experience less needs thwarting on average, and vice versa. That said, there was only 5% shared 
variation. This suggested that the factors also captured largely distinct aspects of SWB.  
  
                                               
5 Final scores comprised items that had already been transformed to have equal influence and capture participants’ 
scores relative to their countrymen. Thus, they all had mean  0, and SD  1.  
99 
 
4.4.1.1.2. Life Satisfaction 
I measured life satisfaction with SLS (Diener et al., 1985). It has demonstrated construct 
validity across a variety of different cultures and language groups. It is also associated with a 
plurality of sociological, health and psychological outcomes (Diener et al., 2018).  SLS 
comprises five items, which are each rated on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = “Strongly disagree”, 
7 = “Strongly agree”). An example item is “I am satisfied with my life”. For the present study, 
I conceptualized it as the criterion—or established gold-standard—measure of SWB.  
4.4.1.1.3. Other Scales  
The other scales—positive affect, negative affect, cheerfulness, depression and happiness—all 
measured predominantly affective components of SWB. Positive affect and negative affect 
were each measured by rating 10 emotion words from the PANAS scale (Watson et al., 1988). 
Participants were asked how frequently they had experienced each emotion “in the past few 
weeks” on a five-point Likert scale (1 = “Very slightly or not at all”; 5 = “Extremely”). An 
example item for positive affect is “Excited”. An example item for negative affect is “Scared”. 
Cheerfulness and depression were constituent facets of NEO-IPIP-120 extraversion and 
neuroticism factors, respectively (Johnson, 2014). In the present study, I measured both 
cheerfulness and depression using their four item sub-scales (both rated on 7-point Likert 
scales;6 1 = “strongly disagree”, 7 = “strongly agree”). Although they are big five facets, I used 
them here because they also capture the direct sensitivity to experience the affective 
components of SWB (Schimmack et al., 2004). An example item for cheerfulness is “Radiate 
joy”. An example item for depression is “Dislike myself”. Happiness was measured with the 
first two items from the four-item subjective happiness scale (Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999).7 
They were both rated on seven-point Likert scales (1 = “Not a very happy person”; 7 = “A very 
happy person”). The items were “In general, I consider myself…” and “Compared with most 
of my peers, I consider myself…”). The positively valanced convergent measures—positive 
affect, cheerfulness and happiness—were all positively associated with SLS. The negatively 
valanced convergent measures—negative affect and depression—were both negatively 
                                               
6 In Chapter 3, the NEO-PI-R was measured using a 5-point Likert scale. However, in subsequent country waves 
I used a seven-point scale. When using this more comprehensive data, I thus transformed the minimum and 
maximum item scores from the first wave to one and seven respectively when evaluating raw descriptive statistics. 
It was unlikely that different Likert scale lengths impacted actual results because personality was z-scored 
separately in each country for all the analyses.   
7 Translations failed for the remaining two items, likely because they had more complex sentence structures. 
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associated with SLS. Thus, there was evidence that all scores converged, in the intuitive 
directions, to measure latent aspects of SWB. 
4.4.1.1.4. Structural Markers 
The structural markers—social class and religiosity—were both sociodemographic variables 
that were (a) relatively stable during adulthood, and (b) have established positive associations 
with SWB, both within and across cultures (Verdugo, 2002; Heiphetz, Spelke & Banaji, 2013). 
Social class was measured with the single item “Where do you place yourself on the following 
spectrum of social class?” on a 100-point sliding scale (1 = “Working class”; 100 = “Upper 
class). Religiosity was measured with the single binary item “Do you currently practise a 
religion? (e.g. Pray, attend regular services)” (1 = “Yes”). Both structural markers were 
positively associated with SLS.   
4.4.1.1.5. Lifestyle Markers 
The lifestyle markers—physical health, fruit and vegetable consumption, exercise frequency 
and relationship status—were all sociodemographic variables that also had established positive 
associations with SWB (Walsh, 2011). They were all measured with single items. Physical 
health was “How do you rate your health in the past 12 months?” and was rated on a 100-point 
sliding scale (1 = “Very poor”; 100 = “Very good”). Fruit and vegetable consumption was 
“How often do you eat fruit and vegetables?”. Exercise frequency was “About how often do 
you do at least 30 minutes of exercise?”. Both were also rated on 100-point sliding scales (1 = 
“Almost never”; 100 = “Every day”). The final variable was binary scored relationship status: 
“Are you currently in a romantic relationship?” (1 = “Yes”). All lifestyle markers were 
positively associated with SLS. Thus, there was evidence that they proxied for SWB. An added 
benefit was that they were anchored to tangible, real-world, circumstances.   
4.4.1.1.6. Response Bias 
Response bias was the tendency for participants to preferentially respond using either the 
minimum or maximum Likert scale endpoints, regardless of question wording. It was the 
average of participants’ responses to the 10/30 NEO-IPIP facets that had an equal balance of 
two positively and two negatively worded items.8 I preferred using exclusively balanced factors 
                                               
8 Prior to calculating response bias, I imputed the 0.11% of item responses that were missing using the multiple 
imputation procedure listed in the ‘Data Preparation’ section below. For expedience, I performed the procedure 
with participants from all countries rather than participants from each country separately. Due to computational 
constraints, I performed multiple imputation using six equal sized blocks of 15 items. Each block comprised 3 
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because—unlike imbalanced factors—scores mitigated artefacts that could have been caused 
by idiosyncratic responses to single items. Low and high scores suggested participants favoured 
the minimum and maximum scale endpoints respectively. There was a positive association 
between response bias and SLS. This was unsurprising because people high in SWB may 
respond to survey scales more agreeably (DeNeve & Cooper, 1998). Thus, I evaluated BMPN 
factor associations after controlling for response bias. 
4.4.1.2. Data Preparation 
Within each country, I again log transformed those continuous variables where skew/SE(skew) 
> |1|. Also, within countries, I converted all continuous variables to z-scores (M = 0; SD = 1). 
This meant that all scores were relative to participants’ countrymen, rather than absolute. After 
z-scoring, all ICCs were approximately zero. Then for each country, I simulated all missing 
variables scores—except for the BMPN—using multiple imputation by chained equations 
(MICE). In the first instance, MICE assigns random values to all missing scores. Then, it 
sequentially generates prediction models for each variable using predictive means matching 
(PMM). The first stage of PMM is linear regression for continuous variables and logistic 
regression for binary variables. It yields predicted values for all non-missing and missing 
scores. Then, each case that originally had a missing value is randomly assigned the true value 
from one of the five non-missing cases with the nearest predicted values. Finally, MICE 
iteratively repeats this procedure (e.g.) five times—the fidelity of predicted scores for each 
missing value increasing with every iteration—and then substitutes the final randomly assigned 
values into the original data. There is evidence that MICE better preserves both original 
variable skewness and realistic random response variability than either simple means 
substitution or the raw predicted values from just one iteration of PMM (Buuren & Groothuis-
Oudshoorn, 2011). Its effectiveness tends to plateau at/beyond five iterations of PMM.  
Then, I evaluated the extent that MICE produced appropriate imputed variable scores for the 
present data. For continuous variables, I evaluated the percentage overlap in histograms of non-
imputed and imputed scores. For binary variables, I evaluated the absolute difference in the 
percentage of non-imputed vs imputed cases that had the variable, subtracted from one. Results 
are in Table 4.5. Overall, there were between 93% and > 99% non-missing cases for each 
variable, and convergence ranged from 83% to 100%. Convergence may have been imperfect 
                                               
items—from different facets—in each factor. There were negligible missing values, and thus minimal opportunity 




because (a) of fluctuations in PMM value assignment, (b) outliers in the imputed data 
suppressed true convergence rates, or (c) there were real differences in the profiles of cases that 
had missing vs non-missing data. Considering the generally high response rates, convergence 
scores and potential mitigating circumstances, I decided that multiply imputed variable scores 
were sufficiently accurate to be included in the final analysis.  
 
Table 4.5 
Multiple imputation diagnostics by variable 
Variable % Non-Missing % Convergence 
Age 93% 97% 
Cheerfulness > 99% 92% 
Depression > 99% 95% 
Exercise Frequency 98% 85% 
Fruit and Veggies 98% 85% 
Happiness 98% 92% 
Heterosexual 97% 97% 
Male 97% 99% 
Minority 98% 96% 
Negative Affect 98% 94% 
Physical Health 98% 83% 
Positive Affect 98% 92% 
Relationship Status 97% 100% 
Religiosity 98% 96% 
Satisfaction with Life 99% 91% 
Social Class 98% 85% 
Notes. % Non-Missing = The percentage of cases that 
originally responded to each variable. % Convergence = 
Overlap in kernel density plots of non-imputed and imputed 
scores for continuous variables, and one minus the absolute 
difference in the percentage prevalences of non-imputed vs 
imputed scores for binary cases.  
 
4.4.1.3. Procedure 
The aim of Study 2 was to evaluate the extent that BMPN needs satisfaction and thwarting 
captured real, construct valid, aspects of latent SWB. Construct validity is itself unobservable, 
and thus it must be inferred by triangulating indirect evidence. In the present study, I did this 
via convergent, discriminant, external, incremental and pragmatic validity.  
Convergent validity was when the BMPN factors were associated with the other partial 
measures of SWB, both before and after controlling for response bias. For example, in needs 
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satisfaction convergent validity was when there were positive associations with the positively 
valanced scales, and negative associations with negatively valanced scales.  
Discriminant validity was when the absolute magnitude of the convergent validity association 
for one BMPN factor was larger than the concomitant association for the other factor. For 
example, there was evidence for discriminant validity when the associations between needs 
satisfaction and other positively valanced SWB scales were larger—in absolute magnitude—
than the associations between needs thwarting and these same scales. I expressed these as 
absolute ratios of point estimate associations and as conservative ratios—which used the 99% 
CI bounds of each association that were most likely to reverse the direction of effects. For 
example, values greater than one suggested associations were stronger for needs satisfaction 
than needs thwarting, and values less than one suggested the inverse. In another application, 
ratios greater than one suggested associations were larger for BMPN than SLS, and ratios less 
than one suggested in the inverse.  
External validity was when there was convergent and discriminant validity for separate sub-
samples comprising each of the 28 countries, and then also subsamples comprising exclusively 
women, men, the youngest-aged third, the middle-aged third, the oldest-aged third, non-
minorities, minorities, non-heterosexuals and heterosexuals. Thus, results helped evaluate 
whether the heterogenous overall sample obfuscated incongruent sub-sample effects.  
Pragmatic validity was when the BMPN measured more transitive aspects of SWB than SLS. 
Transitive variables were positive affect and negative affect, which both captured emotion 
experiences “… in the past few weeks”. Challengingly, the raw magnitudes of associations for 
BMPN factor/s vs SLS could have been confounded by differences in overall scale 
measurement accuracy. Thus, I evaluated whether associations with transitive variables were 
larger than associations with the comparatively stable variables: happiness (experiences “In 
general…”), cheerfulness and depression (stable personality traits), and social class and 
religiosity (structural). For needs satisfaction, I focussed only the positively valanced 
measures—positive affect, happiness and cheerfulness—and social class and religiosity. For 
needs thwarting, I focussed only on the negatively valanced measures—negative affect and 
depression—and social class and religiosity. I evaluated all effects for SLS because it was 
originally designed to measure the whole of SWB.  
Incremental validity was when BMPN factors explained real world phenomena over-and-above 
existing constructs. Thus, I evaluated the associations between BMPN and the lifestyle markers 
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of SWB after controlling for sex, age, response bias and SLS. I fit both needs satisfaction and 
needs thwarting in the same model, thus ruling out the possibility that results were driven by a 
single aggregate BMPN factor that was captured in their shared variation. This helped give 
further evidence for the parsimoniousness of the two-factor solution. 
4.4.2. Results 
I used five psychometric approaches to evaluate the construct validity of needs satisfaction and 
thwarting. My sample size was so large that—after adjusting for country-level variable skew—
any remaining outliers likely had negligible leverage. Thus, I retained all available cases. Four 
study features also protected against the inflated Type 1 error that is potentially caused by 
performing multiple statistical tests. Specifically, I (1) evaluated aggregate effect patterns; (2) 
selected an error threshold (p < .01) that was conservative enough to conclude that most of 
each pattern was unlikely to be caused by sampling error; (3) used enough participants to negate 
the effects of random sample fluctuations; and, (4) likely used heterogenous enough 
participants to negate diverging sub-population effects. 
4.4.2.1. Convergent Validity 
First, I evaluated whether needs satisfaction and thwarting were associated with the other 
partial SWB scales, in the intuitive directions. To this end, I evaluated zero-order bivariate 
associations, as well as associations after controlling for response bias. Results are in Table 
4.6. Needs satisfaction was positively associated with happiness, positive affect and 
cheerfulness, and it was negatively associated with negative affect and depression. Needs 
thwarting was negatively associated with happiness, positive affect and cheerfulness, and 
positively associated with negative affect and depression. Then, effect patterns and magnitudes 
were fully consistent after controlling for response bias. Thus, I concluded that both factors 
were robustly associated with convergent SWB scales.  
4.4.2.2. Discriminant Validity 
Next, I evaluated whether needs satisfaction and thwarting were differentially associated with 
positively and negatively valanced SWB. To this end, I computed absolute effect ratios by 
dividing each needs satisfaction association by its corresponding needs thwarting association. 
I repeated this process for the conservative ratio, using the CI bounds that were most likely to 
reverse the pattern of observed magnitudes. Ratios greater than one thus suggested that the 
needs satisfaction association was larger, and ratios less than one suggested that the needs 
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thwarting association was larger. Results are also in Table 4.6. Needs satisfaction was more 
strongly associated with happiness, positive affect and cheerfulness than needs thwarting. 
Needs thwarting was more strongly associated with negative affect and depression than needs 
satisfaction. All results held using both ratios and conservative ratios, both before and after 
controlling for response bias. Therefore, the needs satisfaction and thwarting factors were more 
associated with SWB experiences of flourishing and suffering respectively. Moreover, findings 
for needs thwarting suggested that the factor measured real underlying SWB; it did not emerge 
simply because its items were all originally designed to be reversed scored.   
 
Table 4.6 
Convergent and discriminant validity of psychological needs satisfaction and thwarting factors  
BMPN Factor Variable 
Zero-order correlations  Controlling for response bias 
R (99% CI) Ratio (Cons) r Ratio (Cons) 
Satisfaction 
Happiness 0.51 (0.49, 0.53) 1.41 (1.28) 0.5 (0.49, 0.52) 1.16 (1.07) 
Positive Affect 0.54 (0.52, 0.55) 4.37 (3.61) 0.51 (0.49, 0.52) 2.28 (2.02) 
Cheerfulness 0.56 (0.55, 0.57) 1.99 (1.86) 0.53 (0.51, 0.54) 1.25 (1.19) 
Negative Affect -0.24 (-0.26, -0.22) 0.39 (0.43) -0.33 (-0.35, -0.31) 0.57 (0.62) 
Depression -0.4 (-0.42, -0.39) 0.70 (0.74) -0.47 (-0.48, -0.46) 0.85 (0.88) 
Thwarting 
Happiness -0.36 (-0.38, -0.34) - -0.43 (-0.45, -0.41) - 
Positive Affect -0.12 (-0.14, -0.1) - -0.22 (-0.24, -0.2) - 
Cheerfulness -0.28 (-0.29, -0.27) - -0.42 (-0.43, -0.41) - 
Negative Affect 0.61 (0.59, 0.62) - 0.57 (0.55, 0.58) - 
Depression 0.57 (0.56, 0.58) - 0.55 (0.54, 0.56) - 
Notes. BMPN = Balanced measure of psychological needs. Variable: split by whether the convergent measure 
captured aspects of flourishing (positive) or suffering (negative). Ratio = The absolute ratio of each needs 
satisfaction vs thwarting association. Ratios > 1 suggested effects were larger for needs satisfaction, and vice 
versa. Cons = The absolute ratio of the CIs for needs satisfaction and thwarting effects that were most likely to 
cross the threshold of one, thus giving evidence against the discriminant validity of the BMPN factors.  
 
4.4.2.3. External Validity  
Next, I evaluated whether convergent and discriminant validity held when using deliberately 
unrepresentative participants. To this end, I replicated sample-wide findings separately for 
participants in each country, and separately again for women and men, the youngest, middle 
and oldest participants, non-minorities and minorities, and non-heterosexuals and 
heterosexuals. For simplicity, I focussed on zero-order associations. Results are in Table 4.7. 
For countries, I first found that internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha) for needs satisfaction 
(M = .84; CI = .83, .85) and needs thwarting factors (M = .80; CI = .77, .81) were both 
consistently strong. Then, I replicated the full pattern of convergent and discriminant 
associations for both factors. There was matching support for BMPN external validity using 
biased demographic samples. Internal consistency for needs satisfaction (M = .84; CI = .83, 
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.85) and needs thwarting factors (M = .82; CI = .81, .83) were both consistently strong. Then, 
I again replicated the full pattern of convergent and discriminant associations. Overall, results 
suggested that sample-wide effects did not obfuscate diverging sub-population effects. 
 
Table 4.7 
Convergent and discriminant validity of psychological needs satisfaction and thwarting factors 
for different, unrepresentative, sub-populations 
Samples BMPN Factor Variable R (99% CI) Ratio (Cons. ratio) 
Countries 
Satisfaction 
Happiness 0.51 (0.44, 0.57) 4.34 (1.33) 
Positive Affect 0.53 (0.46, 0.59) 12.02 (2.48) 
Cheerfulness 0.55 (0.49, 0.61) 4.86 (1.62) 
Negative Affect -0.22 (-0.3, -0.14) 0.37 (0.57) 
Depression -0.39 (-0.46, -0.32) 0.69 (0.92) 
Thwarting 
Happiness -0.36 (-0.43, -0.28) - 
Positive Affect -0.09 (-0.17, 0) - 
Cheerfulness -0.27 (-0.35, -0.19) - 
Negative Affect 0.6 (0.54, 0.65) - 
Depression 0.57 (0.51, 0.62) - 
Demographics 
Satisfaction 
Happiness 0.51 (0.48, 0.54) 1.55 (1.29) 
Positive Affect 0.54 (0.51, 0.56) 5.81 (3.62) 
Cheerfulness 0.56 (0.54, 0.58) 2.26 (1.93) 
Negative Affect -0.22 (-0.25, -0.18) 0.36 (0.44) 
Depression -0.39 (-0.41, -0.36) 0.68 (0.75) 
Thwarting 
Happiness -0.34 (-0.38, -0.31) - 
Positive Affect -0.11 (-0.15, -0.07) - 
Cheerfulness -0.26 (-0.29, -0.24) - 
Negative Affect 0.6 (0.58, 0.63) - 
Depression 0.57 (0.55, 0.58) - 
Notes.  Countries = Each of the 28 countries sampled separately; Demographics = samples using 
just men, women, young, middle aged, old, minority, non-minority, heterosexual and non-
heterosexual cases. Valence = whether the convergent measure captured negative/positive SWB. 
BMPN factors were only validated against scales with the corresponding valence. The 99% CI 
was the mean ± 2.58*SE because the sample size of effects was too small to provide bootstrapped 
CIs. Ratio = the absolute ratio of needs satisfaction to thwarting associations. Cons. ratio = the 
absolute ratio of the CIs for needs satisfaction effects that yielded values most likely to cross the 
threshold of one, and thus provide evidence against the discriminant validity of the BMPN scales.  
 
4.4.2.4. Pragmatic Validity 
Next, I evaluated whether needs satisfaction and thwarting were more associated with transitive 
than stable SWB, compared to SLS. As a preliminary step, I evaluated bivariate associations 
between the BMPN factors and SLS. There was a robust positive association for needs 
satisfaction (r = .49; CI = .58, .50; t(28,370) = 93.92, p < .001) and a robust negative association 
for needs thwarting (r = -.30; CI = -.32, -.29; t(28,370) = -53.57, p < .001). The magnitude of 
the needs satisfaction association may have been larger because SLS measured more positively 
than negatively valanced SWB.  
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Both BMPN factors were more associated with transitive SWB than stable SWB, compared to 
SLS. For needs satisfaction, I computed the ratio of associations between transitive positive 
affect and each of the other more stable positively valanced and structural measures of SWB. 
I did likewise for needs thwarting with transitive negative affect and each of the other more 
stable negatively valanced and structural measures of SWB. Then, I computed corresponding 
ratios for SLS. Finally, I divided each BMPN ratio by the corresponding SLS ratio. Thus, the 
ratios-of-ratios totally controlled for differences in scale accuracy, as well as different overall 
magnitudes of bivariate associations between BMPN and SLS. Scores greater than one 
suggested the BMPN had stronger relative associations with transitive SWB than life 
satisfaction, and scores less than one suggested the inverse. Results are in Table 4.8. Overall, 
both the ratio-of-ratio point estimate and conservative estimate—which again used the CI 
bounds that were most likely to reverse effects—were consistently above one for both needs 
satisfaction and needs thwarting. Thus, there was also consistent evidence that the BMPN 




Relative magnitude of needs satisfaction and thwarting associations for transitive vs stable convergent measures 
of SWB, compared to SLS associations  
DV Transitiveness Convergent Measure R (CI) Num. Rat. (Cons) R-of-R (Cons)  
NS 
Transitive Positive Affect 0.54 (0.52, 0.55) - - - 
Stable 
Cheer 0.56 (0.55, 0.57) PA 0.96 (1) 1.34 (1.32) 
Happiness  0.51 (0.49, 0.53) PA 1.06 (0.98) 1.79 (1.56) 
Social Class 0.16 (0.15, 0.18) PA 3.38 (2.89) 2.53 (2.46) 
Religious 0.08 (0.06, 0.09) PA 6.75 (5.78) 2.06 (2.21) 
NT 
Transitive Negative Affect 0.61 (0.59, 0.62) - - - 
Stable  
Depression 0.57 (0.56, 0.58) NA 1.07 (1.02) 2.19 (1.81) 
Social Class -0.08 (-0.1, -0.07) NA 7.62 (5.9) 9.8 (6.67) 
Religious -0.02 (-0.03, 0) NA 30.5 (19.67) 15.98 (13.46) 
SLS  
Transitive 
Positive Affect 0.36 (0.34, 0.37) - - - 
Negative Affect  -0.21 (-0.23, -0.19) - - - 
Stable 
Cheer 0.5 (0.49, 0.51) PA 0.72 (0.76) - 
Happiness 0.61 (0.59, 0.62) PA 0.59 (0.63) - 
Depression  -0.43 (-0.44, -0.41) NA 0.49 (0.56) - 
Social Class 0.27 (0.26, 0.29) 
PA 1.33 (1.17) - 
NA 0.78 (0.88) - 
Religious 0.11 (0.1, 0.13) 
PA 3.27 (2.62) - 
NA 1.91 (1.46) - 
Notes.  DV: NS = Needs satisfaction, NT = Needs thwarting, SLS = Satisfaction with life scale. Num. = Numerator 
used in calculating the ratio and ratio-of-ratios. It was always one of the two transitive convergent measures of 
SWB: positive affect or negative affect. The denominator was always the comparatively stable convergent 
measure. I computed an exhaustive set of pairwise ratios with transitive and stable effects, but only for those 
variables that had matching valence. Thus, the effect for positive affect was calculated relative to cheerfulness 
and happiness, and the effect for negative affect was calculated relative to depression. Social class and religiosity 
were relative to both positive and negative affect. Ratios were absolute. Cons = The absolute ratio of the CIs for 
needs satisfaction and thwarting, and SLS, effects that yielded values most likely to cross one. R-of-R = Needs 
satisfaction and deprivation thwarting ratios, divided by their corresponding satisfaction with life ratios. Scores 
greater than one meant the BMPN captured more transitive SWB than SLS. Conservative R-of-R’s could 
sometimes be larger than the point estimates, when the widths of CIs for BMPN and SLS associations diverged.  
 
4.4.2.5. Incremental Validity 
Finally, I evaluated whether needs satisfaction and thwarting were associated with concrete 
lifestyle outcomes over and above other existing measures. To this end, I fit single multiple 
regression models for each outcome—physical health, fruit and vegetable consumption, 
exercise frequency and relationship status—controlling for sex, age, response bias, satisfaction 
with life and the shared variation in BMPN factors. Results are in Table 4.9. As a preliminary 
step, I evaluated the effects for just controls on physical health, which was the most 
heterogeneous of the target outcomes. Overall, being male and increasing SLS were both 
positively associated with health. Age and response bias were negatively associated with 
physical health. Then, I evaluated needs satisfaction and thwarting effects for each lifestyle 
outcome, with controls. There were consistent positive associations for needs satisfaction and 
consistent negative associations for needs thwarting. Therefore, there was also evidence that 
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both factors explained unique aspects of SWB that were not captured by criterion SLS, the 
controls or response bias.  
 
Table 4.9 
Incremental validity of needs satisfaction and thwarting associations  
Outcome Variable B (99% CI)  T-value  P-Value 
Physical Health 
Intercept -0.08 (-0.1, -0.06) -9.55 < .001 
Age -0.07 (-0.08, -0.05) -11.71 < .001 
Response bias -0.04 (-0.06, -0.03) -7.17 < .001 
Sex 0.15 (0.12, 0.18) 13.17 < .001 
Satisfaction with life 0.32 (0.31, 0.34) 56.58 < .001 
Physical Health 
Satisfaction 0.17 (0.14, 0.2) 17.00 < .001 
Thwarting -0.21 (-0.24, -0.19) -20.59 < .001 
Fruit and Vegetable  
Consumption 
Satisfaction 0.21 (0.18, 0.23) 19.79 < .001 
Thwarting -0.11 (-0.14, -0.09) -10.51 < .001 
Exercise Frequency 
Satisfaction 0.19 (0.16, 0.21) 17.76 < .001 
Thwarting -0.07 (-0.1, -0.04) -6.38 < .001 
Relationship Status 
Satisfaction 0.1 (0.04, 0.16) 4.35 < .001 
Thwarting -0.1 (-0.16, -0.04) -4.21 < .001 
Notes. SLS = Satisfaction with life. Control variables: age, response bias, sex and SLS. 
For expedience, the intercept and control effects were only reported for physical health, 
without including the BMPN. All BMPN effects were reported after fitting controls. 
  
4.5. Discussion 
In this chapter, I evaluated whether the BMPN could be rescored to measure overall SWB. I 
relaxed the assumption that it comprised three separate factors—autonomy, competence and 
relatedness—to instead find its endemic structure, using EFA. There was consistent evidence 
that two factors explained (a) item covariation better than a single factor that simply added all 
the items together, and (b) much more item covariation than subsequent factors. Two factors 
were also (c) least likely to produce additional unaccounted-for factors. Then, in the two-factor 
solution, I found that items clustered together to measure separate psychological needs 
satisfaction and psychological needs thwarting. All items loaded more strongly onto their own 
factor than the other factor. Moreover, 15/16 items were negatively associated with the 
opposing factor. This suggested that they measured largely distinct facets of SWB. 
Then, I evaluated whether needs satisfaction and thwarting captured construct valid SWB. 
First, I evaluated the extent that they were associated with other, partial, SWB scales. Needs 
satisfaction was positively associated with positive affect, cheerfulness and happiness, and 
negatively associated with negative affect and depression. Needs thwarting was negatively 
associated with positive affect, cheerfulness and happiness, and positively associated with 
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negative affect and depression. Thus, all effects were exactly opposite and in the expected 
directions. Then, I found that needs satisfaction was more strongly associated with the 
positively valanced SWB scales than needs thwarting, and vice versa. Results held comparing 
both point estimate associations, and the 99% CI bounds of each association that were most 
likely to reverse the observed magnitudes. Thus, needs satisfaction and thwarting may 
disproportionately capture aspects of SWB associated with flourishing and suffering, 
respectively. All these convergent and discriminant associations emerged in both the sample at 
large, and in participants from each separate country and a variety of unrepresentative 
demographic strata (e.g. just young adults, just ethnic minorities). Therefore, the large 
heterogeneous sample also did not obfuscate diverging effects for noteworthy sub-populations.  
Finally, I evaluated the utility of the BMPN factors compared to existing measures. I evaluated 
whether it captured more transitive SWB than life satisfaction. First, I examined the magnitude 
of associations between needs satisfaction and positive affect—and needs thwarting and 
negative affect—relative to associations from the more stable SWB variables and structural 
markers. Then, I evaluated each ratio relative to the corresponding ratio involving SLS 
associations.  In every instance, both the point estimate and conservative ratios suggested that 
the BMPN factors were more strongly associated with transitive SWB than SLS. Finally, I 
evaluated whether the BMPN was associated with lifestyle outcomes even after controlling for 
possible confounds, as well as SLS. Specifically, I controlled for age, sex, response bias, SLS 
and the variance shared by both BMPN factors. Overall, there was fully consistent evidence 
that needs satisfaction was positively associated—and needs thwarting was negatively 
associated—with physical health, fruit and vegetable consumption, exercise frequency and 
whether individuals were in a relationship. Thus, there was consistent evidence needs 
satisfaction and thwarting both explained more transitive SWB than life satisfaction, as well as 
unique variation in concrete lifestyle markers of SWB.  
4.5.1. Implications 
This chapter may have measurement, theoretical and research design implications. From a 
measurement perspective, there was evidence BMPN can be rescored to form two 
superordinate factors that capture overall psychological needs satisfaction and thwarting.  
When used in this way, the BMPN may be one of the few short scales that captures total 
SWB—at least according to SDT—rather than just one or a few biased sub-component. It also 
has demonstrated construct validity in heterogenous countries and languages (Linton, Dieppe 
& Medina-Lara, 2016; Chen et al., 2015). As such, researchers might expand the uses of the 
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BMPN, as well as potentially other psychological needs scales, to measure omnibus SWB. 
Theoretically, BMPN scales captured two largely dissociable, construct valid components of 
SWB. In previous studies, any emergent factor with just negatively phrased items was 
considered an artefact. However, I found that both factor scores—each with exclusively 
positively or negatively worded items—converged with other SWB scales even after 
controlling for response bias. Moreover, both had real and superior explanatory power when 
accounting for SWB phenomena that matched their valence.  
Practically, researchers may use needs satisfaction and/or thwarting as their primary measure 
of SWB. Although SLS may be particularly good at capturing the well-being implications of 
long-term structural SWB factors—like ethnicity and social class—results in this chapter 
suggest that it is less sensitive to transitive SWB phenomena than BMPN. In some 
circumstances, using BMPN might thus help establish the correct temporal sequence between 
the predictor and outcome, which mitigates the risks of confounding and reverse causation. 
Results also suggested that BMPN explained unique variation in lifestyle phenomena after 
accounting for SLS. As such, researchers may prefer the BMPN in some contexts. 
4.5.2. Limitations and Future Directions 
Nevertheless, there are at least four limitations. First, I established convergent and discriminant 
validity using exclusively self-report. Effects could have been conflated by common method 
variance or participants’ general lack of self-awareness. Second, I focussed on relative rather 
than absolute effect sizes. Thus, I could conclude BMPN factors were more associated with 
one aspect of SWB over another, but not that they objectively measured that aspect. Third, in 
pragmatic validity there was only one transitive variable—positive/negative affect—for both 
needs satisfaction and thwarting. This increased the risk of confounding. Finally, I only 
compared the utility of the BMPN to SLS. Although SLS is a prevailing measure of SWB, 
there may now be more comprehensive criterion measures, such as the scales of general well-
being (Longo et al., 2017). Thus, I could only conclude that the BMPN may be preferable to 
SLS, and not necessarily another more comprehensive scale, in some research contexts. 
Future research can help increase the certainty of findings. For example, the construct validity 
of BMPN needs satisfaction and thwarting factors would be improved by (a) using both self- 
and peer-reported convergent variables, (b) evaluating results using ratio scales—where zero-
values have meaningful interpretations (e.g. dopamine level)—which allow researchers to 
evaluate absolute and not relative effect patterns, and (c) measuring outcomes longitudinally 
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to better establish the correct temporal sequence (e.g. of incremental validity associations). 
Researchers would also benefit from using a fuller suite of representative (rather than ad hoc) 
convergent SWB scales. This would help confirm whether BMPN unbiasedly captures the 
entire construct. Finally, it is unclear whether two superordinate two factor BMPN structure 
generalises to other psychological needs scales.  
4.5.3. Conclusion  
The rescored BMPN addresses the need for a comprehensive measure of SWB. A product of 
the mature literature on human motivation, it was originally designed to capture the separate 
feelings of autonomy, competence and relatedness. When aggregated, however, I found 
extremely consistent evidence that it also captures the superordinate SWB experiences of 
flourishing and suffering. Then, I also found that the BMPN captures more transitive SWB 
than life satisfaction, and uniquely predicts various lifestyle outcomes over and above plausible 
covariates. Finally, both the superordinate BMPN structure—and support for its construct 
validity—may be extremely consistent across a variety of populations and iterative 
computational approaches. As such, there is evidence it is an especially robust, and novel, 





Propensity Score Matching Increases the Internal 
Validity of Big Five Facets Effects on SWB 
5.1. Abstract 
A large body of research has investigated how personality differences predict SWB. However, 
it is difficult to investigate the role of individual big five personality facets because they have 
complex intercorrelations both within and between factors. Thus, controlling for all potentially 
covarying facets might increase multicollinearity—when correlated facets cancel each other 
out despite having real associations with SWB—while relaxing controls risks confounding. I 
propose that propensity score matching (PSM) mitigates this tradeoff. PSM is a sampling 
strategy that selects participants who differ on the facet of interest but are similar across the 
remaining facets. Thus, it may hold potentially confounding facets relatively constant without 
risking multicollinearity. Using the large multinational AXA sample (N = 36,498), I found that 
PSM held covariates 74% to 80% more constant than zero-order correlations, preserved non-
negligible effect sizes and replicated established neuroticism and extraversion factor 
associations better than multiple regression. PSM also better isolated individual facet effects 
than the prevailing machine learning alternative: elastic net regression. Therefore, I used PSM 
to isolate the full range of facet associations with both needs thwarting and needs satisfaction 
SWB, as well as convergent SLS and health. There were consistent and noteworthy (r > .10) 
negative associations for depression and vulnerability, and consistent and noteworthy positive 
associations for cheerfulness, friendliness, gregariousness, self-efficacy and self-discipline. 
There was also evidence for different effect patterns in both agreeableness (morality, 
cooperation, and altruism) and conscientiousness (cautiousness and achievement-striving) 
across needs thwarting and needs satisfaction. Overall, PSM might lessen the tradeoff between 
confounding and multicollinearity, and thus offer a more internally valid approach to 
describing bivariate facet-SWB effects than conventional zero-order correlations and multiple 




In the previous two chapters, I evaluated univariate measurement issues concerning the big five 
facet predictors and the SWB outcomes. Now, I switch to their bivariate associations. These 
are an essential first-step in most empirical psychology research. They are an efficient way of 
assessing, preliminarily, whether theoretically plausible associations manifest in real world 
populations. That is, they can help inform whether an effect is large enough to warrant further 
investigation (Grissom & Kim, 2005). Moreover, they might give some indication of relative 
effect magnitudes, which can help direct research infrastructure to the most promising 
phenomena. When studying the big five and SWB, high-specificity facet-level analyses may 
be especially interesting because their effects are feasibly guided by discrete mechanisms, 
which might thus yield both actionable theory and precise applied insights.  
However, to date methodological artefacts have obfuscated true facet-SWB associations. 
Although the big five are nominally orthogonal, facets in different factors may form 
overlapping or superordinate structures (Saucier & Ostendorf, 1999; Musek, 2007). That is, 
they may be correlated both within and between factors. This increases the risk of confounding 
because associations may be attributable to a wide plurality of unaccounted-for facets. Existing 
research has attempted to limit confounding by using stepwise and multiple regression. 
Problematically, these cannot tolerate the full range of facet covariates, which often causes 
multicollinearity (Thompson, 1995; Cohen et al., 2013). Multicollinearity is when the variation 
shared between two or more facets is totally removed from the statistical model, such that the 
target facet (a) is no longer representative of its underlying psychological construct, and/or (b) 
disproportionately comprises random response error (Kraha, Turner, Nimon, Zientek & 
Henson, 2012). Multicollinearity may cause effects to artificially change, and often to shrink. 
The consequence is that existing research inconsistently links between two facets—one of 
which is depression—and at least eight facets to SWB. It also contradicts the wider range of 
effects found in adjacent literatures.  
Thus, I adapt propensity score matching (PSM) to lessen this confounding-multicollinearity 
tradeoff. PSM is underpinned by a simple premise: a covariate cannot confound when it does 
not vary (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985). It involves selecting participants for analysis who differ 
on the primary variable of interest but are similar on the remaining covariates. To date, PSM 
has been mostly used to increase the internal validity of experimental studies, especially when 
there is small sample size (Lu & Lemeshow, 2018). For example, Gupta, Han, Mortal, Silveri 
and Turban (2018) recently used it to find that women CEOs are subject to more shareholder 
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dissent than matched male CEOs. The present chapter aims to evaluate whether PSM improves 
the internal validity of continuous personality facet associations with SWB without increasing 
multicollinearity, compared to feasible alternatives. Then, I use PSM to evaluate the full pattern 
of more internally valid big five facet associations with SWB.    
5.2.1. Big Five Personality and SWB 
The big five may capture a relatively universal structure of personality. It comprises putatively 
orthogonal neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness and conscientiousness factors. 
It was a consolidation of the three prevailing theoretical traits at the time, and the two additional 
traits that consistently emerged in natural language (McCrae & Costa, 2017). Then, the big five 
structure was demonstrated in the major countervailing models of personality (see John & 
Srivastava, 1999). Since then, it has emerged in most cultures and languages tested (e.g. 
McCrae & Terracciano, 2005). The big five is also hierarchical. Costa & MacCrae (1992) found 
each of the big five has six subordinate facets. For example, neuroticism is the constellation of 
anxiety, anger, depression, self-consciousness, immoderation and vulnerability. This facet 
structure has also been widely replicated (McCrae, Costa, Del Pilar, Rolland & Parker, 1998; 
McCrae & Allik, 2002).  Thus, the big five factors and their facets are sufficiently universal to 
be considered a gold-standard conceptualization of personality.  
There has been extensive research on the big five factor associations with SWB.  DeNeve and 
Cooper (1998) conducted the first large-scale review. Using prevailing personality constructs 
at the time, they found a negative association for neuroticism and a positive association for 
positive affect, which was captured in extraversion and agreeableness. In their updated meta-
analysis, Steel et al. (2008) focussed exclusively on big five questionnaires. They found that 
associations were larger than previously observed, and especially strong for neuroticism (-) and 
extraversion (+) across a variety of different well-being measures. There were also positive 
associations for agreeableness and conscientiousness. More recently, Soto (2015) confirmed 
these findings longitudinally, using a large (N > 16,000) nationally representative Australian 
sample. Lamers, Westerhof, Kovács & Bohlmeijer (2012)—also using nationally 
representative panel data, from the Netherlands—highlighted the differential big five effects 
for suffering and flourishing. They found that low neuroticism disproportionally protected 
against mental illness, and high extraversion and then agreeableness disproportionately 
promoted positive mental health. Overall, findings implicate 4/5 of personality in SWB.  
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However, factor-level findings are likely too high-bandwidth to either be actionable or isolate 
single mechanisms. High-specificity facet-level associations are the most comprehensive 
remedy. As I outlined in the General Introduction, existing stepwise approaches implicate trait 
depression, and then either cheerfulness or achievement striving (Schimmack et al., 2004; 
Quevedo & Abella, 2011). Contrastingly multiple regression implicates up to 8/30 facets from 
neuroticism, extraversion and conscientiousness (Albuquerque et al., 2010; Anglim & Grant, 
2016). Adjacent literatures suggest the additional SWB benefits of prosocial cooperation and 
altruism—perhaps through building social capitol (Helliwell, 2006). Among others, they also 
highlight the benefits of agency, through assertiveness and self-efficacy—perhaps because 
these traits promote environmental mastery (Sheldon & Elliot, 1999). Overall, there are a range 
of existing documented effects. 
5.2.2. Limitations in Existing Research 
However, existing facet effects contradict each other. The only consensus is that trait 
depression reduces SWB. However, adjacent lines of research suggest more pluralistic 
associations. These contradictions may be caused by complex facet intercorrelations—both 
within and between the big five—that make it difficult to control for the full range of other, 
potentially confounding, personality facets.  
Evidence for complex facet intercorrelations is that the factors are not actually orthogonal. 
During its conception, the big five hierarchical structure was challenged by circumplex 
approaches (Saucier & Ostendorf, 1999). Circumplex approaches suggest that facets may be 
differentially associated with their respective factors, and that each facet might uniquely covary 
with facets in different factors. For example, the influential agency-communion circumplex 
may capture predominantly aspects of conscientiousness and agreeableness respectively 
(Smith, Gallo, Goble, Ngu & Stark, 1998). Although the exact nature of the circumplex may 
depend on culture (Costa & McCrae, 1995), its prevalence still questions the strict hierarchical 
structure of the big five.  
This criticism has since been corroborated by the emergence of a general factor. In their re-
evaluation of two previous meta-analyses on the structure of personality, Rushton and Irwing 
(2008) found that a single meta-factor accounted for around 45% of total variation in the entire 
big five. Just’s (2011) review found that each factor score had undesirable and desirable 
endpoints, and that responding was relatively constant across factors. In van der Linden, 
Dunkel and Petrides’s (2016) updated review—which comprised self-reports, peer reports, and 
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observed behaviour—they found that a single personality factor consistently emerged across 
methodologies. It was even prevalent genetically (Riemann & Kandler, 2010). Thus, facets 
may cluster together both within and between factors. This may occur to such a degree that, in 
some circumstances, a general factor of personality more parsimoniously accounts for inter-
facet variation than the separate big five factors. 
Existing methods may thus be ill-equipped to account for the full range of facet confounds. As 
I mentioned in the General Introduction, the exact range of confounds may differ by the target 
facet, outcome and population of interest. When evaluating associations across entire 
personality, it is thus safest to control for all 29 facet covariates. However, such comprehensive 
controls remove almost all meaningful variation from the target facet. This may increase the 
preponderance of findings that are spuriously based on random errors (Cohen et al., 2013). To 
remedy, researchers often fit a priori but partial controls. In stepwise regression, they may 
arbitrarily assign theoretical precedence to (e.g.) the affect facets over commensurably-
plausible agency facets (Thompson, 1995). Results are then self-fulfilling. Alternatively, they 
make potentially-false assumptions about the likeliest confounds in multiple regression. For 
example, they might neglect inter-facet confounds by only exerting intra-facet control. 
Conversely, they might control for all the superordinate big five factors. However, this 
completely removes the facet variance that contributes to the overarching factor, which is thus 
central to its construct validity. It is unfeasible to fully revert to findings from other, more 
distal, literatures because of fragmented operationalizations and controls, and because they 
require extra assumptions about how personality translates into manifest behaviour. Overall, 
most big five facet associations with SWB are still unclear.   
5.2.3. The PSM Solution  
In short, the problem with existing personality facet-SWB associations is sub-optimal internal 
validity. Associations may either involve facets that are confounded, or so degraded that they 
have lost all construct validity. In both cases, the consequence is untrustworthy effect estimates. 
These are especially compromised when the precise composition of appropriate controls differs 
according to both the target facet and outcome of interest, which produces unreliable patterns 
of effect magnitudes. This may be especially problematic during exploratory research, when 
the largest magnitude effects are considered the best candidates for more resource-intensive 
follow-up studies (Rozin, 2001). In such cases, any method—such as PSM—that incrementally 
boosts internal validity may help optimize resource allocation.  
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PSM mitigates the tradeoff between multicollinearity and confounding by matching 
participants across their covariates. At the outset, it generates propensity scores. They are 
predicted values from a logistic regression where the covariates—(e.g.) the 29 big five facets 
that are not the target—are the predictors and a binary version of the intended facet IV is the 
outcome. Thus, here propensity scores are single numeric summaries of the relationship 
between participants’ target facet and remaining entire personality. Then, PSM matches pairs 
of participants who have similar propensity scores but different target facet scores.  
For the big five, the numeric version of the target facet—with PSM weights—is then used to 
predict SWB. Whilst matching is likely imperfect, PSM may still be superior to unweighted 
alternatives when matched pairs’ covariates partially cancel each other out without the need to 
explicitly fit other facets as controls. To minimise idiosyncratic matches, high scorers can be 
matched to multiple low scorers (or vice versa). Thus, low scorers with especially common 
covariates might be represented in multiple matches, while those with especially uncommon 
covariates might be discarded completely. Therefore, PSM is a sampling strategy that attempts 
to hold potential confounds constant, much as (e.g.) an experimenter might intend when using 
the same testing environment for all participants.  
To date, PSM has been mostly used in fields outside social psychology. More specifically, 
PSM is a popular way of evaluating categorical effects when there is (a) small sample size 
and/or (b) quasi-experimental assignment to conditions. There, it is deployed as a means of 
raising internal validity to an acceptable minimum, to offset the potential confounding effects 
of non-random covariates. For example, Caliendo and Kopeinig’s (2008) literature review 
found that PSM was commonly used to evaluate policy interventions. To this end, Hitt and Frei 
(2002) used PSM to find the effects of implementing online banking on company profitability, 
across matched country regions. PSM is also commonly used to evaluate medical interventions. 
For example, to find the merits of different surgery procedures (Appéré et al., 2017), and novel 
cancer drugs (Elshafei et al., 2018). However, existing research is largely confined to 
categorical predictors (there are some exceptions—although not in psychology—which I 
review below). Further, PSM may be equally or more effective in large samples, especially 
when there are too many plausible covariates to fit as explicit controls. In such conditions, 
sample size may increase affordances for the kind of extremely close matches that reduce the 
total number and/or leverage of problem covariates.   
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Indeed, PSM can feasibly be applied to the numeric personality facets. Although median 
splits—used when generating the propensity scores—have many pitfalls (MacCallum, Zhang, 
Preacher & Rucker, 2002), they might be appropriate in PSM because they only generate 
sample weights, and not final associations. Further, propensity scores can be generated using 
multiple binary splits, rather than just a single split, so that covariates are held constant across 
more ecologically valid levels of the target predictor. For example, very high scorers might 
only be matched with very low scorers, and moderately high scorers with moderately low 
scorers (i.e. quartiles). Even using these quartiles, splits almost approximate the ordinal five- 
or seven-point Likert scales typically used to measure the big five. To illustrate, very high 
scorers’ median response to facet items may be “strongly agree”, and very low scorers’ median 
response may be “strongly disagree”. Put another way, quartiles might already have endemic 
meanings that mitigate the artificiality of using median splits. Finally, there is also a second 
stage where PSM weights are applied to the original numeric versions of each facet. Any degree 
of matching that is preserved in the transition back to the numeric predictor would still hold 
covariates more constant than zero-order associations.  
PSM has occasionally also been applied to survey research in the social sciences. For example, 
Dehejia and Wahba (2002) evaluated the effect of a work experience training program—with 
participants either randomly allocated to the program or a control condition—on future 
earnings. Then, they used PSM to fully replicate effects using convergent survey data. Foster 
(2003) used PSM to evaluate the extent that outpatient children suffering from mental health 
issues benefited from exposure to ongoing services. Outpatients were matched based on their 
symptomatology and previous exposure to therapy. Like personality, these services were 
conceptualised on an ordinal scale. Results suggested diminishing returns after 12-18 
exposures. Further, Scherman, Arriagada and Valenzuela (2014) used PSM to match 
participants with different levels of social media usage on their socio-economic status and 
political engagement. Then, they found that social media usage was positively associated with 
subsequent protest behaviour. Therefore, PSM has already been used in the social sciences to 
boost the internal validity of correlational research.  
5.2.4. Combined PSM and Elastic Net 
Emergent machine learning techniques may also address the multicollinearity-confounding 
tradeoff. Most prominently, elastic net regression is designed specifically to predict outcomes 
from variables that have complex patterns of intercorrelations (Zou & Hastie, 2005). It is a 
combination of ridge and lasso regressions, which both have varying parameters designed to 
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mitigate ungeneralizable (i.e. overfitted) models (Cohen et al., 2013). Ridge regression down-
weights large coefficients so that no single variable has excessive impact on predictions. Lasso 
regression down-weights small coefficients to converge on zero, thus reducing the likelihood 
that spurious variables impact predictions. Then, elastic net selects the systematically varying 
combinations of ridge and lasso parameters that yield the most explanatory model.  
A combination of PSM and elastic net (PSM-ENET) may optimize the internal validity of 
personality facet associations with SWB. There are arguments against and for this proposition. 
Against elastic net is that it tends to retain clusters of correlated variables when any one 
constituent has a strong association with the outcome (Ryali, Chen, Supekar & Menon, 2012). 
Thus, it might yield a de facto factor solution that compromises the PSM matching on 
individual facets. In addition, to date the primary function of elastic net is to yield high fidelity 
predicted scores, often when the number of predictors converges with or exceeds the number 
of cases. Thus, ridge and lasso parameters may change realistic coefficients to optimize overall 
model fit. The argument in favour of PSM-ENET is that it uses complimentary approaches to 
mitigate multicollinearity. From the outset, PSM uses sample weights to reduce the overall 
likelihood of confounding. Then, the elastic net may account for whatever covariance remains 
by allowing controls to also be fit during modelling. That is, PSM may initially reduce the 
latent factors in the data, which thus allows elastic net to better isolate specific facet 
associations with SWB. Overall, it remains unclear whether elastic net can be used to help 
optimize the internal validity of PSM associations.   
5.2.5. The Present Studies 
The present studies represent a first-of-their kind application of PSM, and combined PSM-
ENET, to numeric survey predictors in the psychological literature. First, I compared PSM to 
zero-order correlations and multiple regression. Specifically, I evaluated the extent (a) PSM 
weights held covariates more constant, (b) increasing PSM controls caused multicollinearity, 
and (c) PSM replicated canonical big five factor neuroticism and extraversion associations with 
SWB. The rationale for (c) was that established factor-level associations were likely to be 
robust because there were insufficient covariates to cause multicollinearity, and then that 
factor-level effects would manifest in their facet substrates. Then, I evaluated whether 
combined PSM-ENET better replicated neuroticism and extraversion effects, compared to 
PSM in isolation. Finally, I evaluated big five facet associations with SWB using the best-
performing method, to find the full pattern of effects.  
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5.3. Study 1 
Study 1 evaluated the efficacy of PSM. The control methods were initially zero-order 
correlations and multiple regression. I selected zero-order associations because they are the 
equivalent of fitting a single facet as the superordinate variable in a stepwise regression. 
Beyond this, I did not focus on stepwise regression because of its tendency to produce 
cascading statistical errors based on the variable/s arbitrarily chosen in the first step. In multiple 
regression, I focussed on models that accounted for incrementally increasing and, ultimately, 
all 29 facet controls. Finally, I evaluated whether PSM better replicated neuroticism and 
extraversion factor associations than either elastic net or PSM-ENET. 
5.3.1. Method 
The data analysed below are again from the self-report component of the AXA Research 
Project outlined in Chapter 1. The project was originally intended to generate prediction 
algorithms for multinational participants, which linked their self-report sociodemographic and 
psychological construct scores to their logged Twitter behaviour. Algorithms were then 
intended to be exported to massive databases of Twitter users who did not complete the 
concomitant self-reports. However, the survey data alone had sufficient power to permit PSM 
analyses without conflating Type 1 error (see ‘Present Studies’ in the General Introduction). 
Thus, I focussed exclusively on it because analyses using twitter-derived constructs would have 
meant compounded measurement and prediction errors, and to avoid any ethics complications 
concerning the use of data that were obtained without explicit prior consent. 
5.3.1.1. Participants 
Participants were 36,498 multinational internet panellists from 33 different countries—
speaking 14 different languages—who completed a 15-minute battery of questionnaires that 
mostly assessed personality, SWB and demographic characteristics. Full participant 
descriptives are in Table 5.1. The mean sample size by country was 1,106 (SD = 373.49). As 
per Chapter 4, the participants were retained (90%) because they answered at least 70% of the 
questions and used multiple different response options when answering the 120 personality 
items. There were 50% men (ICC = .06) and the mean age was 34.55 (SD = 11.84; ICC = .08). 





All survey items were administered using the prevailing back-translation approach in social 
psychology, which I described in Chapter 4 (Brislin, 1970). Some scales were only given to a 
subsample of countries. Although this meant that sample sizes differed across outcomes, all 
effects were still derived from > 29,000 participants. When appropriate, I also included other 
auxiliary scales from various country waves of the AXA project, to (a) help establish the 
construct validity of constituent of personality variables, and (b) enhance the internal validity 
of observed personality-SWB effects. These comprise a broad spectrum of attributes—
included at the request of various collaborators—that range from attitudes towards climate 





Participant descriptive statistics 
Region Language  ISO  N RET Sex Age 
Anglosphere  
English AUS 1,172 90% 54% 40.21 (12.77) 
English CAN 1,367 91% 62% 36.04 (13.88) 
English GBR 1,511 92% 64% 35.04 (12.87) 
English USA 2,088 92% 81% 36.81 (13.25) 
English ZAF 1,195 90% 53% 35.33 (11.44) 
SUBTOTAL 7,333 91% 65% 36.6 (12.92) 
Asia  
Mandarin CHN 960 86% 43% 32.93 (8.78) 
Indonesian IDN 2,141 89% 48% 30.68 (9.03) 
English IND 996 91% 22% 30.54 (9.38) 
Japanese JPN 458 83% 52% 42.11 (12.17) 
Korean KOR 493 91% 52% 36.92 (11.11) 
Thai THA 1,079 89% 51% 33.95 (9.14) 
Turkish TUR 1,106 81% 28% 30.56 (9.48) 
Mandarin TWN 1,025 84% 50% 34.22 (10.62) 
SUBTOTAL 8,258 87% 43% 32.78 (9.61) 
Europe 
German AUT 1,240 93% 55% 39.89 (12.62) 
French BEL 1,017 87% 51% 40.49 (13.4) 
German DEU 1,128 94% 45% 37.53 (13.42) 
Spanish ESP 1,020 94% 37% 33.82 (9.7) 
English FIN 1,043 91% 52% 38.37 (12.43) 
French FRA 1,103 93% 55% 37.2 (13.2) 
Italian ITA 1,108 92% 51% 34.68 (10.78) 
Polish POL 970 89% 34% 30.9 (11.23) 
Russian RUS 1,174 94% 54% 36.87 (11.84) 
SUBTOTAL 9,803 92% 48% 36.74 (12.1) 
South America  
Spanish ARG 1,144 88% 50% 36.24 (12.27) 
Spanish BOL 169 79% 45% 33.19 (12.06) 
Portuguese BRA 520 94% 39% 30.22 (9.03) 
Spanish CHL 1,159 89% 50% 33.57 (11.15) 
Spanish COL 1,100 94% 34% 30.55 (9.43) 
Spanish ECU 1,198 84% 53% 34.17 (11.8) 
Spanish MEX 1,210 96% 41% 30.09 (9.13) 
Spanish PER 1,126 89% 39% 29.72 (9.64) 
Spanish PRY 1,052 80% 53% 29.86 (9.04) 
Spanish URY 1,301 85% 55% 35.89 (12.27) 
Spanish VEN 1,125 94% 39% 32.41 (10.95) 
SUBTOTAL 11,104 89% 46% 32.48 (10.62) 
GRANDTOTAL 36,498 90% 50% 34.52 (11.25) 





I measured the big five for all participants, using the publicly available 120-item version of 
the NEO-AC from the International Personality Item Pool (Johnson, 2014). There were four 
items for each of the 30 facets. Items were rated on a scale from 1 = “strongly disagree” to 7 = 
“strongly agree”. Descriptive statistics and bivariate associations with SWB are in Table 5.2. 
First, I evaluated internal consistency to confirm that items in each facet measured components 
of the same underlying construct. For 29/30 facets, Cronbach’s alpha ranged from α = .40 to α 
= .80. I deemed this sufficient because scales were designed to capture the same construct 
heterogeneity as the original 300-item NEO-AC. Using the Spearman-Brown correction for 
survey length, this would have corresponded to α = .62 to α = .91. Thus, scores either 
approached or surpassed the conventional threshold (α = .70) for internal consistency, even 
when the NEO-AC was administered to a plurality of different cultures and in multiple 
languages. The only exception was liberalism (α = .17; projected α = .34), which was the extent 





Big five facet descriptive statistics and bivariate associations with SWB 
FAC No. Facet/Subscale N M (SD) α (300) ICC THWT SAT 
NUR 
1 Anxiety 36,497 4.12 (1.31) 0.7 (0.85) 0.03 0.52* -0.2* 
2 Anger 36,498 3.54 (1.4) 0.78 (0.9) 0.03 0.41* -0.25* 
3 Depression 36,498 3.17 (1.36) 0.76 (0.89) 0.08 0.56* -0.45* 
4 Self-consciousness 36,498 3.93 (1.15) 0.51 (0.72) 0.04 0.39* -0.29* 
5 Immoderation 36,498 3.71 (1.05) 0.45 (0.67) 0.03 0.17* -0.22* 
6 Vulnerability  36,497 3.39 (1.23) 0.65 (0.82) 0.08 0.49* -0.36* 
 Total  36,498 3.64 (0.91) 0.88 (0.95) 0.06 0.6* -0.41* 
EXT 
1 Friendliness 36,498 4.64 (1.26) 0.72 (0.87) 0.06 -0.36* 0.43* 
2 Gregariousness 36,498 3.95 (1.33) 0.66 (0.83) 0.05 -0.24* 0.33* 
3 Assertiveness 36,497 4.7 (1.14) 0.66 (0.83) 0.13 -0.18* 0.5* 
4 Activity Level 36,498 4.09 (1) 0.4 (0.62) 0.07 -0.01 0.28* 
5 Excitement-Seeking 36,498 4.06 (1.16) 0.6 (0.79) 0.05 0.16* 0.27* 
6 Cheerfulness  36,498 5.22 (1.2) 0.79 (0.9) 0.14 -0.27* 0.6* 
 Total  36,498 4.44 (0.81) 0.85 (0.93) 0.1 -0.23* 0.59* 
OPN 
1 Imagination 36,498 4.89 (1.28) 0.73 (0.87) 0.1 0.2* 0.21* 
2 Artistic Interests  36,497 4.96 (1.22) 0.63 (0.81) 0.06 -0.12* 0.31* 
3 Emotionality 36,498 4.84 (1.02) 0.47 (0.69) 0.04 -0.14* 0.23* 
4 Adventurousness 36,497 4.14 (1.06) 0.51 (0.72) 0.07 -0.25* 0.21* 
5 Intellect  36,498 4.58 (1.16) 0.57 (0.77) 0.03 -0.2* 0.2* 
6 Liberalism  36,498 3.85 (0.93) 0.17 (0.34) 0.05 0.06* -0.03* 
 Total  36,498 4.54 (0.63) 0.72 (0.87) 0.06 -0.12* 0.34* 
AGR 
1 Trust 36,497 4.28 (1.17) 0.71 (0.86) 0.04 -0.13* 0.26* 
2 Morality 36,498 5.68 (1.24) 0.8 (0.91) 0.1 -0.39* 0.17* 
3 Altruism 36,498 5.33 (1.07) 0.65 (0.82) 0.06 -0.24* 0.36* 
4 Cooperation 36,498 5.3 (1.25) 0.67 (0.84) 0.09 -0.4* 0.13* 
5 Modesty 36,498 4.2 (1.26) 0.67 (0.84) 0.1 -0.02* -0.31* 
6 Sympathy 36,498 4.84 (1.08) 0.49 (0.71) 0.07 -0.12* 0.23* 
 Total  36,498 4.94 (0.74) 0.83 (0.92) 0.07 -0.35* 0.21* 
CON 
1 Self-Efficacy  36,498 5.23 (1.08) 0.76 (0.89) 0.11 -0.23* 0.61* 
2 Orderliness  36,497 4.68 (1.43) 0.74 (0.88) 0.03 -0.33* 0.2* 
3 Dutifulness  36,498 5.41 (1.02) 0.6 (0.79) 0.07 -0.34* 0.3* 
4 Achievement-Striving 36,497 5 (1.12) 0.6 (0.79) 0.1 -0.3* 0.41* 
5 Self-Discipline 36,498 4.81 (1.13) 0.64 (0.82) 0.07 -0.42* 0.49* 
6 Cautiousness  36,498 4.65 (1.37) 0.79 (0.9) 0.04 -0.4* 0.12* 
 Total  36,498 4.96 (0.84) 0.88 (0.95) 0.08 -0.48* 0.48* 
Notes. No. = Original facet number (Johnson, 2014). α (300) = Observed Cronbach’s alpha (projected alpha 
for original 300 item version of scale using the Spearman-Brown correction). ICC = Intraclass correlation 
coefficient. THWT = Bivariate association with psychological needs thwarting. SAT = Bivariate 
association with psychological needs satisfaction. * = p < .001 
 
Despite its low internal consistency, liberalism showed convergent and discriminant validity. 
In this instance, I defined convergent validity as robust correlations, in the intuitive directions, 
with theoretically related variables. I defined discriminant validity as when the correlations 
were larger, in absolute magnitude, than those with theoretically unrelated variables. 
Convergent and discriminant variables were single scored items that I selected because they 
were (a) all binary (1 = “yes”) to hold variable type constant, (b) had either strong or weak 
theoretical relationships with liberalism, and (c) were not used elsewhere in the present chapter. 
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The convergent variables were support for policies to mitigate climate change and increase 
immigration, and the discriminant variables were whether participants smoked and regularly 
donated to charity. Table 5.3 contains exact questions, variable wording, descriptive statistics 
and bivariate associations. Overall, convergent associations were larger than discriminant 
associations and their 99.9% CIs did not overlap. As such, I decided that liberalism was 
sufficiently construct valid to retain in the subsequent analyses.  
 
Table 5.3 
Convergent and discriminant variable associations with liberalism  
Type Variable N M ICC R (99.9% CI) 
Convergent 
Support for climate change 19,716 73% 0.05 0.08 (0.06, 0.1) 
Support for immigration 18,918 45% 0.12 0.18 (0.16, 0.2) 
Discriminant 
Current smoker 10,203 32% 0.01 0 (-0.03, 0.04) 
Donated to charity 35,275 42% 0.06 0.02 (0, 0.03) 
Notes. Variable type = Whether there was a strong (convergent) or weak (discriminant) 
theoretical association with liberalism. M = % of participants who answered “yes”. ICC 
= Intraclass correlation coefficient. R = Pearson’s R correlation with liberalism.  
 
Thus, I evaluated descriptive statistics for the all thirty facets in the big five. At the outset, I 
did this using original (non- group mean z-scored) scores. Overall, inspection of the ICC 
suggested 86% to 97% of variation in facet scores was attributable to individuals and not their 
countries of residence. In addition, there was no evidence for floor or ceiling effects. Thus, I 
next evaluated bivariate associations for facets within each factor.  In support of the big five 
factor structure, 74/75 of the bivariate associations were positive (rmean = .33; SD = .17). The 
only exception was between trust and modesty in agreeableness (r = -.12; CI95 = -.13, -.11). 
However, both these facets were positively associated with the remainder of agreeableness and 
thus they may have still belonged to the same latent factor. Then, I computed an exhaustive set 
of absolute bivariate associations between facets in different factors. The average absolute 
magnitude that was approximately 2/3 that of the intra-factor associations (rabs = .21; SD = .13). 
Thus, I also confirmed that the facets were correlated between factors.   
5.3.1.2.2. Subjective Well-Being  
The primary measure was the 18-item BMPN (Sheldon & Hilpert, 2012). The BMPN was 
administered to 29,629 participants in 28/33 countries. In Chapter 4, I found evidence for the 
construct validity of separate needs thwarting and satisfaction factors—each comprising nine 
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items rated on a five-point Likert scale (1 = “Strongly disagree”; 5 = “Strongly agree”)—that 
captured feelings of suffering and flourishing respectively. Example items, descriptive 
statistics and bivariate associations between it and the other SWB variables are reported again 
in Table 5.4. Compared to the widely-used SLS, I found evidence that both factors measured 
transitive SWB—thus helping establish the correct temporal sequence with more stable facet 
predictors—and explained additional unique variation in real-world outcomes such as exercise 
frequency, fruit and vegetable consumption and relationship status. An added benefit was that 
BMPN items asked about discrete experiences (e.g. “I am currently experiencing some kind of 
failure…”). Thus, they were unlikely to be conflated with personality items (e.g. “often feel 
blue”), which measured more general tendencies. I highlight again that there was only a weak-
moderate negative association between needs satisfaction and thwarting. This suggested that 
the BMPN factors formed largely independent components of SWB. 
 
Table 5.4  
SWB descriptive statistics and intercorrelations 
Outcome Variable N Mean (SD) α ICC R-THWT R-SLS R-Health 
Primary 
Needs Satisfaction 28,940 3.73 (0.69) 0.84 0.11 0.22* 0.52* 0.28* 
Needs Thwarting 28,943 3.27 (0.8) 0.81 0.06 - 0.3* 0.21* 
Secondary 
SLS 35,737 4.38 (1.43) 0.87 0.07 - - 0.35* 
Health  35,358 62.95 (23.55) - 0.07 - - - 
Notes. ICC = Intraclass correlation coefficient. R-TWT = Bivariate correlation with needs thwarting. R-SLS = 
Bivariate correlation with the SLS. R-Health = Bivariate correlation with health.  
 
The secondary measures—administered to all participants—were SLS and physical health. 
Example items, descriptive statistics and bivariate SWB associations are also in Table 5.4. SLS 
captures mostly cognitive appraisals of SWB, and has demonstrated construct validity across 
cultures and languages (Pavot & Diener, 2008). It comprises five items that are each rated on 
a seven-point Likert scale (1 = “strongly disagree”; 7 = “strongly agree”). Physical health was 
“Please rate your health over the past 12 months” and scored on a 100-point sliding scale (1 = 
“Extremely poor”; 100 = “Extremely good”). Overall, effects that converged across primary 





The comprehensiveness of personality facet covariates meant that they likely also accounted 
for a range of other individual-level variables. Thus, I only fit a limited number of additional 
controls—sex, age, social class, religiosity and response bias—which were each measured with 
single items. Although I introduced them in Chapter 4, I introduce them again here because the 
sample was larger and more heterogenous when using SLS and health secondary outcomes. 
Social class was “Where do you place yourself on the spectrum of social class compared to 
your countrymen?” and rated on a 100-point sliding scale (1 = “Very bottom”; 100 = “Very 
top”) (M = 41.31; SD = 22.57; ICC = .10). Religiosity was “Are you currently practising a 
religion?” (1 = “yes”; 42%; ICC = .19). Response bias was the tendency for participants to 
prefer the minimum or maximum ends of Likert-style response scales. I centred response bias 
so that preferences for the minimum end were negative and preferences for the maximum end 
were positive (M = 0.18; SD = 0.48; ICC = .06). Then, I used multiple regression to evaluate 
the effects for all controls on both needs thwarting and needs satisfaction. Results are in Table 
5.5. Response bias was by far the strongest predictor of both outcomes. Controlling for it, in 
particular, may have ensured parsimonious facet associations with SWB. I evaluated all effects 
relative only to participants’ countrymen, and thus there was no need for multilevel models or 
country-level controls.  
 
Table 5.5 
Multiple regression effects for control variables on needs thwarting and satisfaction 
Outcome Variable Beta (99.9% CI) T (df) p 
Needs Thwarting 
Sex 0 (-0.03, 0.03) 0.29(26,625) .773 
Age -0.01 (-0.01, -0.01) -32.92(26,625) < .001 
Social Class 0 (-0.01, 0) -22.43(26,625) < .001 
Religious -0.04 (-0.07, -0.01) -4.31(26,625) < .001 
Response Bias 0.62 (0.58, 0.65) 63.32(26,625) < .001 
Needs Satisfaction 
Sex -0.01 (-0.04, 0.01) -1.77(26,625) .077 
Age 0 (0, 0.01) 11.91(26,625) < .001 
Social Class 0 (0, 0.01) 26.76(26,625) < .001 
Religious 0.15 (0.12, 0.18) 18.15(26,625) < .001 
Response Bias 0.36 (0.33, 0.39) 41.5(26,625) < .001 
Notes. The controls were all fit together in a single multiple regression model for each 






5.3.1.3.1. Multiple Imputation 
I imputed all missing variables separately for each country using MICE. As per the procedure 
in Chapter 3, MICE assigns values to missing scores with plausible sampling error. To 
minimize the need for multiple imputation at the outset, multi-item scale scores were the 
average of all non-missing item responses. Thus, only scales that were completely unanswered, 
as well as single items, were missing (2% total). As an added precaution, I also performed 
multiple imputation using three independent sets of variables—demographic controls, big five 
facets and SWB—so that each set of imputed scores was uncontaminated by the other sets. To 
maximize the fidelity of imputations, I used all additional control and SWB variables available 
in each country. They are reported in Table 5.6. Averaging across all variables, there was 82% 
(SD = 10%) overlap in kernel density plots for non-imputed and imputed scores after multiple 
imputation. I decided this was sufficient—especially considering the small percentage of 
missing values—to accept the imputations. 
     
Table 5.6  
Additional demographic and SWB variables used during multiple imputation 
Group Item M M (SD) ICC 
Demographic 
University degree 31,281 55% .13 
Ethnic minority 23,456 17% .11 
Romantic relationship 34,345 62% .02 
Household income 24,239 37.37 (24.65) .2 
Exercise regularly 35,301 46.46 (30.88) .08 
Eat greens regularly 35,306 65.9 (24.74) .05 
Recently donated to charity 35,275 42% .06 
Heterosexual  32,303 86% .02 
Current smoker 10,203 32% .01 
SWB 
PANAS – Positive Affect 13,759 3.41 (0.78) .12 
PANAS – Negative Affect  13,758 2.33 (0.87) .06 
Type 2 diabetes 10,214 7% .01 
High cholesterol 10,218 19% .01 
High blood pressures?” 10,199 20% .03 
Notes. Group = Multiple imputation category. M (SD) = % of participants who 





5.3.1.3.2. Measurement Equivalence 
I evaluated measurement equivalence across countries using multigroup (MG) confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA). Underlying CFA evaluates whether variables conform to a pre-defined 
factor structure. In practise, good CFA fit means unexplained variance is attributable 
exclusively to the individual variables, and not unaccounted-for variable clusters. MG-CFA 
then evaluates the extent this pre-defined structure continues to fit the data after introducing 
increasingly stringent assumptions about measurement equivalence across groups. These 
assumptions are configural invariance (the factor structure is appropriate in each separate 
group), metric invariance (factor loadings are also equal), scalar invariance (cases in different 
groups who score the same on each factor respond similarly to each facet) and residual 
invariance (CFA models have equal explanatory power in separate groups; Pendergast, von der 
Embse, Kilgus & Eklund, 2017). As the MG-CFA equivalence assumptions increase—
meaning fewer CFA parameters are free to accommodate the actual data—CFA model fit 
meaningfully decreases when there is measurement non-equivalence. There is measurement 
equivalence when decreases are only negligible.   
There are multiple ways of evaluating meaningful MG-CFA decreases. Often, researchers use 
the chi-squared goodness of fit statistic to determine whether the CFA model has more 
explanatory power than control-model alternatives. However, this metric is sensitive to sample 
size and thus inappropriate in conditions of high power. Instead, I focussed on the comparative 
fit index (CFI), which captures the percentage of shared facet variation explained by the CFA 
model. The threshold for adequate CFA model fit is often CFI > .90 (Pendergast et al., 2017). 
Corresponding delta statistics are the approximate SEs of model fits across countries.      
I performed MG-CFA for the NEO-IPIP, the original BMPN facets and the superordinate 
BMPN SWB factors from Chapter 4. The original BMPN facets comprised experiences of 
thwarting and satisfaction in each of the three basic psychological needs domains (autonomy, 
competence, relatedness). All facets were z-scored within each country—which again accorded 
with Aguinis et al.’s (2013) best-practise recommendations for analyses using multi-level data. 
All results are in Table 5.7. I relaxed the threshold for good model fit in the NEO-IPIP 
because—as suggested in the General Introduction—facet intercorrelations may transcend 
factor boundaries in ways that do not have measurement equivalence. As such, there was poor 
CFA fit when the NEO facets were organised exclusively into the big five factors (CFI = 0.72). 
Nevertheless, there were only marginal further decreases in fit as MG-CFA added increasing 
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measurement equivalence assumptions. For the BMPN, the model specifying the originally-
intended three factors was a poor fit (CFI = 0.62). Contrastingly, there was very good fit for 
my revised model (see Chapter 4), where negatively valanced facets collapsed into aggregate 
needs thwarting and the positively valanced facets collapsed into aggregate needs satisfaction 
(CFI = 0.97). Then, CFA models with increasingly stringent equivalence assumptions all 
remained above the threshold for adequate fit. There were only marginal incremental decreases. 
Therefore, I concluded that both the NEO-IPIP and my two-factor BMPN measure of SWB 
had sufficient measurement equivalence to proceed.  
 
Table 5.7 
Measurement equivalence of NEO-IPIP and BMPN 
needs thwarting and needs satisfaction factors 
Equivalence NEO-IPIP BMPN 
CFA .72 .97 
Configural .70 .95 
Loadings .68 (.02) .95 (< .01) 
Intercepts  .68 (< .01) .95 (< .01) 
Residuals .67 (.01) .94 (.01) 
Reduction 7% 3% 
Notes. Equivalence = MG-CFA parameters. CFA = 
Original confirmatory factor analysis averaging 
across countries. Values are CFI (delta).  
 
5.3.1.3.3. Accounting for Controls 
Next, I apportioned all individual-level and country control variance from the target variables. 
To this end, I first created separate multiple regression models where the controls iteratively 
predicted each target personality facet, and each SWB outcome. Then, the target variable was 
assigned its concomitant residuals. This was the exact equivalent of fitting all control variables 
and facets in the same multiple regression model predicting SWB. The benefit of doing this 
procedure ahead of the main analysis was that I could exclusively focus results on the primary 
big five facet associations. In aggregate, controls explained small but fluctuating proportions 
of facet (M = 9%; SD = 6%) and SWB (M = 12%; SD = 4%) variance. Afterwards, none of 
these controls could impact effect estimates, at least as main effects. Then, I also removed all 
additional variation attributable to participants’ country. Specifically, I group mean z-scored 




5.3.1.3.4. PSM Procedure  
Using PSM, I iteratively generated a separate set of participant weights for each personality 
facet. Weights were designed to retain the vast proportion of cases who scored high on the 
target personality facet and then oversample those cases who scored low on the target facet but 
had converging scores across the remaining 29 facets. Thus, weights were designed to hold the 
remaining facets more constant than unweighted alternatives. For clarity, I report my procedure 
as a series of numbered steps for each target facet:  
1. I made a categorical version of the target facet by splitting scores into equal-sized 
“very low”, “moderately low”, “moderately high” and “very high” quartiles. Quartiles 
meant I could find separate matches for moderate (2nd and 3rd quartiles) and more extreme 
(1st and 4th quartiles) cases. This increased the likelihood that matches had roughly equal 
scores on the target variable, thus improving matching fidelity compared to a single 
median split. Quartiles already approximated the five- and seven-point Likert scales 
typically used to assess personality. In support, I found that quartiles explained 86% (SD 
= 1%) of the variation in original numeric scores. Thus, they were both high fidelity and 
contained sufficient cases (N = 9,124) for extremely close matches.   
2. PSM is predicated on logistic regression and thus the predictor must be binary. As 
such, I generated two PSM models for each target facet. The first was where moderately 
high vs. moderately low scores was the DV, and the second was where very high vs. very 
low scores was the DV. In both cases, the IVs were the 29 other personality facets. 
Propensity scores were simply the predicted values—the likelihood participants would 
score “high” on the target facet based on their covariates—from these models. Thus, 
models yielded a unique propensity score for every participant. While the propensity 
scores themselves were subject to multicollinearity, shared covariance that was parsed 
from specific predictors was still captured in the concomitant model intercept and thus 
conserved (Cohen et al., 2013). Thus, despite potentially unreliable single coefficients, 
overall predictions were still an appropriate numeric summary of the entire relationship 
between all covariates and the target facet.   
3. Then, I matched each moderately high scorer to the five moderately low scorers with 
the nearest propensity scores. I repeated this procedure for very high vs very low scorers. 
I decided on five matches to mitigate idiosyncratic pairings, and to maximize the large 
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sample size. I decided against a greater number to limit matching imprecision. I only 
formed matched groups when all propensity scores were < 0.5 pooled SDs.  
4. Matches were then converted to weights. Every moderately high and very high scorer 
that was successfully matched had a weight of 1. Every moderately low and very low 
scorer was assigned a weighting of .20 every time they were matched. Thus, the weights 
of the five low scoring cases who matched with each high scoring case summed to one.  
5. Weights were used in linear regression where the numeric version of the intended facet 
IV was used to predict SWB. Thus, quartiles were only used as a preliminary step to 
generate weights. Although matching was imperfect—because I matched cases across 
multiple covariates and switched from categorical to numeric variables—PSM was still 
potentially effective when it held covariates more constant than unweighted solutions.  
5.3.1.3.5. PSM Diagnostics  
Overall, PSM generated unique subsamples of participants for every facet who had similar 
scores across the remaining 29 facets. When each facet was the target, M = 89% (SD = 5%) of 
the cases had non-zero weight and were thus retained. As a preliminary step, I compared 
propensity score differences before and after the actual PSM weights were applied. Prior to 
applying weights, the average difference in raw propensity scores between high vs low 
responses was M = .29 (SD = .10). After PSM, it was M = .05 (SD = .02). This was an 83% 
reduction. Then, I also evaluated whether improvements were driven by middle or extreme 
cases. For the middle two quartiles, PSM weights reduced propensity score differences from 
M = .08 (SD = .04) to M = .01 (SD < .01), which was a 92% reduction. For the extreme two 
quartiles, they were reduced from M = .50 (SD = .17) to M = .05 (SD = .02), which was a 90% 
reduction. Thus, PSM equalised the distribution of propensity scores across all four quartiles.  
5.3.1.3.6. PSM-ENET 
Finally, I evaluated whether PSM-ENET better isolated single personality facet effects than 
PSM in isolation. Thus, I fit all 30 personality facets—in their numeric form and with PSM 
weights—together again in the same elastic net model. I evaluated which of 100 combinations 
of LASSO and ridge parameters (the L1 and L2 norms)—covering the full range of possible 
regularizations—maximized model accuracy, which I computed using 10-fold cross validation 
(10-FCV). 10-FCV randomly partitions the sample into deciles and then generates an 
exhaustive set of models using 9/10 of the deciles. I selected 10-folds because it was both 
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sufficient to mitigate the chances of spurious results, compared to fewer-folds, and often 
recommended as best practise in instructive machine learning texts (James et al., 2013; Kuhn, 
2008). Then, model accuracy is the association between the true and predicted scores for the 
remaining decile. The final model is the average model accuracy—using optimized LASSO 
and ridge parameters—and coefficient loadings from all ten iterations of 10-FCV. Strengths of 
the approach are that model accuracy is not artificially inflated by using the same participants 
during training and testing, and idiosyncratic (i.e. overfitted) model coefficients are cancelled 
out across the folds (James et al., 2013). Thus, 10-FCV PSM-ENET was a rigorous test of 
whether PSM was compatible with the prevailing machine learning alternative.   
There were separate elastic net models for every facet. Models used the PSM sample weights 
specific to each facet, when it was the target. Then, I saved only the beta coefficient for the 
target facet from each model. I also fit separate models for each SWB outcome. Thus, there 
were a total of 120 separate PSM-ENETs. On average, R2 for facet models predicting the 
primary outcomes—needs thwarting (36%) and satisfaction (41%)—were consistent across 
models. R2 for the models predicting the other two convergent outcomes—SLS (28%) and 
health (11%)—were lower but still also consistent across models. Thus, collectively the 30 
personality facets had robust predictive power. However, it was still unclear whether this 
robustness was preserved in individual coefficient estimates.   
5.3.2. Results 
I compared PSM associations to zero-order correlations and multiple regression controlling for 
all non-target (i.e. all 29 other) facets. Full output—including beta coefficients, confidence 
intervals and overall variance explained—for these different models is in Table A5.1 
(Appendix 5.1). These models are also referred to, and partially reported in tables, throughout 
the results. The focus was on evaluating whether PSM improved covariate score constancy and 
multicollinearity, and then replicated canonical big five factor associations. Then, I repeated 
this third approach comparing PSM to both elastic net and combined PSM-ENET. I mitigated 
Type 1 error by treating correlations as the unit of analysis. Thus, they comprised a sample of 
observed effects that were only subjected to inferential statistics at a second stage: as 
associations of associations. The significance threshold was p < .001.  
5.3.2.1. Covariate Constancy 
My first approach was to evaluate whether PSM improved the constancy of covariate facet 
scores across the different quartile levels of each target facet. Here, I focussed exclusively on 
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the facets and did not use SWB. Thus, there were 694 (6 target variables, split into quartiles 
and each with 29 covariates) separate means for the facets in each NEO-factor. As a preliminary 
step, I evaluated the extent mean covariate scores from across the quartiles summed to below 
or above zero after PSM.9 Results are in Table 5.8. For neuroticism facets, participants were 
disproportionately matched when they scored low on the extraversion, openness, agreeableness 
and conscientiousness facets. This pattern was inverted for the facets in the remaining factors.  
 
Table 5.8 
Reduction in the 29 facet covariate scores across different levels of the target facet, after propensity score 
matching (PSM)  
Factor Covariate M (SD) Binary % (SD) Middle % (SD) Extreme % (SD) 
Neuroticism 
Within 0.25 (0.16) 85% (5%) 92% (3%) 82% (6%) 
Between -0.14 (0.09) 77% (41%) 76% (64%) 71% (77%) 
Extraversion 
Within 0.21 (0.16) 82% (7%) 90% (4%) 80% (8%) 
Between 0.04 (0.13) 76% (69%) 88% (22%) 72% (58%) 
Openness 
Within 0.13 (0.14) 83% (10%) 89% (5%) 81% (12%) 
Between 0.06 (0.09) 80% (25%) 82% (31%) 69% (110%) 
Agreeableness 
Within 0.19 (0.14) 86% (8%) 91% (9%) 84% (10%) 
Between 0.06 (0.1) 77% (22%) 88% (10%) 74% (26%) 
Conscientiousness 
Within 0.28 (0.21) 85% (5%) 91% (3%) 83% (6%) 
Between 0.05 (0.12) 74% (52%) 82% (37%) 73% (30%) 
Notes. Covariate: I separated results for facets in the same (within) and different (between) factors. M 
(SD) = Mean covariate score. Binary % = Mean percentage reduction (SD) in covariate means between 
high and low median splits after PSM. Middle % = Mean percentage reduction (SD) in covariate means 
between second and third quartiles after PSM. Extreme % = Mean percentage reduction (SD) in covariate 
means between first and fourth quartiles after PSM. 
 
Then, I evaluated the percentage reduction in covariate differences after matching. Specifically, 
I evaluated the differences in mean covariate scores between low and high median splits, and 
between middling and extreme quartiles, both without and with PSM weights. Then, I 
calculated the percentage improvement using PSM weights. Results are also in Table 5.8. 
Averaging across the facets in each factor, results suggested that PSM reduced covariate score 
differences between low and high median splits by 74% to 80%. The range of percentage 
reductions was similar using just middling quartiles (76% =to 88%) and just extreme quartiles 
(69% to 84%). Results held across all five factors. Facet scores from the same factor (M = 84%; 
                                               
9 Prior to PSM, all covariate means summed to zero because they were z-scored (M = 0; SD = 1).  
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SD = 2%) were held more constant than facet scores from other factors (M = 77%; SD = 2%).  
Overall, PSM increased the constancy of covarying facets both within and between the big five.  
5.3.2.2. Multicollinear Effects 
Second, I evaluated whether PSM reduced effect multicollinearity compared to multiple 
regression. Specifically, I used the big five facets to predict each of the four SWB outcomes 
using randomly selected facet controls that increased from 1 to 29, in increments of 1. I used 
the same controls for PSM and multiple regression to avoid confounded results. Due to 
computational demands, I randomly sampled only 1,000 participants—on whom I performed 
PSM—at each increment. To stabilize coefficient estimates across SWB outcomes and 
randomly selected controls, I also repeated the procedure 10 times at each increment. Thus, 
there were 8,700 (30 target variables * 29 control levels * 10 iterations at each level) separate 
PSM and multiple regression models. As a preliminary step, I found that—averaging across all 
personality facets and SWB—the mean effect magnitude for PSM was 0.12 (SD = 0.10) and 
the mean effect magnitude for multiple regression it was 0.08 (SD = 0.08). This suggested that 
observed effects were larger for PSM. Then, I evaluated how effect magnitude changed as the 
number of controls increased.   
Effect magnitude for PSM diminished by less as controls increased, compared to multiple 
regression. I evaluated effects with the number of controls as the predictor, and absolute mean 
effect magnitude as the outcome. After controlling for personality factor and outcome: the 
logarithmic effect for increasing controls (i.e. the forgetting curve) on effect magnitude was 
less negative for PSM than multiple regression (b = .02; CI99.9 = .01, .02; t(571) = 8.59; p < 
.001). Results are in Figure 5.1. Put more simply, as controls increased multiple regression 
effect magnitudes decreased more steeply than PSM. Both began to plateau, but only after a 
greater number of controls for PSM. PSM effects became significantly larger when there were 
only 3 controls (b = .02; CI99.9 = < .01, .03; t(2,938) = 4.05; p < .001). While this threshold was 
partly a function of sample size, it still highlights that magnitudes diverged even when 
attempting to exert modest control. Finally, I also evaluated the inflection point—the first 
instance where predicted scores were less than 50% of the largest observed magnitude—for 
both sets of effects. The inflection point was 8 controls for multiple regression, and 25 controls 
for PSM. Thus, multiple regression effects also decreased more rapidly compared to PSM. 
Finally, PSM effects decreased by < 1% from the inflection point to all 29 controls. This 
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suggested that effect size decay had almost stopped in PSM, and that models could tolerate the 
additional four controls beyond the inflection point with minimal extra multicollinearity.  
 
 
Figure 5.1. Effect size of personality facet-SWB associations with increasing control variables. Every personality 
facet was iteratively used as the target variable, for both primary outcomes (needs thwarting, needs satisfaction) 
and both secondary outcomes (SLS, health). Controls were randomly selected non-target personality facet 
covariates, which increased from 1-29 in increments of 1. I repeated each analyses at each number of controls 10 
times—with randomly selected variables—to increase the stability of estimates. Absolute effect size was the 
average absolute beta coefficient of regression model effects where controls were either accounted for as PSM 
weights, or as explicitly defined variables in multiple regression models. 
 
5.3.2.3. Replicating Established Big Factor Effects   
Third, I evaluated which method best replicated factor-level personality effects on SWB. I 
reasoned that the more internally valid method would better show the established relative 
strength of neuroticism and extraversion effects (the target factors) on SWB, compared to the 
other factor effects (non-target factors). I reversed needs thwarting so that its associations were 
in the same direction as the remaining outcomes. I compared PSM results to zero-order 
correlations and partial correlations from multiple regression with all 29 covariates. As a 
preliminary step, I evaluated all facet associations with SWB outcomes in the target and non-
target factors. All results are in Table 5.9. For all methods, target neuroticism facet associations 
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were negative and target extraversion facet associations were positive. Although zero-order 
effects appeared to be larger, they may still have failed to differentiate between target and non-
target effects. Indeed, aggregate target vs non-target PSM effect proportions (3.51) were larger 
than zero-order (2.96) and multiple regression (2.40) proportions. Thus, PSM associations were 
better in aggregate at differentiating between effects in different facets.  
PSM also better replicated established neuroticism and extraversion associations at the facet-
level, compared to zero-order and multiple regression. To this end, I computed an exhaustive 
set of pairwise absolute proportions between facets in target versus non-target factors. Thus, 
there were 432 (6 target facets * 18 non-target facets * 4 SWB outcomes) unique pairwise 
ratios for both neuroticism and extraversion. The higher the value, the more unambiguously 
the target factor effects were isolated. The predictor was the method and the proportions were 
the outcome. There was a floor effect of absolute r = .005 to prevent unrealistically large ratios. 
I evaluated effects using separate Poisson regressions for neuroticism and extraversion, 
controlling for outcome. Compared to zero-order correlations, multiple regression proportions 
were roughly equal for neuroticism (b = -0.05; CI99.9 = -0.16, 0.07; t(1288) = -1.40; p = .162) 
and lower for extraversion (b = .-0.28; CI99.9 = -0.42, -0.15; t(1288) = -6.90; p < .001). Thus, I 
compared PSM to the better-performing zero-order correlations. PSM yielded higher 
proportions for both neuroticism (b = .44; CI99.9 = .33, .54; t(1288) = 13.88; p < .001) and 
extraversion (b = .33; CI99.9 = .22, .45; t(1288) = 9.51; p < .001). Thus, PSM most 
unambiguously replicated established personality factor effects for SWB.  
Finally, I evaluated how ratios differed between non-target factors for PSM associations. 
Compared to conscientiousness, combined neuroticism and extraversion PSM proportions 
were especially large for openness (bratio = 1.73; CI99.9 = 1.57, 1.90; t(861) = 35.36; p < .001) 
and then agreeableness (bratio = 0.96; CI99.9 = 0.78, 1.13; t(861) = 18.01; p < .001). Therefore, 
PSM also best differentiated target facet effects when non-target facets came from the factors—






Mean bivariate associations between SWB and neuroticism, extraversion and other facets 
using PSM and alternate methods 
Method Factor R (SD) R-Prop B (SD) B-Prop 
PSM 
Neuroticism -0.13 (0.09) 1.94 -0.14 (0.09) 1.9 
Extraversion 0.1 (0.08) 1.57 0.12 (0.1) 1.65 
Other 0.07 (0.06) - 0.07 (0.07) - 
Zero-Order 
Neuroticism -0.29 (0.11) 1.63 - - 
Extraversion 0.24 (0.13) 1.34 - - 
Other 0.18 (0.11) - - - 
Multiple Regression 
Neuroticism -0.04 (0.06) 1.54 - - 
Extraversion 0.02 (0.05) 0.86 - - 
Other 0.03 (0.03) - - - 
Elastic Net 
Neuroticism - - -0.05 (0.07) 1.82 
Extraversion - - 0.03 (0.06) 1.04 
Other - - 0.03 (0.03) - 
PSM-ENET 
Neuroticism - - -0.05 (0.07) 1.63 
Extraversion - - 0.03 (0.06) 1.26 
Other - - 0.03 (0.03) - 
Notes. All results were averaged across the four SWB outcomes after reversing needs 
thwarting correlations. Method: I compared PSM associations to zero-order correlations, 
multiple regression partial correlations with all 29 facets as covariates, elastic net and 
combined PSM and elastic net (PSM-ENET). Factor: Neuroticism and Extraversion were 
the target factors that had established associations with SWB; Other = Absolute effects 
for openness, agreeableness and conscientiousness factors. R (SD) = The mean 
correlation from constituent facet effects. R-Prop = Target correlation means proportional 
to non-target correlation means. B (SD) = The mean beta coefficient from constituent 
facet effects; it was computed in lieu of R because my version of elastic net did not allow 
partial correlations. B-Prop = Target beta means proportional to non-target beta means. 
 
5.3.2.4. PSM vs Combined PSM and Elastic Net 
Finally, I replicated Approach 3 comparing PSM to PSM-ENET. For comprehensiveness, I 
also compared results to elastic net in isolation. I switched from associations to beta-coefficient 
effect estimates because my elastic net procedure did not yield partial correlations. For 
methodological control, I generated each set of coefficients using the same 10-fold cross-
validation protocol, via R’s ‘glmnet’ package with ‘caret’ package interface. After reversing 
effects for needs thwarting, I again evaluated raw effects. Results are in also in Table 5.9. While 
they were all in the expected direction, they were larger for PSM than either elastic net or PSM-
ENET. Aggregate target vs absolute non-target effect proportions for all three methods were 
approximately equal in neuroticism, and larger for PSM in extraversion. Overall, there was 
thus preliminary evidence that PSM outperformed elastic net and PSM-ENET. 
PSM in isolation best replicated established factor associations with SWB. I again computed 
an exhaustive set of absolute pairwise proportions between target and non-target facet effects. 
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I created a floor effect of absolute b = .002 to prevent unrealistically large ratios. As a 
preliminary step, I compared PSM-ENET to elastic net in isolation (PSM-ENET = 1). They 
were equally good at differentiating neuroticism effects (bratio = -0.04; CI99.9 = -0.12, 0.05; 
t(1,290) = 1.35; p = .178), and PSM-ENET better differentiated extraversion effects (bratio = 
0.19; CI99.9 = 0.08, 0.29; t(1,290) = 5.75; p < .001). Thus, I compared the better-performing 
PSM-ENET to PSM. PSM better differentiated effects than PSM-ENET (PSM = 1) for both 
neuroticism (bratio = 0.24; CI99.9 = 0.16, 0.32; t(1,290) = 9.44; p < .001) and extraversion (bratio 
= 0.27; CI99.9 = 0.18, 0.37; t(1,290) = 9.42; p < .001). Moreover, I replicated these effects using 
a series of different plausible models that accounted for potential methodological artefacts. 
These are in Table 5.10. Specifically, I fully replicated superior PSM effects when I (a) made 
the ceiling ratio 20 to mitigate the impact of outlier ratios; (b) used linear regression with log 
transformed ratios to mitigate the limitations of using Poisson regression with decimals; (c) 
omitted  ratios involving conscientiousness because it has the next-most plausible factor-level 
associations with SWB; and (d) used only the largest ratio from each target facet to prevent 
artificially inflated results caused by using duplicate effects. The only exception to the overall 
consistent superiority of PSM was the effect for extraversion in (b), which trended in the same 
direction as the other effects but did not reach significance. In summary, PSM fully 
outperformed PSM-ENET when replicating established neuroticism and extraversion factor 






Replicating established neuroticism and extraversion factor associations with SWB using 
PSM and PSM-ENET, across multiple methods  
Method Target Factor B (99.9% CI) T (df) p 
Truncated Outliers 
Neuroticism 0.19 (0.08, 0.29) 5.77(869) < .001 
Extraversion 0.12 (0.01, 0.24) 3.49(869) < .001 
Log Linear Regression 
Neuroticism 0.77 (0.42, 1.13) 7.18(869) < .001 
Extraversion 0.3 (-0.07, 0.68) 2.65(869) .008 
Conscientiousness Removed  
Neuroticism 0.56 (0.47, 0.66) 19.36(571) < .001 
Extraversion 0.61 (0.5, 0.72) 18.35(571) < .001 
No Duplicate Numerators 
Neuroticism 0.43 (0.23, 0.63) 7.12(355) < .001 
Extraversion 0.71 (0.47, 0.94) 9.9(355) < .001 
Notes. Method: Different permutations of my primary analysis that (a) created a ceiling 
value of 20 for observed effect ratios (Truncated Outliers), (b) used log-transformed ratios 
in linear regression (Log Linear Regression), (c) removed conscientiousness from the non-
target effects because it had the next-most established relationship with SWB 
(Conscientiousness Removed), and (d) used only the largest ratio involving each target 
facet to mitigate undue influence from a single facet on the final model. Target factor: 
Whether pairwise ratios were computed with either neuroticism or extraversion facets as 
the numerator (and then non-target facets as the denominators). B (99.9% CI): Positive 
effects suggest that PSM ratios were larger than combined PSM-ENET.  
 
5.4. Study 2 
In Study 2, I evaluated every big five facet association with SWB. I used exclusively PSM 
because it yielded more internally valid individual facet-level associations with SWB than 
zero-order correlations, multiple regression, elastic net and PSM-ENET alternatives. I 
evaluated PSM-weighted big five effects using all 30 facets and across multiple measures of 
SWB. The primary outcomes were needs thwarting and satisfaction, which measured suffering 
and flourishing respectively. Secondarily, I evaluated convergent facet associations with SLS 
and health. To limit the number of additional hypothesis tests, I only evaluated effects for 
secondary outcomes when there were observed effects for the primary outcomes in the same 
direction. Converging effects further increased confidence that the primary effects did not 
emerge simply because of measurement or sampling error.  
5.4.1. Method 
5.4.1.1. Procedure 
The participants, materials, data preparation and PSM were identical to Study 1. For each facet, 
I used PSM sample weights that specifically increased the internal validity of its association 
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with each SWB outcome. For simplicity, I computed each facet effect estimate using a single 
weighted correlation, rather than 10-fold cross validation. I examined facet effects on needs 
thwarting and satisfaction separately because they were dissociable SWB constructs. Thus, I 
evaluated 60 associations in total. Then, I also evaluated whether there were convergent effects 
for secondary outcomes. In all instances, the significance threshold was again p < .001.  
5.4.2. Results 
All associations were intended to be exploratory. Thus, I used my discretion to focus 
interpretations on those effects that (a) replicated across primary and secondary outcomes, (b) 
had CI bounds that were above the r  .10 threshold for noteworthiness, and/or (c) diverged 
from the majority of other effects in their factor. I grouped effects with overlapping CIs—and 
reported their extreme-most CI bounds—except in some borderline cases where effects had 
plausible theoretical discontinuities. Full results are in Figure 5.2. 
5.4.2.1. Needs Thwarting 
First, I evaluated facet associations with needs thwarting. All six neuroticism facets 
exacerbated needs thwarting, and all associations replicated across both SLS and physical 
health secondary outcomes. Effects for depression, and then anxiety and vulnerability (CI = 
.19, .23), were noteworthy. Four of six extraversion effects protected against needs thwarting, 
and they all replicated across both secondary outcomes. Effects for cheerfulness, and then 
friendliness and gregariousness (CI = -.18, -.12), were noteworthy. Four of six openness effects 
also impacted needs thwarting. Although none replicated across all three outcomes or were 
reliably above the threshold for noteworthiness, it was interesting to note that only imagination 
exacerbated needs thwarting. All six agreeableness facets impacted needs thwarting. Of these, 
morality and cooperation (CI = -.15, -.09) had noteworthy protective effects, although only the 
later replicated across all three outcomes. Although the effect for modesty was below r = .10, 
interestingly it alone exacerbated needs thwarting. Its effects also replicated across both 
secondary outcomes. Finally, all six conscientiousness facets protected against needs thwarting 
and replicated across both secondary outcomes. Effects for self-discipline, and then self-
efficacy and cautiousness (CI = -.18, -.11), were all noteworthy. Thus, there were a range of 




5.4.2.2. Needs Satisfaction 
Then, I evaluated facet associations with needs satisfaction. All six neuroticism facets also 
inhibited needs satisfaction, and effects replicated across both SLS and physical health. Effects 
for depression and then vulnerability were both noteworthy. All six extraversion effects 
promoted needs satisfaction and replicated across both secondary outcomes. Cheerfulness, and 
then friendliness, gregariousness and assertiveness (CI = .13, .22), were all noteworthy. Five 
of six openness effects also impacted needs satisfaction. Although none replicated across all 
three outcomes or were reliably above the threshold for noteworthiness, it was interesting to 
note that imagination both exacerbated needs thwarting and promoted needs satisfaction. All 
six agreeableness facets also impacted needs satisfaction. Five of the six effects were positive, 
but only altruism was noteworthy. Its effect did not replicate across both outcomes. 
Interestingly, modesty inhibited needs satisfaction and its effect was both noteworthy and 
replicated across all four outcomes. Finally, all six conscientiousness facets promoted needs 
satisfaction and replicated across both secondary outcomes. There were cascading effect 
magnitudes: Self-efficacy, then self-discipline, then achievement-striving, and then dutifulness 
were all noteworthy. Overall, there were also wide ranging, and partially divergent, big five 





Figure 5.2. Heatmap of PSM weighted correlations between every big five facet and both the primary outcomes. 
Point estimate values are Pearson’s R correlations with needs thwarting and satisfaction. Bracketed values are the 
99.9% CIs. The darker the panel the more positive the association. The X axis contains the big five factors and the 
Y axis contains each of their six nested facets. The factors and facets (in order) are: Neuroticism (anxiety, anger, 
depression, self-consciousness, immoderation, vulnerability), Extraversion (friendliness, gregariousness, 
assertiveness, activity-level, excitement-seeking, cheerfulness), Openness (imagination, artistic interests, 
emotionality, adventurousness, intellect, liberalism), Agreeableness (trust, morality, altruism, cooperation, 
modesty, sympathy) and Conscientiousness (self-efficacy, orderliness, dutifulness, achievement-striving, self-
discipline, cautiousness). * = p < .001 for the needs thwarting/satisfaction association. + = p < .001 for the 
secondary satisfaction with life association, when it also converged with the primary association. ^ = p < .001 for 




Researchers typically use zero-order correlations, stepwise regression and multiple regression 
to evaluate personality facet effects on SWB. However, when doing so, they neglect intra- and 
inter-factor personality confounds or suppress effect estimates to the point they are 
meaningless. Until the present chapter, this trade-off was thought to be inevitable. However, I 
found that PSM—using pairs of participants who differ on the key variable of interest but have 
similar covariates—held all potentially confounding personality facet covariates more constant 
than existing alternatives, and with reduced multicollinearity. Then, I used PSM to better 
replicate established big five factor associations with SWB. Finally, I found that PSM in 
isolation outperformed both elastic net and combined PSM-ENET solutions. Thus, I used PSM 
to evaluate the full plurality of big five facet associations with SWB.  
PSM outperformed conventional regression alternatives. First, I evaluated the difference in all 
29 covariate facet means—where each facet was iteratively made the target—across quartiles 
before and after PSM. Even among cases from the first and fourth quartiles—the most difficult 
to match because they comprised the most dissimilar cases—there was still more than a 2/3 
reduction in covariate means. In most instances, matching led to at least a 3/4 reduction in 
covariate means. Moreover, effects held across (a) the facets in all five factors, (b) covariates 
from the same and different factors, and (c) both original quartile and post-hoc median split 
target facets. Then, I evaluated the changes in absolute effect magnitudes—when each facet 
was used to predict SWB—as the number of covariates increased from 1 to 29. PSM effects 
decreased by less initially and then also stabilized at a higher absolute effect magnitude, 
compared to multiple regression. PSM effects became significantly larger than multiple 
regression when there were just three covariates. Even when fitting all 29 covariates, PSM 
effects were still conserved at approximately half the magnitude observed when fitting a single 
covariate. All effects held across the four SWB outcomes. Overall, I thus concluded that PSM 
held covariates more constant than zero-order correlations, and that it produced less 
multicollinear effects than multiple regression.  
Then, I found that PSM better replicated established neuroticism and extraversion factor 
associations with SWB, compared to alternatives. Factor associations require fewer personality 
controls and thus do not suffer from the same tradeoff between confounding and 
multicollinearity as facet-level effects. That is, they are more trustworthy. Thus, these effects 
could serve as the criterion associations. First, I computed an exhaustive set of absolute 
pairwise ratios between the target replication and non-target facets. I initially found that PSM 
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ratios were larger than both zero-order and multiple regression ratios for both neuroticism and 
extraversion facets. Then, I replicated effects comparing PSM to the prevailing machine 
learning alternative. As a preliminary step, I found that elastic net in isolation and PSM-ENET 
performed equally well for neuroticism facet effects, and that PSM-ENET better differentiated 
extraversion facet effects. Thus, I compared the overall better-performing PSM-ENET to PSM. 
PSM in isolation outperformed PSM-ENET for both neuroticism and extraversion. Moreover, 
I replicated effects in four different ways that mitigated both the impact of outliers and 
methodological artefacts. Results again held across all four SWB outcomes. Therefore, I 
concluded that PSM yielded more internally valid big five facet-SWB associations than 
plausible regression and even machine learning alternatives.  
5.5.1. Big Five Facet Associations with SWB 
Thus, I used PSM to evaluate all big five facet effects on SWB. There were separate facet 
associations for needs thwarting and needs satisfaction. In addition to the remaining 29 facets, 
I also controlled for basic demographics and survey response bias. In support of Schimmack et 
al. (2004), depression from neuroticism and cheerfulness from extraversion had relatively large 
and robust effects on both suffering and flourishing SWB. However, there were also a range of 
other associations—of noteworthy magnitude (r = .10)—that emerged across both needs 
thwarting and needs satisfaction, as well as the secondary outcomes. They were vulnerability 
from neuroticism, friendliness and gregariousness from extraversion, and self-discipline and 
self-efficacy from conscientiousness. Results for vulnerability may suggest that sensitivity to 
frequent negative emotions both exacerbates suffering and impedes flourishing (Steptoe et al., 
2007). Results for friendliness and gregariousness suggest the importance of both social 
support and social capital (Helliwell, 2006). Results for self-discipline and self-efficacy may 
highlight the effectiveness of gritty, goal-oriented, approaches (Sheldon & Elliot, 1999; 
Duckworth et al., 2007). There may be range of personality facet pathways that impact SWB.  
Other associations may help illustrate subtle SWB effects for openness, agreeableness and 
conscientiousness. Although small, there were a variety of openness facet effects on both 
suffering a flourishing. They may support the mild SWB benefits of receptivity to new feelings, 
ideas and experiences (Keng, Smoski & Robins, 2011). The exception was imagination—
which was associated with both exacerbated suffering and increased flourishing—perhaps 
because it promotes both rumination and creativity (Plante, Reysen, Groves, Roberts & 
Gerbasi, 2017). Agreeableness effects highlighted the SWB benefits of behaving prosocially 
(Keltner, Kogan, Piff & Saturn, 2014). However, different kinds of prosociality may protect 
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against suffering and promote flourishing. Indeed, effects for morality and cooperation suggest 
that civic behaviour protects against suffering, perhaps because it mitigates ostracism (Uskul 
& Over, 2017). Contrastingly, altruism may actively give meaning and purpose to life, and thus 
promote flourishing (Keltner et al., 2014). Importantly, modesty—combined shyness and 
tempered self-worth—showed the opposite pattern of effects to the other five agreeableness 
facets. Modesty may be detrimental to SWB because it stymies agentic behaviour in social 
contexts (Freidlin, Littman-Ovadia & Niemiec, 2017). Alternatively, modest people may 
simple report having lower SWB. Finally, all six conscientiousness facets had robust benefits 
that replicated across the four SWB outcomes. Interestingly however, the magnitude of 
cautiousness and achievement-striving was inverted when I switched from needs thwarting to 
needs satisfaction. This may support the relative protective benefits of risk aversion, and the 
relative enabling benefits of aspirational behaviour (Gross, 2015; Locke & Latham, 2002). 
Therefore, the emergent pattern of PSM associations may help reconcile the full range of big 
five facet effects on SWB.  
5.5.2. Propensity Score Matching  
PSM is particularly relevant to the study of personality because it helps account for the complex 
interrelationships between the big five facets. In theory, the 30 big five facets are nested in five 
orthogonal factors. In practise, both circumplex and general factor personality theories suggest 
facet relationships cross factor boundaries (e.g. Saucier & Ostendorf, 1999; van der Linden et 
al., 2016). Until now, this meant that researchers chose between multicollinear or confounded 
facet associations. Consequently, they found only a few noteworthy associations, or 
inconsistent associations that contradicted research in adjacent literatures. While previous 
research has focussed on using PSM to increase the internal validity of quasi-experiments, this 
chapter used PSM to overcome the trade-off between multicollinearity and confounding in 
numeric predictors. PSM achieves this by controlling for the complex web of potentially 
confounding personality facet covariates during sampling rather than statistical modelling. 
Specifically, PSM selects participants who differ on the predictor facet but have convergent 
scores across the remaining 29 facets. Thus, the remaining 29 facets are less likely to confound 
results because they have less actual covariance with the target predictor and outcome. 
PSM may outperform elastic net, which is the prevailing machine learning alternative. 
Although these methods target distinct sampling and modelling components of the analysis, 
they may not be compatible because elastic net compromises individual effect coefficients to 
optimize the overall accuracy of predicted scores. While PSM weights did improve the extent 
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that elastic net isolated specific effect estimates, the combined procedure may have still down-
weighted particularly large coefficients and rounded small coefficients to zero in order to 
optimize the extent clusters of correlated variables—and not individual variables—yielded 
robust predictions (Zou & Hastie, 2005). Of course, PSM in isolation is imperfect. 
Nevertheless, it may still yield more internally valid, consistently replicable and parsimonious 
big five facet-SWB effect estimates than both conventional and elastic net alternatives.  
5.5.3. Limitations and Future Directions 
There were also several limitations in the present chapter. Principally, I used cross-sectional 
surveys. Thus, I could not infer causation. In addition, some reported associations may have 
been artefacts of the self-report format. It was also unlikely that participants sampled were 
representative of their respective countries, or their countries representative of their world 
region. While I could have improved representativeness by fitting additional sample weights, 
this would have diluted PSM weights. Thus, despite being equipped with a large sample, I was 
still confronted with the tradeoff between using the more internally valid PSM solution, or an 
alternate, more externally valid, sample weighting strategy. Another alternative was to select a 
sub-sample of more representative participants. However, this may have compromised 
matching fidelity because fewer participants meant fewer dyads with closely covarying facet 
controls. PSM associations also have constraints. The greater the number of covariates, the less 
perfectly PSM can control for any single variable. Although covariates were usually held at 
least 3/4 more constant with 29 controls, changing intercorrelations and/or additional controls 
may reduce internal validity. Finally, internal validity would also be diluted when evaluating 
interactions between facets because models must then combine both sets of PSM weights. 
Thus, PSM may be most useful for bivariate descriptive research.  
Nevertheless, PSM associations may still offer more parsimonious descriptive insights than 
alternatives in a range of contexts. For example, it could be used to evaluate the unique effects 
of different associated cognitions—like anxiety and rumination—on clinical depression. 
Further, high-fidelity PSM associations might help researchers identify differential patterns of 
effect sizes. This may allow researchers to better direct their attention to the most promising 
associations. From the chapter, researchers might be particularly interested in confirming 
patterns for neuroticism and extraversion effects, the different prosocial behaviours that protect 
against suffering and promote flourishing, the deleterious SWB effects of modesty and the 
differential SWB benefits of caution and achievement striving. Overall, PSM may help isolate 




The big five is a comprehensive account of personality. However, until the present chapter 
there were contradicting big five facet associations with SWB, which mostly emphasised the 
importance of trait affectivity. This limited range of facet associations may have been an 
artefact of stepwise and multiple regression approaches. While both might sometimes mitigate 
confounding, they also make the burden of proof artificially high for some or all the other 
facets. Consequently, results are often incompatible with adjacent literatures—which also 
emphasise the SWB effects of (e.g.) friendliness and altruism facets, among others. To remedy, 
I deployed PSM to mitigate the multicollinearity-confounding tradeoff. PSM associations held 
covariates more constant than zero-order associations, and caused more realistic effect size 
estimates than multiple regression. PSM also better replicated established personality factor 
associations with SWB than both conventional regression and machine learning approaches. 
Then, I used PSM to reveal patterns of associations throughout the entire big five. Results 
suggested multiple pathways for SWB beyond mere negative and positive affect. Thus, I 
concluded that individuals with a wide range of different personality profiles might be 





Twenty-Nine Way Interactions? Random Forest 
Constellations Isolate the Personality Facets that are 
Prevalent in Extreme SWB 
6.1. Abstract 
Social psychology approaches must simplify the individual for scientific rigor. This often 
involves the assumption that at most two or three other personality traits change (i.e. moderate) 
the relationship between any given target trait and the outcome. It thus fails to account for the 
full range of intrapersonal contingencies. To remedy, I used random forest to capture effects 
for each facet across differing levels of all remaining 29 facets. Of course, it is impossible to 
interpret these complicated dependencies. Instead, I used them to find the most robust facet 
main effects. Study 1 found that a single random forest model generalised to participants in 
different world regions and sociodemographic strata. I also found that it most accurately 
predicted SWB for participants with extreme 1% self-reported scores. In Study 2, I used four 
billion simulated cases to evaluate the facets that were most prevalent in cases with extreme 
1% SWB. Results largely confirmed findings in Chapter 5: cases scoring high on most 
neuroticism facets, and low on most of the remaining facets had extreme needs thwarting. I 
observed the inverse pattern for needs satisfaction. However, Study 2 used naturally occurring 
trait constellations, which meant that some intrapersonal contingencies emerged more 
frequently than others. Thus, Study 3 used another four billion simulated cases where there was 
equal likelihood of every possible trait combination. Results suggested a smaller subset of 9 
facet effects—such as the benefits of cooperation on needs thwarting and altruism on needs 
satisfaction—that were robust to fully changing intrapersonal contexts. They may be most 
robustly associated with extreme SWB because they are the most intransient. Overall, random 
forest (S1) found that single universal facet constellations were associated with suffering and 
flourishing, even when relaxing the assumption of non-complex effects; (S2) replicated results 
from Chapter 5 concerning the facet main effects that were most prevalent in the population 




Human experiences are multifaceted, rich and, importantly, unique. Even monozygotic twins 
show quantifiable and sometimes even quite extreme differentiation (Chen et al., 2018). 
Theories about socialization and, more recently, epigenetics have been recruited to explain this 
diversity (Witherington & Lickliter, 2017). Personality theories also acknowledge that 
individuals are unique. However, even when assuming that each of the big five facets has just 
three levels, there are still 2.06 x 1014 possible score profiles. Any of these may change (i.e. 
moderate) the effects of the target facet on outcomes like SWB. To date, the prevailing 
approach assumes that only small a priori defined subsets of these contingencies—usually 
comprising just one or two traits—act as moderators. It is appealing because it identifies a 
discrete set of effect contingencies that can be triangulated to isolate possible mechanisms.    
However, this approach fails to account for how changes in whole constellations of personality 
traits impact SWB. Chapter 5 highlighted the difficulty accounting for the full range of 
plausible interrelated facet effects—which often transcend factor boundaries—even when only 
evaluating main effects, due to increased multicollinearity. This problem is compounded when 
moving to two- and three-way interactions, and then beyond. It is impossible for existing 
models to account for all the possible ways that other traits can change the magnitude and/or 
pattern of observed effects. Random forest machine learning—usually thought of as a black-
box method to predict outcome variables—may remedy by capturing the complex patterns of 
dependencies between all 30 big five facets and SWB. I propose that it can be used to predict 
SWB for huge simulated databases of participants (e.g. billions) who have comprehensive 
ranges of plausible facet score constellations, and then isolate the cases with different stratum 
(e.g. bottom and top percentile) predicted SWB. These interactions—with up to 29 layers when 
using the 30-facet operationalization of the big five—are too numerous and too complex to 
interpret separately. However, effects that emerge across a large percentage of different 
contingencies may be immutable and thus driven by robust mechanisms. As such, random 
forest may help differentiate the most internally valid personality effects. Thus, I aim to (1) 
evaluate the universality of random forest predictions, (2) describe the facets that are most 
prevalent in real-world cases with extreme SWB, and (3) identify the subset of facets that have 
robust prevalences in fully random constellations, which are unlikely to occur in the real world. 
152 
 
6.2.1.  Prevailing Interaction Approaches  
Circumplex theories of personality are designed to capture two-way interactions. During 
Chapter 5, I noted that they demonstrate how personality facets cluster across factor 
boundaries, thus challenging the strictly hierarchical structure of the big five. Circumplexes—
conceptualised as individuals’ intersecting location on two trait scales and by virtue expressed 
as a single set of Cartesian coordinates—are also considered co-dependent and thus irreducible 
interactions (Woods & Anderson, 2016). They predict various SWB-relevant outcomes. For 
example, Smith et al. (1998) found that, among married couples, agency-communion 
circumplex coordinates were differentially associated with both cardiovascular reactivity to 
disagreements and aptitude tests. Similarly, Van Katwyk, Fox, Spector and Kelloway (2000) 
found that the trait valence-arousal affect circumplex predicted job satisfaction, stress and 
physical health. Schwartz & Boehnke (2004) located ten discrete human values on the trait 
openness-individualism circumplex. Then, using this circumplex, Joshanloo & Ghaedi (2009) 
found that individuals who clustered around achievement and traditionalism value orientation 
markers had an exceptionally high sense of purposefulness. In sum, circumplex approaches 
suggest that interacting trait pairs have predictive validity.  
By contrast, continuous big five trait approaches can have both linear and non-linear effects. I 
discussed linear big five associations with SWB in Chapter 5 (e.g. for cooperation and self-
discipline). Recently, non-linear combinations of big five variables have been linked to various 
forms of psychological impairment, especially in sub-clinical populations (Suzuki, Samuel, 
Pahlen & Krueger, 2015). For example, using a three-year prospective longitudinal design, 
Gershuny & Sher (1998) found that extraversion reduced the association between high 
neuroticism and global experiences of anxiety. Later, Naragon-Gainey & Simms (2017) found 
that also having high conscientiousness increased this protective effect. At the facet level, 
Kaplan, Levinson, Rodebaugh, Menatti and Weeks (2015) found that having low trust 
increased the negative association between openness and social anxiety. Allen et al. (2017) 
used the big five aspects—ten intermediary traits between the factors and facets—to find that 
withdrawal, industriousness and enthusiasm interacted with one another to predict depressive 
symptomology in both non-clinical and clinical populations. Overall, the big five factors and 




6.2.2. Problems with the Literature 
However, these approaches fail to account for the whole individual. Circumplexes presuppose 
exclusively two-way interactions when effects may have a different number of contingencies. 
For example, the valence-arousal model of affect may apply less to feelings of disgust—which 
also rely on gastrointestinal cues—than other emotion experiences (Eskine, Kacinik & Prinz, 
2011). Further, big five approaches have difficulty selecting appropriate moderators due to 
complex-patterns of covarying facet scores. It is unclear whether facet contingencies are 
genuine, or whether they proxy for other facets. It is also unclear whether the same moderators 
generalise across socio-demographic and cultural strata. Consequently, issues in variable 
selection may result in fragmented and potentially biased moderation effects. These ultimately 
increase the risk of spuriousness. Finally, there are also interpretation difficulties. To illustrate, 
a four-way interaction is a contingency on the contingency of the contingency of the main 
effect. Results may be incomprehensible—and thus unactionable—long before they account 
for the full range of possible moderators. 
Moreover, even robust and comprehensive patterns of contingencies do not necessarily help 
triangulate causal mechanisms. This is because trait prevalences are often yoked to one-
another. For example, being high in friendliness might predispose someone to also being high 
in gregariousness. This causes range restriction, which is when the sample disproportionately 
comprises participants with predictor scores that are unrepresentative of the full range of 
possible values (Wiberg & Sundström, 2009). In complex interactions, range restriction occurs 
when levels of each predictor preferentially co-occur with certain levels of each moderator.10 
It means that each predictor exerts its impact on the outcome within a bounded and potentially 
unrepresentative subset of intrapersonal contexts. Results from cases with exceptional 
cooccurrence patterns—the kind needed to triangulate effects with genuinely robust 
mechanisms—are typically discounted as residual errors, which thus have little impact on the 
magnitude of observed effect sizes (although they may impact model precision). Put another 
way, range restriction is another source of confounding: emergent effects may cause the 
outcome, or they may be artefacts of the precise set of intrapersonal trait contexts prevalent in 
the sample. Emergent machine learning technologies help reconcile these limitations.  
                                               
10 It is important to note that range restriction concerns the density of score distributions, not their actual ranges. 
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6.2.3. Random Forest 
Random forest is a machine learning technique that can capture extremely complex non-linear 
trait combinations in the population. Specifically, it generates decision trees that predict (e.g.) 
SWB on sub-samples of participants.11 In every decision tree, a randomly selected predictor is 
binary split at the value that leads to the greatest reduction in model imprecision. Then, this 
procedure is repeated—within existing splits—using subsequent randomly selected predictors, 
until adding more randomly-selected predictors stops reducing model inaccuracy. All 
participants in the same nested set of splits are then given the same predicted score. Thus, the 
facets can form complex patterns of non-linear dependencies because they are nested under a 
range of superordinate facet splits. Then, this entire procedure is iteratively repeated—typically 
at least 500 times—with different random predictor orderings and different bootstrapped 
participants. Final values are the mean predictions from all trees. Given enough iterations, each 
predictor has an approximately equal chance of being modelled at each different level of the 
decision tree, and both with and without its most collinear variables. This helps random forest 
account for complex non-linear effects while mitigating both potential confounding, and the 
multicollinearity that would be caused by fitting all covariates together in a single iteration.   
To date in psychology, random forest has been used as a proof-of-concept tool that shows 
groups of predictors are related to an outcome. For example, Mowery, Park, Bryan & Conway 
(2016) decomposed individual Tweets into their linguistic components and then used random 
forest to determine whether they indicated normal functioning, depressive symptomology or 
clinically diagnosed depression. Walsh, Ribeiro and Franklin (2017) used medical records from 
self-harming patients to random forest predict whether they attempted suicide, with 84% 
accuracy. Manesi, Van Lange, Van Doesum & Pollet (2018) used random forest to determine 
which variables associated with prosociality, socio-demographics and environmental primes 
were associated with charitable giving following a typhoon in the Philippines. They found that 
variables relating to empathy were most important to model accuracy.12 Overall, random forest 
has so far been deployed because it may increase prediction accuracy over other linear and 
more simplified non-linear modelling approaches. Most recently in Manesi et al. (2018), it was 
also used to isolate the predictor variables that were most implicated in model accuracy. 
However, the resultant importance scores still do not offer empirical support that predictors are 
                                               
11 Subsamples are usually bootstrapped (i.e. sampled with replacement) to match the original sample size. 
12 Although effect direction may seem intuitive, this cannot be confirmed by random forest importance score alone 
because they simply indicate the extent that excluding a variable increases model imprecision.  
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implicated specifically in low or high outcome scores (e.g. they could have been more 
implicated in middling outcome scores). Therefore, existing random forest approaches can 
show that two phenomena are related but, to date, it does not isolate specific directional effects. 
The present chapter is a first-of-its-kind attempt to isolate specific directional predictors from 
random forest models. Random forest has been viewed as a ‘black box’ approach until now 
because every variable can have both positive and negative effects on the outcome, depending 
on how it combines with the other variables. As such, it does not yield directional coefficient 
estimates. However, the algorithm can be reverse-engineered by examining variable 
prevalences in different strata of predicted SWB, such as the top and bottom percentiles. The 
mean prevalence is the variable score that combines with the most levels from other variables 
to yield scores in that stratum. Put another way, mean prevalence is the variable score that 
offers the most affordances for experiencing that stratum of SWB.  
An added challenge of this approach, however, is that variable prevalences conflate predictors 
and co-occurring traits. That is, facets that artefactually co-occur with genuine predictors in the 
population will also be overrepresented in (e.g.) bottom and top strata predicted SWB. To date, 
difficulty isolating the predictors may be one cause of contradicting findings in theory-driven 
conventional approaches, and concomitant unempirical analyses (see Chapter 5). Random 
forest offers a comprehensive solution: genuine predictors will still have extreme low or high 
prevalences when SWB is predicted using participants where every constellation of facet scores 
is equally likely. This criterion has been made more salient during social psychology’s 
replication crisis, which recognized that robust main effects must hold both within populations 
across testing environments, and in different populations (Shrout & Rogers, 2018). A classic 
example of meeting this robustness criterion is compliance in conditions of uncertainty. It 
emerges across demographics and cultures, and almost always occurs when requests are made 
by perceived legitimate authority (Packer, 2008). Applied to the big five and SWB, genuine 
predictors may have prevalences that are particularly non-contingent on the remaining facets.  
6.2.4. Present Studies 
The present chapter aimed to evaluate the facets most associated with SWB when accounting 
for individuals’ whole constellation of big five personality traits. At the outset, it was unclear 
whether relaxing the assumption of linear controls meant a single statistical model still 
surmised the relationship between facet predictors and SWB throughout the entire population. 
Thus, Study 1 evaluated whether (1) models were more accurate for some sociodemographic 
156 
 
strata than others; (2) the same complex facet effects emerged across deliberately biased sub-
samples; and, (3) predictions were more accurate for cases with extreme vs middling SWB. 
Then, Study 2 evaluated the (4) facets that were most prevalent in extreme (i.e. lowest and 
highest) population SWB. I used simulated cases to account for different realistic real-world 
patterns of facet co-occurrence, rather than relying on the single-observed and potentially 
idiosyncratic pattern in the sample. Finally, Study 3 (5) evaluated the extent prevalences 
replicated when I relaxed the assumption of facet co-occurrence, so that there was equal 
likelihood of every possible set of facet score combinations. This helped evaluate the facets 
that most likely caused extreme SWB. I expected a subset of facets from (4) to emerge in (5) 
because the latter were predicated on having effects that were robust to a much wider range of 
intrapersonal contingencies.  
6.3. Study 1 
6.3.1. Method 
6.3.1.1. Procedure  
I used the same data and preliminary approaches as Chapters 4 and 5. Specifically, participants 
were the 36,498 multinational internet panellists from 33 different countries and 14 language 
groups. Full details of the sampling procedure and methods are in Chapter 1. The 30 big five 
facets were measured using the 120-item public version of the NEO personality inventory 
(NEO-IPIP-120; N = 36,498), the primary outcomes were needs thwarting and satisfaction (N 
= 29,629), and the secondary outcomes were SLS and self-reported health (N = 36,498). I 
imputed the 2% of variable scores that were missing, within each country. Then, I removed all 
covariation from the data between the controls—sex, age, social class, religiosity and response 
bias—and the (a) 30 personality facets, and (b) 4 SWB outcomes. Finally, the facets and 
outcomes were z-scored so that all values were relative to participants’ countrymen. Having 
already accounted for the controls, the analyses thus focussed exclusively on personality facets 
and SWB. Effects were relative to participants’ countrymen rather than absolute.  
6.3.1.2. Random Forests  
I generated separate random forests for each outcome, using 10-fold cross validation (10-FCV). 
As in Chapter 5, 10-FCV separates participants into ten equal-sized groups. Then, it develops 
an exhaustive set of models on 9/10 of the groups and evaluates associations between true and 
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model predicted scores for the 10th, excluded, group. Ten folds is sufficient to mitigate spurious 
results (Kuhn, 2008). Each 10-FCV used R’s ‘randomForest’ package default values for 
decision trees (500) and predictors randomly sampled at each split (1/3) because they have 
demonstrated robustness (Liaw & Wiener, 2002). Due to computational constraints, I generated 
model predictions using only 10,000 randomly sampled participants. To mitigate idiosyncratic 
findings, I generated three models for each outcome using different random samples. Predicted 
scores for participants involved in model development were from the 10-FCV iteration where 
they were not involved in model development. Then, I used the overall 10-FCV model to 
generate predicted scores for remaining participants. Thus, every participant had three 
predicted scores for each outcome. 
Models explained noteworthy variation in each SWB outcome. I computed accuracy—as both 
the correlation and mean absolute error (MAE)—between self-reported and predicted scores. 
Results are in Table 6.1. For every outcome, Cronbach’s alpha suggested that the three 
predicted scores were almost perfectly identical. Thus, I took their average. Models explained 
35% and 41% variation in self-reported scores for needs thwarting and satisfaction 
respectively, and 28% and 11% for SLS and health respectively. Although model accuracy was 
approximately equal to the elastic nets used in Chapter 5—which evaluated main effects—
random forests may have still yielded more parsimonious patterns of specific facet effects 
because it was designed to capture more ecologically valid facet interrelationships. Observed 
R2 model accuracies were the equivalent of MAE  3/5 SDs in self-reported scores for the 
primary outcomes, and MAE  7/10 SDs in self-reported scores for the secondary outcomes. 
Put another way, self-report and predicted SWB were on average different by greater than 0.5 
SDs. Despite this overall imprecision, results from Chapter 3 suggested that MAE may have 






Prediction accuracy for the big five facets on SWB, using random forest 
DV Α M (SD) R MAE (SD) 
Needs Satisfaction .99 -0.02 (0.61) .64 (.63, .65) 0.59 (0.50) 
Needs Thwarting  .99 0.00 (0.57) .60 (.58, .61) 0.63 (0.50) 
Satisfaction with Life .99 0.00 (0.49) .53 (.52, .55) 0.67 (0.52) 
Subjective Health .97 -0.01 (0.32) .33 (.31, .35) 0.74 (0.59) 
Notes. α = Cronbach’s alpha computed from three random forest predicted 
scores, for each outcome. R = Correlation between average predicted score 
and self-report score, with 99.9% confidence intervals computed from 
effect SEs. MAE = Mean absolute error. 
 
Finally, I evaluated the extent that each facet impacted model accuracy. Complex non-linear 
associations meant that every variable could have both positive and negative effects on SWB. 
Thus, the final models did not yield directional coefficient weights, but variable importance 
scores. These scores captured the extent overall model accuracy decreased in the subset of trees 
where the variable was randomly excluded. Results are in Table 6.2. For needs thwarting, the 
most important facets were depression, vulnerability, anxiety, cheerfulness and then self-
discipline. For needs satisfaction, the most important facets were self-efficacy, cheerfulness, 
self-discipline, depression and then achievement-striving. For both secondary outcomes, the 
most important facets were depression and then cheerfulness. Despite putative convergence 
with PSM associations in Chapter 5, importance scores did not necessarily suggest the facets 






Big five facet importance for random forest prediction accuracy  
Factor  Facet Thwarting Satisfaction SLS Health 
NUR 
F1 37% 13% 25% 53% 
F2 18% 13% 18% 39% 
F3 100% 44% 100% 100% 
F4 14% 14% 18% 38% 
F5 12% 13% 19% 42% 
F6 48% 18% 21% 50% 
EXT 
F1 15% 24% 26% 35% 
F2 12% 13% 22% 36% 
F3 12% 28% 19% 36% 
F4 12% 14% 21% 38% 
F5 12% 14% 18% 35% 
F6 29% 84% 91% 70% 
OPN  
F1 12% 14% 20% 35% 
F2 12% 16% 19% 35% 
F3 12% 17% 18% 37% 
F4 12% 13% 19% 36% 
F5 11% 16% 18% 36% 
F6 12% 12% 18% 37% 
AGR  
F1 12% 16% 29% 38% 
F2 19% 14% 20% 35% 
F3 12% 23% 17% 35% 
F4 16% 12% 18% 36% 
F5 12% 15% 23% 38% 
F6 12% 14% 19% 36% 
CON 
F1 17% 100% 29% 41% 
F2 13% 12% 19% 36% 
F3 15% 17% 20% 37% 
F4 13% 31% 19% 37% 
F5 28% 50% 41% 42% 
F6 18% 12% 18% 35% 
Notes. Importance scores do not have an intuitive interpretation; 
thus, for each outcome, I transformed them into percentages of 
the maximum observed importance (in bold).  
 
6.3.2. Results 
Random forest with 10-FCV were performed using R’s ‘randomForest’ package with ‘caret’ 
package interface. It yielded complex combinations of facets that predicted SWB. There were 
too many potential facet combinations to interpret (229 > 500 million), and thus I focussed on 
(a) overall model accuracy, (b) facet importance scores, and (c) model accuracy for 
increasingly extreme predicted SWB. Accuracy for (a) and (c) was MAE because it yielded 
separate errors for every participant, and thus could both be fit as an outcome in individual-
level prediction models, and used to create mean accuracies for participant subgroups (e.g. each 
percentile). I retained all outlier predictions because there was sufficient statistical power to 
mitigate their leverage. The significance threshold was p < .001.  
160 
 
6.3.2.1. Model Accuracy Across Controls  
First, I evaluated whether models were equally accurate across sociodemographic strata. 
Although I apportioned all control main effects from the random forests models, they were still 
free to interact with the facets to change overall prediction accuracy. Put more simply, models 
may have had greater predictive power in some demographic groups (e.g. women) than others. 
Thus, I used multiple regression to evaluate whether participants’ individual-level control 
characteristics, as well as their world region (Anglosphere, Asia, Europe and Latin America), 
were associated with their MAE. Anglosphere was the reference category because it yielded 
the lowest MAE for all four outcomes.13 This maximized coefficients for the other three world 
regions, thus increasing the likelihood for evidence against the universality of my models. 
Results are in Table 6.3. Total model R2 was < 1% for the models including just control 
characteristics, across both primary outcomes. Concomitant total model R2 was  1% across 
both secondary outcomes. For primary outcomes, the largest observed effects were |b| = 0.02 
for binary predictors and |b| = 0.03 for continuous predictors. Thus, for binary predictors the 
maximum total mean difference in MAE between groups was around 2% of the SD. For 
continuous predictors, every SD increase was associated with a maximum 3% SD change in 
the outcome. For secondary outcomes, the largest observed effects were approximately double 
this figure. However, their CIs also converged on zero, and thus the larger point estimates could 
have been caused by sampling error. Overall, observed magnitudes were small enough to 
suggest model accuracy was constant across different population sub-samples.  
 
Table 6.3 
Differences in overall random forest model accuracy across socio-demographic controls   
Predictor Satisfaction (CI) Thwarting (CI) SLS (CI) Health (CI) 
Sex -0.01 (-0.03, 0.01) -0.03 (-0.05, -0.01) -0.01 (-0.03, 0.01) 0.01 (-0.01, 0.03) 
Age 0.00 (0.00, 0.00) 0.00 (0.00, 0.00) 0.00 (0.00, 0.00) 0.00 (0.00, 0.00) 
Religious 0.02 (0.00, 0.04) 0.01 (-0.01, 0.03) 0.00 (-0.01, 0.02) 0.02 (-0.01, 0.04) 
Social class -0.02 (-0.03, -0.01) -0.01 (-0.02, 0.00) -0.04 (-0.05, -0.03) -0.05 (-0.06, -0.04) 
Response bias 0.00 (-0.01, 0.01) 0.03 (0.02, 0.04) 0.03 (0.02, 0.04) 0.03 (0.02, 0.04) 
Asia 0.01 (-0.02, 0.04) 0.03 (0.00, 0.06) 0.06 (0.03, 0.09) 0.00 (-0.03, 0.04) 
Europe 0.00 (-0.03, 0.03) 0.02 (-0.01, 0.05) 0.02 (-0.01, 0.05) 0.02 (-0.01, 0.05) 
Latin America 0.02 (-0.01, 0.05) 0.02 (-0.01, 0.04) 0.03 (0.01, 0.06) 0.01 (-0.02, 0.04) 
Notes. Anglosphere was the reference category. Values are beta coefficients and 99.9% CIs (in brackets).  
                                               




6.3.2.2. Predicted Scores in Different Sub-Samples  
Next, I evaluated whether facet constellations were consistently associated with SWB, across 
deliberately biased sub-samples. Even though overall model accuracy was relatively constant 
across the control variables, sub-groups in the population could still have had different 
predictor relationships. Thus, I compared predicted scores from models generated using 
specific, biased, control variable strata. There were separate models for women, men, those 
currently practicing and not practising a religion and each world region. There were also 
models for low, middle and high thirds for age, social class and response bias. I generated a 
single random forest model using each stratum, where I randomly sampled a maximum 10,000 
participants for 10-FCV (when relevant), or all participants in strata where N < 10,000.14 Then, 
I generated predicted scores for all participants, as per the Procedure. Model summary statistics 
for the primary outcomes are in Table 6.4. As a preliminary step, I found that all models were 
approximately as accurate as the initial models using fully random participants. Then, for both 
primary outcomes, I found α > .99 for the predicted scores from different strata. This 
corresponded to mean correlations between the predicted scores of r = .98. The mean 
correlation of these biased predicted scores to predicted scores obtained using fully random 
participants was r = .99 (SD < .01). Results also converged for SLS and health (α >= .99; RSLS 
>= .91; RHealth = .94). Therefore, I concluded that facets all combined in approximately the same 
way to predict SWB across the various biased subsamples.  
 
  
                                               
14 I did not fit multiple random forests models for each stratum (a) to conserve computational power, and (b) 




Total random forest model prediction accuracies using different, biased, subsamples 
  Needs Satisfaction Needs Thwarting 
Variable Level R MAE (SD) R MAE (SD) 
Sex 
Male .63 (.63, .64) 0.59 (0.50) .59 (.58, .60) 0.63 (0.51) 
Female .63 (.63, .64) 0.59 (0.50) .59 (.58, .60) 0.63 (0.51) 
Religious 
No .64 (.63, .64) 0.59 (0.50) .59 (.58, .60) 0.63 (0.5) 
Yes .63 (.62, .64) 0.60 (0.50) .59 (.58, .60) 0.63 (0.51) 
Region 
Asia .63 (.62, .64) 0.60 (0.50) .59 (.58, .59) 0.63 (0.51) 
Latin .63 (.62, .64) 0.60 (0.50) .59 (.58, .60) 0.63 (0.5) 
Anglo .63 (.62, .64) 0.59 (0.50) .59 (.58, .59) 0.63 (0.51) 
EU .63 (.63, .64) 0.59 (0.50) .59 (.58, .60) 0.63 (0.51) 
Age 
Young .63 (.63, .64) 0.60 (0.50) .59 (.58, .60) 0.63 (0.5) 
Middle .63 (.63, .64) 0.59 (0.50) .59 (.58, .60) 0.63 (0.51) 
Old .63 (.63, .64) 0.59 (0.50) .59 (.58, .60) 0.63 (0.51) 
Social 
Class 
Bottom .63 (.63, .64) 0.59 (0.50) .59 (.58, .60) 0.63 (0.51) 
Middle .63 (.63, .64) 0.59 (0.50) .59 (.58, .60) 0.63 (0.51) 
Top .63 (.63, .64) 0.59 (0.50) .59 (.58, .60) 0.63 (0.5) 
Response 
Bias 
Low .63 (.62, .64) 0.59 (0.50) .59 (.58, .60) 0.63 (0.51) 
Medium .63 (.63, .64) 0.59 (0.50) .59 (.58, .60) 0.63 (0.51) 
High .63 (.62, .64) 0.60 (0.50) .59 (.58, .60) 0.63 (0.51) 
Notes. There was almost perfect convergence in model accuracies for models 
generated using different biased participant sub-samples. I excluded secondary 
outcomes from Table 6.4 because their effects almost totally converged with 
primary outcomes, and they detracted from overall table readability. 
 
6.3.2.3. Classification Accuracy by Extremeness  
Next, I evaluated whether predicted SWB scores were most accurate for extreme cases. To 
calculate extremeness, I took percentile rank of the absolute values of each self-reported and 
predicted SWB outcome (1 = “Least extreme”, 100 = “Most extreme”). In the first instance, I 
was interested in MAE for true vs predicted score percentile. Result are in Figure 6.1. For both 
primary outcomes and SLS, MAE decreased and then plateaued as extremeness increased from 
1 to  95; then, it decreased sharply from extremeness  96 to 100. It was lowest for the most 
extreme percentile cases, where MAE = 19.24 (SD = 24.63) for needs thwarting, MAE = 12.73 
(SD = 18.22) for needs satisfaction, and MAE = 19.07 (SD = 24.04) for SLS. Thus, cases with 
the highest percentile predicted scores on average had self-report scores that were at least in 
the top 1/5. The exception was for health—which showed a negative quadratic trend across all 
extremeness values—perhaps because of the relative inaccuracy of its predicted scores. Thus, 




Figure 6.1. Mean absolute error by the percentile extremeness of predicted scores. The 1st percentile was the 1% 
absolute predicted scores closest to the mean for both primary outcomes (needs thwarting and needs satisfaction), 
as well as for both secondary outcomes (satisfaction with life (SLS) and health).  The 100th percentile was the 
concomitant 1% absolute predicted scores furthest from the mean. Then, I also converted true scores to 
extremeness percentiles. Thus, the Y axis was the mean absolute difference between predicted and true score 
percentile.  
 
Classification accuracy then increased for extreme cases when I categorized them into 
ecologically valid groups. Items for the primary outcomes and SLS were measured on Likert 
scales with seven-points (1 = “Strongly disagree”; 7 = “Strongly agree”). Thus, I bucketed true 
and predicted scores into these same seven categories. Results are in Figure 6.2. As 
extremeness increased, there was an exponential increase in the percentage of cases classified 
correctly. Thus, predicted scores were again most informative for the extreme cases. For the 
most extreme percentile, correct classification was 77% for needs thwarting, 86% for needs 
satisfaction, and 74% for SLS. Of the cases classified incorrectly, 9%, 7% and 16% 
respectively were incorrectly misclassified by only one category.  This was the equivalent of 
wrongly predicting that cases “disagreed”/“agreed” with SWB items, on average. Thus, even a 
subset of the misclassifications may have also been interpretable. Overall, random forests may 
have thus yielded > 85% meaningful classifications—the majority of these correct rather than 




Figure 6.2. Classification accuracy by percentile extremeness of predicted scores. The 1st percentile was the 1% 
absolute predicted scores closest to the mean for both primary outcomes (needs thwarting and needs satisfaction) 
and satisfaction with life.  The 100th percentile was the concomitant 1% absolute predicted scores furthest from 
the mean. Classification was into one of seven equal sized and ordered buckets. Classified correctly was the 
percentage of cases in each extremeness percentile with matching predicted and true score buckets.   
 
6.3.2.4. Confusion Matrices for Top Percentile Extreme Classifications 
Finally, I used confusion matrices to evaluate classification bias. As above, predicted scores 
were classified into seven equally sized buckets that ranged from ‘lowest’ to ‘highest’ scores. 
Table 6.5 contains the multigroup contingency matrices for all cases in the data, across both 
primary BMPN outcomes and SLS. Results confirmed that classifications were most accurate 
for the extreme categories (i.e. ‘one’ and ‘seven’) across all three outcomes. Classifications 
were least accurate for the middle three categories, likely because it was possible to make at 
least two classification errors in both directions. There were more misclassifications to adjacent 
buckets than non-adjacent buckets, and the buckets furthest away from each true score bucket 
had the fewest misclassifications. Finally, there was some evidence for asymmetric 
classification accuracy in the most extreme buckets, across all three outcomes. For example, in 
needs satisfaction there were more correct classifications into category seven than there were 




Table 6.5.  





One Two Three Four Five Six Seven 
TWT 
One 2040 942 567 321 189 125 49 
Two 962 1047 848 584 423 239 130 
Three 521 877 869 745 571 423 227 
Four 337 579 714 832 788 611 371 
Five 166 384 605 726 848 887 617 
Six 119 240 385 625 829 1015 1020 
Seven 88 164 245 399 585 933 1818 
SAT 
One 1892 981 572 368 236 119 65 
Two 1062 1119 843 549 358 217 85 
Three 602 879 951 755 562 348 136 
Four 338 599 785 870 811 561 268 
Five 189 366 591 821 931 885 450 
Six 100 196 347 593 855 1116 1026 
Seven 50 93 144 276 480 987 2202 
SWL 
One 2353 1022 624 466 344 245 160 
Two 1172 1161 947 754 550 372 258 
Three 670 1004 1002 868 738 590 342 
Four 425 817 959 972 859 692 490 
Five 265 566 753 920 1001 952 757 
Six 202 408 575 741 982 1175 1131 
Seven 127 236 354 493 740 1188 2076 
Notes. TWT = Basic psychological needs thwarting. SAT = Basic 
psychological needs satisfaction. SLS = Satisfaction with life scale. N = 
29,629 for needs thwarting and satisfaction. N = 36,498 for SLS. There were 
an equal number of cases bucketed into each of the true and predicted score 
categories (ranging from “one” to “seven”).  
 
Then, I evaluated classification bias in extreme percentile predicted SWB. Cases in the 0.5th 
predicted score percentile were necessarily bucketed in category ‘one’ and cases in the 99.5th 
predicted score percentile were necessarily bucketed in category ‘seven’. Thus, predicted 
categories within each percentile group did not vary, and I could only compare the number of 
correct vs incorrect classifications. Results are in Table 6.6. They confirmed the asymmetries 
observed in Table 6.5: classifications were more accurate for the bottom vs top 0.5th percentile 
in needs thwarting and SLS, and for the top vs bottom 0.5th percentile in needs satisfaction. 
However, differences were marginal for needs thwarting and SLS, and thus could have been 
due to sampling error. The larger difference for needs satisfaction could have simply been 
because participants were more accurate at self-reporting flourishing than the absence of 
flourishing. Nevertheless, I proceeded with the existing random forest classifications for needs 
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satisfaction, as well as the other SWB outcomes, because I planned to aggregated facet 
prevalences for 0.5th (reversed) and 99.5th percentile predicted SWB. As such, the less accurate 
pole likely widened facet prevalence CIs, which simply increased the stringency of existing 
Type 1 error-detection thresholds.  
 
Table 6.6. 
Correct classifications for extreme percentile 








Bottom 118 31 79% 
Top 112 36 76% 
Satisfaction 
Bottom 119 30 80% 
Top 135 13 91% 
SWL 
Bottom 142 41 78% 
Top 132 50 73% 
Notes. SWL = Satisfaction with life. I only 
retained the bottom and top 0.5th percentile 
predicted scores. This was 297 total cases for both 
BMPN outcomes, and 365 cases for SWL.   
 
6.4. Study 2 
Results from Study 1 suggested that overall prediction accuracy, and the constellations of big 
five facets implicated in random forest SWB, were both universal. Then, it also evaluated 
differences in the accuracy of random forest models by the extremeness of participants’ 
predicted scores. For needs thwarting, needs satisfaction and SLS, random forest prediction 
accuracy was highest for the most extreme 1% of cases. I discarded health because it did not 
show the corresponding accuracy improvements. Then, I evaluated the accuracy of remaining 
effects again, using seven ecologically valid categories. In the three retained outcomes, > 85% 
of classifications from the predicted scores meaningfully mapped onto participants’ true scores. 
In Study 2, I thus evaluated the facet constellations implicated in extreme 1% predicted SWB.  
When evaluating complex non-linear effects, parts of the facet intercorrelations in the sample 
may be attributable to sampling error. If so, they were unrepresentative of the population 
pattern of intercorrelations. This is especially problematic for assessing intra-facet 
contingencies because it may cause restriction of range. To remedy, I used Cholesky 
Decomposition (CD) to simulate facet scores with different plausible intercorrelations. In 
167 
 
psychology, CD is often used to transform different sets of variables—e.g. genetic and 
environmental—so that they are uncorrelated, thus allowing for orthogonal analyses 
(Archontaki, Lewis & Bates, 2013). However, the CD process can also be reversed to simulate 
variable scores that adhere to a pre-defined correlation structure (Davis, 1987). Thus, I 
iteratively simulated batches of cases using patterns of facet intercorrelations that were 
randomly sampled from the respective SE distributions of all the observed bivariate facet 
associations. Then, I used random forests to predict their SWB. I was interested in facet 
prevalences that were reliably below or above zero in the 1% most extreme cases, for 99.9% 
of the CD batches. This was an approximate bootstrapped CI, where there was p < .001 
likelihood that population facet means were outside the observed prevalence ranges.  
6.4.1. Method 
6.4.1.1. Procedure 
The participants and materials were the same as Study 1. To simulate cases, I first generated 
two 30*30 square matrices: (a) bivariate facet correlations, and (b) concomitant SEs. That 
meant each facet had its own column and corresponding row, correlations on the diagonal axis 
all equalled one and the lower and upper triangles of both matrices were symmetrical. For each 
cell in the lower triangle of the correlation matrix, I imputed one value from a randomly 
simulated sample of 1,000 normally distributed correlations where the mean was the observed 
point estimate and the SD was the observed SE. Simulated correlations > |3| SE from the point 
estimate were truncated to prevent unrepresentative matrices. Then, I transposed the lower 
triangle of the matrix onto the upper triangle. Thus, the full matrix comprised facet 
intercorrelations that were randomly sampled from the full range of plausible population 
effects. Then, I used CD to simulate facet scores for 200,000 cases from the new matrix. This 
meant that there were 1,000 cases for both the bottom and top 0.5th percentiles, which was large 
enough to establish central tendency (Israel, 1992). Then, I also truncated facet scores > |3| SD 
from the mean, so that predictions applied to cases in the general population and not possible 
outliers. Overall, simulated scores were thus more representative of  real-world populations.  
I generated predicted scores for each outcome from a single random forest model, which 
comprised all participants.15 Overall model accuracy converged with the models in Study 1 for 
needs thwarting (R2 = 35%), needs satisfaction (R2 = 40%) and SLS (R2 = 28%). For the bottom 
                                               
15I did not use 10-FCV because (a) I did not need to make uncontaminated predictions for existing participants 
because models were exported to simulated cases; (b) 10-FCV and non-10-FCV models generally converge in 
large samples (James et al., 2013); and, (c) Study 1 suggested separate models would be almost identical. 
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and in the top 0.5%, I also removed cases with predicted SWB > |3| SDs from the mean for 
their stratum—again to mitigate outliers—and then took the facet means. I repeated this entire 
procedure 20,000 times for each outcome, so that there was both a representative range of facet 
intercorrelations and enough means to find stable 99.9% CIs in the extreme 1% of cases. As 
such, I simulated a total of four billion cases. 
As a preliminary step, I used 1,000 simulations with the reported procedure to find the 
maximum possible facet mean for the most extreme 1% cases using random normally 
distributed z-scores with truncated outliers. It was M = |2.82| (SD = 0.01). When the mean 
converged with this ceiling, its high values combined with disproportionately more levels from 
the other facets that were prevalent in the population to promote extreme SWB. When the 
upper-bound CI failed to converge with this ceiling, other facets/facet combinations could 
override its SWB effects. Finally, prevalences in bottom and top 0.5% SWB were not 
necessarily exact opposites because random forest affects can be asymmetric. That said, for 
simplicity I averaged effects for the 99.5th percentile and reversed effects for the 0.5th 
percentile—by taking mean point and CI estimates—because the CIs overlapped in all but one 
instance. The exception was for depression, which was more prevalent in extremely high (M = 
2.46; CI = 2.31, 2.60) than extremely low needs thwarting (M = 2.10; CI = 1.93, 2.27). 
6.4.2. Results 
All facet prevalences and 99.9% CIs for the most extreme 1% needs thwarting, needs 
satisfaction and SLS predicted scores are in Figure 6.3. Where prevalences converged with the 
results in Chapter 5, it increased confidence that they exerted genuine impacts on SWB in the 
presence of comprehensive real-world facet contingencies. Where they diverged, facets may 
have only exerted their impact on SWB in combination with constellations of other facets that 
happened to be overrepresented in the sample. I report facet prevalences in order of magnitude 
within each factor. In most cases, I grouped facets when there were overlapping CIs. The 




Figure 6.3. Heatmap of facet prevalence in cases with the most extreme 1% predicted needs thwarting and 
satisfaction. Point estimate values were mean z-score values (M = 0; SD = 1) of prevalence scores generated from 
20,000 simulated populations with different plausible real-world patterns of facet covariance. Confidence intervals 
were from specific simulated populations with .0005th and .9995th mean facet prevalences. Thus, they formed a 
99.9% bootstrapped CI. The darker the panel the more positive the association. The X axis contains the big five 
factors and the Y axis contains each of their six nested facets. The factors and facets (in order) are: Neuroticism 
(anxiety, anger, depression, self-consciousness, immoderation, vulnerability), Extraversion (friendliness, 
gregariousness, assertiveness, activity-level, excitement-seeking, cheerfulness), Openness (imagination, artistic 
interests, emotionality, adventurousness, intellect, liberalism), Agreeableness (trust, morality, altruism, 
cooperation, modesty, sympathy) and Conscientiousness (self-efficacy, orderliness, dutifulness, achievement-
striving, self-discipline, cautiousness). * = The 99.9% facet prevalence CI for need thwarting/needs satisfaction 
did not cross zero. ^ = The 99.9% prevalence CI for satisfaction with life did not cross zero.  
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6.4.2.1. Needs Thwarting  
Cases scoring high on all six neuroticism facets were overrepresented in extreme needs 
thwarting. The largest prevalences were for depression, anxiety and vulnerability. This was 
followed by anger and self-consciousness, and then finally immoderation. Cases scoring low 
on five of the six extraversion facets were also overrepresented. Low cheerfulness, friendliness, 
assertiveness and gregarious were most prevalent, followed by low activity-level. There was 
no effect for excitement seeking. Four openness facets were overrepresented. Low 
adventurousness, intellect and artistic interests, and high imagination, all had approximately 
equal prevalence. There were no effects for emotionality or liberalism. All six agreeableness 
facets were overrepresented. Low cooperation, morality, altruism, trust and sympathy, and high 
modesty, were overrepresented. Finally, cases scoring low on all six conscientious facets were 
overrepresented. Low self-discipline and self-efficacy were most prevalent, followed by low 
cautiousness, dutifulness, orderliness and achievement striving. All needs thwarting effects 
were also significant for SLS.  
6.4.2.2. Needs Satisfaction 
Cases scoring low on all six neuroticism facets were also overrepresented in extreme needs 
satisfaction. Low depression, vulnerability, self-consciousness, anxiety and anger were most 
prevalent, followed by immoderation. Cases scoring high on all six extraversion facets were 
overrepresented. High cheerfulness, friendliness, assertiveness and gregariousness were most 
prevalent, followed by high activity-level and excitement seeking. Four openness facets were 
overrepresented. High artistic interests, intellect, adventurousness and emotionality all had 
approximately equal prevalence. There were no effects for imagination or liberalism. All six 
agreeableness facets were overrepresented. High altruism had the largest prevalence. Then, 
high morality, trust, sympathy and cooperation, as well as low modesty, all had approximately 
equal prevalence. Finally, cases scoring high on all six conscientious facets were 
overrepresented. High self-efficacy and self-discipline were again the most prevalent, followed 
by high achievement-striving, dutifulness, orderliness and cautiousness. All needs satisfaction 
effects were also significant for SLS.  
6.4.2.3. Differential SWB Prevalences 
Finally, I evaluated whether there were any differences in the magnitude of needs thwarting 
and satisfaction facet prevalences. There were four facets that had non-overlapping CI 
magnitudes. In neuroticism, the anxiety effect was larger for needs thwarting (M = 2.14; CI = 
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1.94, 2.33) than needs satisfaction (M = -1.39; CI = -1.66, -1.12). In openness, the effect for 
emotionality was smaller for needs thwarting (M = -0.26; CI = -0.57, 0.06) than needs 
satisfaction (M = 0.92; CI = 0.63, 1.20). Finally, in conscientiousness the effects for both self-
efficacy and achievement-striving were smaller for needs thwarting (C1: M = -1.63, CI = -1.88, 
-1.37; C4: M = -1.04, CI = -1.32, -0.75) than needs satisfaction (C1: M = 2.24, CI = 2.06, 2.41; 
C4: M = 1.58, CI = 1.33, 1.83).  Overall, most facets had convergent prevalences for needs 
thwarting and satisfaction. However, there were still exceptions in three of the big five. This 
suggested partially distinct substrates for suffering and flourishing, in the population sampled.  
6.5. Study 3 
Study 2 suggested that personality constellations comprising low neuroticism facet scores, and 
high scores for most other facets, on average experienced top 1% SWB. It also observed the 
inverse pattern for bottom 1% SWB. However, these prevalences were not necessarily 
internally valid. Positive correlations between facets meant it was greater than chance that any 
participant randomly sampled from the population would score similarly on both facets. Across 
the 30 facets, this meant that certain constellations—corresponding to those typical of the 
population—were oversampled. Whilst Study 2 thus described the average profiles of cases 
experiencing extreme SWB in the real world, it also restricted the range of moderating facet 
levels. Facet prevalences that indicated robust, internally valid, SWB relationships may have 
retained their high prevalence when every personality constellation was equally likely.  
6.5.1. Method 
6.5.1.1. Procedure   
Study 3 replicated the procedure from Study 2, except with simulated orthogonal rather than 
CD intercorrelated big five facet scores. For continuity, I again simulated 200,000 random 
normally distributed cases for each facet. I predicted the three SWB outcomes using the random 
forests models developed in Study 2, and retained the 1,000 cases with both the bottom and top 
0.5% predicted scores. Facet prevalences were computed after removing cases with predicted 
scores > |3| SD from the mean for their stratum. Then, I again repeated this entire procedure 
20,000 times, so there were enough means to compute 99.9% bootstrapped CIs. When facet 
means converged with the ceiling (M = |2.82|), they combined with the most levels from other 
facets—regardless of the likelihood that facets co-occurred in the population—to promote 
extreme SWB. When the upper-bound facet CIs failed to converge with the ceiling, it again 
172 
 
meant that other personality constellations could override SWB effects for the facet in question. 
I again aggregated mean prevalences for the 99.5th and reversed 0.5th percentiles—by taking 
mean point and CI estimates—because the CIs overlapped in all instances.  
6.5.2. Results 
All facet prevalences and 99.9% CIs for the most extreme 1% needs thwarting, needs 
satisfaction and SLS predicted scores are in Figure 6.4. There were far fewer noteworthy effects 
than in Study 2, and thus I report them by magnitude across the five factors. I again grouped 
prevalences when CIs overlapped, except in some marginal cases where there was also 
theoretical discontinuity. For extreme needs thwarting, high depression (N3), and then high 
anxiety (N1) and vulnerability (N6), and then low self-discipline (C5), cheerfulness (E6) and 
cooperation (A4) were most prevalent. For extreme needs satisfaction, high self-efficacy (C1) 
and cheerfulness, and then low depression and high self-discipline, assertiveness (E3) and 
altruism (A3) were most prevalent. I replicated all prevalences for SLS. Of these, the 
neuroticism facet effect magnitudes were larger for needs thwarting (N3: M = 1.82, CI = 1.61, 
2.05; N1: M = 1.15, CI = 0.76, 1.51; N6: M = 0.94, CI = 0.59, 1.25) than for needs satisfaction 
(N3: M = -0.90, CI = -1.26, -0.49; N1: M = -0.09, CI =-0.41, 0.24; N6: M = -0.16, CI = -0.54, 
0.21). Contrastingly, cheerfulness and self-efficacy effect magnitudes were larger for needs 
satisfaction (E6: M = -0.45, CI = -0.92, -0.04; C1:  M = -0.30, CI = -0.65, 0.06) than for needs 
thwarting (E6: M = 1.34, CI = 1.04, 1.61; C1:  M = 1.42, CI = 1.08, 1.73). As such, neuroticism 
facets may have been more prevalent in extreme needs thwarting than extreme needs 
satisfaction. There was also partial support for the converse: self-efficacy and cheerfulness 
were more prevalent in extreme needs satisfaction. Overall, results suggest smaller subsets of 
facets implicated in extreme needs thwarting and needs satisfaction. They emerged with more 





Figure 6.4. Heatmap of facet prevalence in cases with the most extreme 1% predicted needs thwarting and 
satisfaction. Point estimate values were mean z-scores (M = 0; SD = 1) of prevalences generated from 20,000 
simulated populations with different random patterns of facet covariance. Confidence intervals were from specific 
simulated populations with .0005th and .9995th mean facet prevalences. Thus, they formed a 99.9% bootstrapped 
CI. The darker the panel the more positive the association. The X axis contains the big five factors and the Y axis 
contains each of their six nested facets. The factors and facets (in order) are: Neuroticism (anxiety, anger, 
depression, self-consciousness, immoderation, vulnerability), Extraversion (friendliness, gregariousness, 
assertiveness, activity-level, excitement-seeking, cheerfulness), Openness (imagination, artistic interests, 
emotionality, adventurousness, intellect, liberalism), Agreeableness (trust, morality, altruism, cooperation, 
modesty, sympathy) and Conscientiousness (self-efficacy, orderliness, dutifulness, achievement-striving, self-
discipline, cautiousness). * = The 99.9% facet prevalence CI for need thwarting/needs satisfaction did not cross 




The present chapter aimed to evaluate the constellations of personality facets that are associated 
with extremely low and high SWB. Until now, existing research was unable to capture complex 
facet interrelationships, possibly due to multicollinear predictors and interpretive constraints. I 
overcame these challenges using random forest, which captures the complex interdependencies 
between all thirty big five facets. In Study 1, I found that a single random forest captured a 
universal pattern of facet effects on SWB, and that results were especially accurate for cases 
with extreme 1% predicted cases. In Study 2, I found that cases with extremely high SWB had 
low neuroticism, and mostly high extraversion, openness, agreeableness and conscientiousness 
facet scores. I found the inverse pattern for extremely low SWB. In Study 3, I found the smaller 
subset of facets that had extremely robust internally valid relationships with SWB. Final results 
highlighted the importance of just 9/30 big five facets.  
In Study 1, I found that a single universal constellation of facet effects predicted SWB, across 
both a range of sociodemographic groups, and cultures. At the outset, I used random forests 
models to find the associations between interdependent facet combinations and the SWB 
outcomes, which were needs thwarting and needs satisfaction (primary outcomes), and SLS 
and health (secondary outcomes). There were negligible associations between participants’ 
sociodemographic characteristics and the accuracy of their random forest predicted scores. This 
suggested that models applied equally to a broad spectrum of different subgroups, which 
included men and women, the young and old, the working and upper classes, and participants 
from disparate world regions (e.g. Asia, Latin America). Then, I used each of these strata to 
generate separate random forests models. They yielded virtually identical predicted scores for 
the entire sample. This suggested there was also an unchanging pattern of associations between 
the personality facets and SWB. All results converged across both primary and secondary 
outcomes. Finally, I evaluated how random forest accuracy changed as a function of predicted 
score extremeness. As extremeness increased, prediction accuracy also increased for the 
primary outcomes and SLS. Participants with the most extreme 1% predicted SWB scores on 
average had the most extreme 1/5 self-report scores. They were also correctly classified into 
ecologically valid buckets (e.g. ‘very strong’) in upwards of 3/4 cases. Results did not converge 
for health—likely because of comparatively low random forest accuracy—and thus I excluded 
it from subsequent analyses. Whilst the retained predictions were imperfect, they could still 
identify a subset of facet constellations the were implicated in very high true SWB.   
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In Study 2, I found that people experiencing extremely low and high SWB differed from the 
average on a plurality of the big five facets. To this end, I used random forest models to predict 
SWB for four billion simulated cases. Using simulations—rather than just the original self-
report participants—helped to account for a range of different feasible patterns of facet 
covariance in the population. After mitigating outliers, I evaluated each facet mean prevalence 
in the cases with the most extreme 1% predicted SWB. Cases scoring high on facets from 
neuroticism and low on most facets from the other four factors disproportionately experienced 
extreme needs thwarting. I also largely observed the inverse pattern for needs satisfaction. For 
example, facets associated with psychological impairment (e.g. depression, anxiety), 
sociability (e.g. friendliness, altruism) and self-control (self-efficacy and self-discipline) had 
relatively high prevalences in extreme cases for both primary outcomes. Nevertheless, anxiety 
was also more prevalent in needs thwarting, whilst emotionality, self-efficacy and achievement 
striving were all more prevalent in needs satisfaction. All results converged for SLS. Overall, 
Study 2 found the mean facet scores that combined with the most levels of other facets in cases 
to promote extreme SWB, in feasibly real-world populations. 
In Study 3, I found the smaller subset of facets that had the most internally valid associations 
with extreme SWB. To eliminate possible confounding from covarying facet combinations, I 
evaluated when results from Study 2 replicated using another four billion simulated cases 
where every combination of facet scores was equally likely. Cases with extreme needs 
thwarting were characterised by their high depression, anxiety and vulnerability, and their low 
self-discipline, cheerfulness and cooperation. Cases with extreme needs satisfaction were 
characterised by their high self-efficacy, cheerfulness, self-discipline, assertiveness and 
altruism, and their low depression. Overall, results identified the subset of facet values that 
combined with the most levels of other facets to promote extreme SWB, regardless of their 
real-world co-occurrences. These may be the best candidates to have robust, internally valid, 
associations with SWB because they were insensitive to fully changing intrapersonal contexts. 
Put another way, they were the best candidates to have stable mechanisms.  
6.6.1. Implications 
Results are a first-of-their-kind demonstration that random forest can yield directional 
psychological insights for individual predictors. That is, this chapter ultimately found the 
specific facet effects that were most insensitive to the nested and thus interdependent patterns 
of other personality moderators (Asendorpf et al., 2013). Although random forest was 
originally developed as a ‘black-box’ method to generate high-fidelity predicted outcomes, I 
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found its predictions could also be reverse-engineered to investigate specific psychological 
phenomena. As a preliminary step, I found that the same constellations of personality facets 
were universally associated with SWB. This suggests that there are shared trait-based 
propensities to experience both suffering and flourishing, which apply at least across the 
heterogeneous adult population sampled. I also found that random forest was especially 
accurate for extreme predictions. This meant I progressed by accounting for the whole 
individual using extreme subpopulations, but still with normative statistics.  
Individuals who experience extreme suffering and flourishing deviate from the average on most 
facets. To this end, Study 2 found the average profile of people experiencing top percentile 
SWB in the population. High convergence with the main effects in Chapter 5 suggests that 
most facets exert their impact on SWB independent of the other facets. However, convergent 
findings may still have only emerged because the facet exerted its effects on SWB in 
combination with other specific levels of covarying facets, which were overrepresented in the 
sample. This might explain some of the contradictory research in the literature to date: research 
might assess trends driven by these kind of sample-specific range restrictions, which cause 
artefactual moderation effects. Despite this ambiguity, results from Study 2 are still important 
for public policy because they help give high-fidelity descriptions of the unhappiest and 
happiest personality profiles in the population.  
Ultimately, however, the key finding is in Study 3. Random forest also helped evaluate the 
facets that were robust predictors of SWB, across the full range of changing intrapersonal 
contexts. Findings from social psychology’s replication crisis highlight the importance of this 
criterion when proposing direct, causal, main effect mechanisms (Shrout & Rodgers, 2018). In 
this chapter, findings suggested an exhaustive but not profligate account of nine big five facets 
that are robustly implicated in SWB. Depression, cheerfulness and self-discipline may drive 
changes in both suffering and flourishing SWB—if perhaps through different mechanisms 
because the two outcomes are largely uncorrelated. Then, low anxiety and vulnerability, and 
high cooperation may uniquely protect against suffering. Contrastingly, high assertiveness, 
altruism and self-efficacy may uniquely promote flourishing. As I discussed in the General 
Introduction, these traits may exert their influence on SWB because they (a) capture the direct 
sensitivity to experience certain SWB facets, (b) increase the likelihood of extracting SWB 
nutriments from their environment, and/or (c) increase the likelihood of positively reappraising 
existing circumstances (Schimmack et al., 2004; Ryan & Deci, 2001; Boyce & Wood, 2011). 
Although finding exact mechanisms is beyond the current scope, it is now a clearer next step.  
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6.6.2. Limitations and Future Directions 
There are at least four limitations that especially impacted the present chapter. Participants 
were all adults who belonged to online survey panels. This may have reduced their 
heterogeneity, which limited the generalisability of the results. For example, co-dependent 
hunter-gatherers may benefit less from the propensity to cooperate because such behaviours 
are already enforced in their community structures (Hill et al., 2011). Methodologically, 
conclusions were limited to cases with extreme 1% predicted SWB. Results did not necessarily 
imply linear trends. Prevalences for other percentile scores may have also been logarithmic, 
curvilinear, more complex or even completely random. Next, random forest models may suffer 
from overfitting—at least compared to other tree-based alternatives, such as boosting—which 
could limit external validity (James et al., 2013). Finally, models still failed to explain more 
than half the variation in SWB. This suggests the personality facets may co-occur and/or 
interact with other stable socio-demographic variables, as well as learned values, abilities and 
the transient environment, to fully account for manifest SWB.  
In addition, an interesting property of sorting cases into predicted SWB percentiles is that it 
forces rank order facet prevalences. To explain: the strongest predictor will have the smallest 
SD. Then, in random facet constellations, all other facets scores will tend to be normally 
distributed within this first, strong, predictor. Thus, there are simply fewer high scores to select 
in the second-strongest predictor, which dilutes its mean prevalence.  This effect then cascades 
as predictor strength decreases. Prevalences are especially diluted when a stronger predictor 
carries a large proportion of the information contained in a weaker predictor. This property also 
variably manifests in non-random facet constellations (as in Study 2), depending on the extent 
of predictor intercorrelations. It is unclear whether this property is (a) an efficient way of 
parsimoniously selecting a discrete set of predictors, or (b) an additional source of bias.  
Nevertheless, there are also promising directions for future research. Random forest complexity 
is only constrained by sample size: it may be feasible to account for non-linear relations 
between both stable and transitive phenomena, provided there are more subjects than input 
variables (e.g. > 5:1 predictor-to-outcome ratio is often recommended; Green, 1991). This may 
give an unprecedentedly comprehensive account of the psychological substrates that are 
robustly associated with SWB. Internally valid inferences can then be buttressed by using 
longitudinal designs with cross-lagged correlations, to confirm that personality and/or other 
predictors are indeed antecedent to SWB (Keller et al., 1987). Finally, potential mechanisms 
that drive effects may be tested experimentally, by inducing aspects of the causative traits in 
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participants with randomly distributed personalities. Of course, this entire research paradigm 
may also be applied to almost any other combination of IVs and DVs in social psychology.  
6.6.3. Conclusion 
Ultimately, this chapter reconciles discordant research on the personality predictors of SWB. 
Depressed, anxious, vulnerable, ill-disciplined, low cheer and uncooperative individuals may 
be uniquely predisposed to experience suffering. Efficacious, cheerful, self-disciplined, 
assertive, altruistic and non-depressed individuals may be uniquely predisposed to experience 
flourishing. Although findings may appear unremarkable, they isolate a subset of the full range 
of personality facets—which also include putatively robustly facets effects for friendliness, 
adventurousness and trust, among others—implicated in SWB. This may help to definitively 
isolate the subset of internally valid facet effects that have especially plausible mechanisms, 






Here, I integrate findings from across the general introduction and empirical chapters. Overall, 
the PhD addresses sequential aspects of the research process to ultimately identify the most 
robust big five facet correlates of suffering and flourishing SWB. I highlight the findings that: 
(a) online-predicted personality may be so imprecise that, counter-intuitively, it is viable for 
academic research; (b) systematic computational approaches can be used for expedient scale 
validation; (c) PSM-weighted associations between the big five facets and SWB, as well as 
random forest profiling of the most extreme 1% predicted SWB, isolate the average profiles of 
the unhappiest and happiest people throughout the population sampled; and, (d) random forest 
might also isolate the nine most internally valid facet effects. Implications focus on reconciling 
discordant facet-SWB effects in the existing literature, the benefits and constraints of my 
computational paradigm and how findings inform current privacy debates. I also address 
overarching limitations such as sample unrepresentativeness, cross-sectional surveys, 
establishing cross-cultural equivalence and sub-optimal construct operationalization. Finally, 
future directions focus on establishing causal associations using longitudinal designs and then 
experiments, isolating mechanisms, applying methods to other research areas and popularising 
an increasing range of computational methods in social psychology.  
7.2. Chapter Summaries 
Who is happiest? It is a seemingly mundane problem that psychologists have engaged with for 
decades. However, even provisional answers may depend on: (a) procuring sufficiently large 
data to remove sampling, methodological and statistical artefacts, thus enabling researchers to 
evaluate multiple permutations of their questions; (b) expediently finding construct valid 
variable operationalizations; (c) disentangling complexly interrelated personality trait 
predictors; and, (d) accounting for the full range of intrapersonal effect contingencies. Across 
the four empirical chapters, I showed that using computational psychology approaches—
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centred on large online samples, simulations and iterative analyses—to intervene at various 
stages in the research process might yield more definitive personality-SWB associations.  
The first problem was that computational approaches are power hungry. A promising solution 
is to predict variable scores at scale from online behaviour. However, recent ethics debates 
suggest this may be unviable when it intrusively profiles individuals—e.g. on their 
personality—without their explicit consent. Thus, I evaluated the extent these prediction 
algorithms applied to specific individuals. At the outset, I used pure simulations to generate 
perfectly unbiased ‘predicted’ scores with varying fidelity. I focused on three benchmarks— 
‘best-case’ (r = .90), ‘demographic’ (r = .60) and ‘personality’ (r = .30)—that reflected the 
future potential of the technology and current documented accuracies for different types of 
variables. Then, I replicated all results using real-world data and machine learning. Results 
suggested that best-case predictions could (a) consistently differentiate between participants 
with opposite extreme scores, as well as randomly drawn pairs; (b) be corrected to account for 
real-world thresholds (e.g. neutral vs extraverted); and, (c) be bucketed into thirds (i.e. low, 
medium, high). However, even they failed to correctly estimate the true magnitude of 
differences between people, profile individuals across multiple traits or differentiate edge 
cases. For comparison, individual predictions were only marginally better than chance at 
realistic accuracies. To illustrate, at the personality benchmark predictions failed to consistently 
differentiate between opposite personality extremes (e.g. highly introverted vs highly 
extraverted), were worse than simply assuming everyone was the average when corrected to 
capture real-world thresholds, and far more likely predict the entire big five 100% incorrectly 
than 100% correctly. Thus, I concluded that online-predicted personality does not apply to 
specific individuals.  
Counter-intuitively, results may support the viability of predicted personality for academic 
research. Inaccurate predictions are still sufficient to evaluate normative trends, provided they 
are unbiased (prediction errors are fully random) and sample size is large enough to overcome 
increased measurement imprecision (Cohen, 1992). Then, any surplus power would enable 
additional, stratified, sub-population analyses. Further, new prediction algorithms can 
incrementally add construct scores to existing databases, thus increasing the richness of the 
data over time. All that said, I did switch to exclusively self-report data for the remaining 
chapters. This was (a) in keeping with the shifting focus of my PhD towards more fundamental 
associative research, which could be largely answered in surveys; (b) to avoid using data 
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obtained without explicit consent, regardless of its accuracy; and, (c) to avoid compounded 
prediction and original-scale measurement errors.  
The second problem I addressed was finding appropriate construct operationalizations. There 
are multiple reasons constructs may be sub-optimally captured. In this PhD, there were a 
(surprising) lack of scales that comprehensively measured SWB. Thus, I used computational 
approaches to expediently, and systematically, repurpose the BMPN—which was originally 
intended to measure the three substrates of intrinsic motivation—as the primary outcome. EFA 
suggested two factors. Across bootstrapped factor loadings, there was consistent evidence that 
they were needs thwarting and needs satisfaction. Then, I evaluated their exhaustive 
associations with the other SWB and lifestyle variables in the data. Needs thwarting was more 
associated with negatively valanced SWB (i.e. suffering), and needs satisfaction was more 
associated with positively valanced SWB (i.e. flourishing). They also captured more transient 
SWB than life satisfaction. This was important for bivariate personality-SWB associations 
because BMPN thus better isolated facets effects that were sensitive to changes in the 
environment. The BMPN factors also explained variation in lifestyle outcomes—e.g. healthy 
eating, marriage—over and above criterion SLS. All results held across different country and 
sociodemographic strata. There was no evidence they were artefacts of response bias. 
The third problem was finding internally valid bivariate facet-SWB associations. Facet-level 
analyses may be specific enough to isolate discrete mechanisms. However, IV fragmentation 
at this level of analysis increases the number of potentially confounding covariates beyond the 
threshold that can be tolerated using non-computational approaches. To remedy, I used PSM 
to extract pairs of participants who differed on the target facet but were similar across all 29 of 
the covarying facets. Thus, PSM mitigated the need to fit explicit controls because potentially 
confounding facets were held constant. Weighted PSM correlations better accounted for the 
facet covariates than zero-order correlations (i.e. the first tier in stepwise regression) and caused 
less artificial reduction in effect sizes than multiple regression. They also better reconstructed 
establish established factor-level effects—which are less fragmented and thus more 
definitive—than correlations, multiple regression, elastic net machine learning and even 
combined PSM-ENET. Then, using PSM, I found the full range of big five facet associations 
with SWB. There were neuroticism and extraversion facet effects beyond cheerfulness and 
depression, diverging effects within agreeableness and cascading SWB benefits for 
conscientiousness. These patterns may help reconcile the contradictory effects that currently 
exist in both the trait-SWB literature, and in multiple adjacent literatures. 
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The fourth problem was that even internally valid associations can change across intra-personal 
contexts. Even if PSM perfectly controlled for main effect confounds, results may still have 
been artefacts of ungeneralizable—sample-specific—facet interactions. To remedy, I thus 
replicated PSM findings using random forest. Random forest accounts for nested SWB effects 
involving all 30 facets. That is, it accounts for the full constellations of even complex 
personality contingencies. First, I found a single random forest model was equally accurate 
across various demographic strata, such as gender, age group (young, middle, old) and world 
region. Then, I generated separate random forest models using 17 different sample strata (e.g. 
just women, just Latin Americans). They yielded nearly identical predictions. This suggested 
that the facets combined in similar ways to predict SWB across diverging subsamples. Thus, a 
single, universal, combination of facets was still associated with SWB after relaxing the 
assumption of linear covariates. Then, I evaluated model accuracy for participants with 
different magnitude predicted scores. Accuracy was highest for the most extreme 1% 
predictions. On average, they had the most extreme 1/5 true scores, and were categorized either 
fully correctly or nearly correctly for > 85% of cases. Although predictions were imperfect, 
they were still sufficient at the extremes to identify very low and very high true scores.  
Then, I evaluated the facets that were prevalent in extreme SWB across changing personality 
contingencies. Nested random forest interactions are far too complex to interpret. Instead, I 
evaluated facet prevalences in cases with extreme predicted SWB. However, results may still 
have been ungeneralizable due to idiosyncratic facet covariation in the sample. Thus, I 
predicted SWB for four billion simulated cases with facet scores that conformed to different, 
plausible, covariance patterns in the population. Many of the novel PSM findings held in the 
1% most extreme of these predicted scores. For example, high depression consistently 
exacerbated needs thwarting more than it inhibited needs satisfaction. High self-efficacy 
promoted needs satisfaction more than it protected against needs thwarting. Modesty had 
consistent SWB consequences, whilst adventurousness and intellect had consistent SWB 
benefits. Cooperation was indeed more implicated than altruism in needs thwarting, and vice 
versa for needs satisfaction. Other PSM results may have been a consequence of range 
restriction. For example, adventurousness may have only exacerbated needs thwarting when 
combined with other facet levels that were overrepresented in the self-report data. Similarly, 
the sample covariance pattern may have suppressed the true protective benefits of activity-level 
on needs thwarting. It remained inconclusive whether morality, and cautiousness versus 
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achievement striving, had differential effects on needs thwarting compared to needs 
satisfaction. Overall, random forest clarified a range of PSM-derived SWB effects. 
Triangulated PSM and random forest findings may be the most definitive, internally valid, 
account of who is on average happiest in the population. They better control for confounding 
facet effects, compared to conventional (e.g. multiple regression) and other machine learning 
alternatives (e.g. elastic net). Thus, they may allow researchers to construct the archetypal 
unhappiest and happiest personality profiles. These are in Figure 7.1. Unlike previous research, 
trait prevalences are from normative rather than case study data. Of course, effects may have 
still been caused by residual confounding (improvements were relative, not absolute). 
Nevertheless, they might offer better empirical grounds for future research than alternatives.  
 
 
Figure 7.1. Mean facet prevalences in the most extreme 1% of realistic simulated cases from Chapter 6. N1-6 = 
Neuroticism facets (anxiety, anger, depression, self-consciousness, immoderation, vulnerability). E1-6 = 
Extraversion facets (friendliness, gregariousness, assertiveness, activity-level, excitement-seeking, cheerfulness). 
O1-6 = Openness facets (imagination, artistic interests, emotionality, adventurousness, intellect, liberalism), A1-
6 = Agreeableness facets (trust, morality, altruism, cooperation, modesty, sympathy). C1-6 = Conscientiousness 
facets (self-efficacy, orderliness, dutifulness, achievement-striving, self-discipline, cautiousness). The dashed line 
represents the population mean (M = 0; SD = 1).  
 
However, there is a ceiling to internal validity using feasibly real-world participants. In such 
cases, every facet still preferentially co-occurs with a different subset of other facets. Individual 
facet effects might change completely when there is equal likelihood of it combining with 
infrequently-occurring facet constellations. Observing facets in these conditions helps isolate 
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the main effects that are robust to an especially wide range of intrapersonal contingencies. 
Thus, I replicated the random-forest prediction method described above for another four billion 
simulated cases with fully random facet scores. A total of nine facets were implicated in 
extreme SWB. These are in Figure 7.2. Depression, cheerfulness and self-discipline were 
associated with both needs thwarting and satisfaction. High anxiety and vulnerability, and low 
cooperation, were exclusively implicated in needs thwarting. High assertiveness, altruism and 
self-efficacy were exclusively implicated in needs satisfaction. Collectively, results highlight 
the partly overlapping personality substrates of suffering and flourishing SWB. They transcend 
the affective facets, but still implicate fewer than 1/3 of the entire big five. Thus, results may 
parsimoniously describe the full range of facet-SWB effects.  
 
 
Figure 7.2. The nine big five facets that were robustly associated with 
extreme SWB. They emerged even after they were combined with 
random covarying facet constellations, which were both likely and 
unlikely to occur in real world populations. They had especially non-
contingent associations with SWB, which may thus indicate that their 
effects are driven by stable mechanisms.     
7.3. Implications 
The most concrete PhD implications are for personality-SWB associations. First, I found 
evidence that emergent technologies yield high power samples without violating individual 
privacy. Then, I established a novel measure of omnibus SWB and isolated the full plurality of 
bivariate personality facet-SWB associations. In doing so, I mitigated many of the perceived 
trade-offs that constrain existing research in the field: (Chapter 3) samples from online 
behaviour are unacceptably intrusive; (Chapter 4) psychometric robustness necessitates using 
partial constructs, like tripartite SWB; (Chapter 5) establishing internal validity causes 
multicollinearity; (Chapter 6) normative statistical trends must oversimplify the individual by 
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ignoring intrapersonal contingencies. Ultimately, results helped find more definitive 
exploratory associations between all the granular personality facets and comprehensive SWB. 
Results are more parsimonious than both existing factor-level associations—which implicate 
up to four of the big five—and facet-level associations, which only reliably implicate 
depression. They reconcile adjacent research on the SWB consequences of certain coping-
styles (anxiety, vulnerability), mastering the environment (self-discipline, self-efficacy, 
assertiveness) and prosociality (cooperation, altruism) (Gross, 2015; Ryan & Deci, 2000; 
Keltner et al., 2014). Therefore, results may inform more empirically based follow-up 
hypotheses, thus helping streamline cumulative science in the field. 
More widely, findings show the value of large samples. The constructs measured using the 
particularly cheap, large and heterogeneous online AXA study sample were mostly robust. 
Specifically, they had adequate internal consistency, measurement invariance, and convergent 
and discriminant validity. This further supports the viability of online samples that transcend 
WEIRD populations (Henrich et al., 2010). In addition, power was so large that I could reuse 
the same sample throughout the entire PhD. By combining stringent thresholds for noteworthy 
effects (e.g. r > .10; p < .001) and non-parametric statistics (e.g. 99.9% CIs from resampled 
effects), I likely constrained the overall incidence of Type 1 error within acceptable bounds. 
Of course, any remaining spuriousness effects may have been conserved across chapters. Even 
so, findings may have been unusually robust for such ranging cross-sectional research. 
I also evaluated whole populations of effects across iteratively changing samples, variables and 
models. These resampling approaches met recent methods recommendations to extract effects 
from multiple replications (Shrout & Rodgers, 2018). For example, bootstrapping and 10-fold 
cross-validation—which both replicate analyses across random subsamples—mitigated results 
caused by sampling error (James et al., 2013). Then, I also iteratively repeated the analyses 
across specific strata (e.g. just women) to increase external validity. This helped mitigate a 
limitation of increased sample heterogeneity: that aggregate findings can obfuscate disordinal 
subpopulation effects. For iteratively changing variables, comparing scales—e.g. across every 
convergent measure of SWB—helped quickly indicate how they captured the underlying 
construct, relative to convergent measures. For example, I found that the BMPN captured more 
transitive SWB than SLS. Iteratively changing model parameters—usually designed to 
maximize model explanatory power—increased ecological validity by extracting the highest 
fidelity associations from the data. That is, models were better attuned to real-world complexity 
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than relatively unadaptable non-machine learning alternatives (Yarkoni & Westfall, 2017). 
Overall, iterative approaches helped extract trends from entire populations of effects. 
These approaches also yielded more precise effect estimates. The large sample meant that point 
estimates converged with even 99.9% CIs. Thus, often the only substantive sources of model 
error were the above-mentioned resampling techniques. This helped isolate differential 
patterns of effects. That is, I prototyped the post-Replication Crisis recommendation to move 
beyond falsely dichotomous p-value significance testing and evaluate effect magnitudes 
(Nelson et al., 2018). I also used participant weights to generate higher-fidelity effects. 
Although PSM weights were designed to boost internal validity by controlling for covarying 
facets, other weighting strategies could be used in a similar way to boost (e.g.) sample 
representativeness for various populations (Cohen et al., 2013). Finally, I used simulations to 
evaluate the extent that edge conditions—which are normally beyond the scope of survey 
studies—changed observed findings. Notably, I evaluated the extent unrealistically accurate 
personality predictions applied to specific individuals, and the extent different plausible 
predictor covariances changed observed facet-SWB associations. This helped isolate the most 
robust, plausible, effects.   
Overall, results advance aspects of the computational paradigm in psychology. Once obtaining 
my large sample, I focussed largely on resampling and machine learning. These strategies may 
be particularly helpful at improving the certainty of findings in cross-sectional survey research, 
which is often the weakest form evidence used by empirical psychologists. Cross-sectional 
research may have especially fine margins between legitimate but still fickle effect variation 
across populations, and variation that is an artefact of arbitrary but (at least partly) unavoidable 
sampling, measurement and statistical errors (de Boeck & Jeon, 2018). And yet cross-sectional 
survey research is also essential. It is an expedient and often cheap way of finding the 
preliminary descriptive evidence needed to justify further time and research expenditure. It 
complements more in-depth, but also theoretically partial, qualitative research (Ponterotto, 
2002). Computational psychology’s potential to survey and then pick from whole populations 
of effects—combined with its potential internal and external validity gains—reduces the 
chances that follow-up research is guided by confirmation bias (Ioannidis, 2012). That is, 
researchers are less likely to find support for their preconceptions simply because they have 
neglected larger effects or confounds. While exploratory research will never be definitive, the 
computational paradigm can mitigate the large volume of false positives that limit progress. 
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However, findings also highlight that computational approaches are not a panacea. Even 
extremely accurate prediction algorithms may not yield psychological construct scores that 
apply to specific individuals. Instead, they compound with underlying scale measurement error 
to only ever capture traces of the true phenomenology. Thus, they may only be useful in 
aggregate, to evaluate probabilistic trends. Further, ‘exhaustive’ scale associations are still 
constrained by the variables measured, which are chosen by the researcher and thus partial. 
Even machine learning methods have ceiling effects. PSM—which used simple weighted 
correlations—was better at isolating specific facet-SWB associations than the more complex 
elastic net. This was even though elastic net was explicitly designed to account for highly 
intercorrelated predictors. Then elastic net—which only accounted for main effects—used 
cumulative personality to explain as much variation in SWB as more-complex-again random 
forest, which accounted for both main and non-linear effects. Moreover, Chapter 3 observed 
that machine learning prediction accuracy plateaued at around 80 predictors. It likely plateaued 
again when there were thousands or tens-of-thousands, not hundreds of thousands, of 
participants (see Kosinski et al., 2013). This suggests that current technologies may already be 
converging with best-case future hypotheticals. Thus, their projected future accuracy may be 
overstated. Finally, even random forest—until recently the gold-standard machine learning 
approach (e.g. Ahmad, Mourshed & Rezgui, 2017)—yielded predicted psychological construct 
scores that were perhaps only actionable for extreme cases. Although facet prevalences for 
bottom and top cases were often diametrically opposite, it was unclear whether they were 
linked by (e.g.) linear, cubic or logarithmic trends. Further, I was only able to generate 
normative claims for the extreme cases with the aid of extremely high-power simulations. 
These depend on potentially-wrong researcher assumptions about the rules that govern the 
phenomena, such as normally distributed variables. Overall, computational psychology 
approaches may thus incrementally, but not diametrically, improve current methods.  
Finally, the potentials and constraints of the featured computational approaches can inform 
privacy debates. In the empirical chapters, higher fidelity computational methods still only 
yielded normative claims; I found no evidence they were intrusive. Further, findings from 
Chapter 3—about the non-applicability of predicted personality to specific individuals—also 
apply to the bivariate associations in subsequent chapters. To illustrate, there may only be 
marginally above-chance likelihood that any one individual with high trait depression has low 
SWB. Thus, survey research in the personality-SWB sub-field could continue to be regulated 
by ethics frameworks that mandate prior IRB approval, informed consent and minimal risk.  
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However, it is also sometimes unfeasible to obtain explicit informed consent for a specific 
study. Perhaps most topically, this occurs when archives of online behaviour are obtained from 
existing repositories (e.g. Twitter) and used in compliance with their existing terms and 
conditions (Golbeck et al., 2011). Despite recent landmark US Supreme Court cases—(e.g.) 
sanctioning the right to be forgotten and preventing law enforcement agencies from accessing 
GPS phone data without a search warrant (Grierson & Quinn, 2018; Liptak, 2018)—there is 
still no comprehensive regulatory framework for large digitally stored data (Athey, Catalini & 
Tucker, 2017). Thus, independent IRBs, researchers, private companies and other entities must 
exercise their own discretion. In practise, this means initiatives are often reactive. For example, 
Facebook only updated their privacy policy after widespread public allegations that their data 
helped influence the 2016 Presidential Election (Hsu & Kang, 2018). Contrastingly, in 2018 
the EU introduced the GDPR. It mandates that every data repository provides accessible terms 
and conditions, obtains explicit consent, transparently discloses how data are used, and enables 
users to easily opt-out and permanently delete their data (eugdpr.org). It provides a pre-emptive 
and universal safeguard that helps align user privacy expectations with both current 
technological capacities and market incentives. Thus, it may complement existing protocols to 
better promote fully-consensual data usage. 
7.4. Major Limitations  
The PhD has structural, sampling and measurement limitations that go beyond the in-built 
limitations of the featured computational approaches. There are at least two overarching 
structural limitations. First, the empirical chapters only intervened at selected points in the 
research process. For example, I did not iteratively evaluate different ways of operationalizing 
personality or isolate specific plausible interaction effects (e.g. between neuroticism and 
conscientiousness facets; Naragon‐Gainey & Simms, 2017). Ultimately, I prioritized topicality 
because total comprehensiveness was unfeasible in any single PhD. Second, there were 
inconsistencies across empirical chapters. For example, while Chapter 3 argued that online-
predicted personality was sufficiently non-intrusive to use for psychological research, I still 
reverted to exclusively self-reported personality in subsequent chapters. In addition, PSM 
methods for more internally valid exploratory associations were immediately superseded by 
the potentially more definitive random forest methods used in Chapter 6. Ultimately, this was 
because chapters reflected the often non-linear and chaotic nature of academic research.  
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There were at least three sampling limitations. Although my sample was multinational and 
multilingual, it also comprised exclusively members of online survey panels. Although I 
controlled for some of their demographic characteristics (e.g. sex, age, social class) they still 
likely differed from non-panel members in the population on other qualities—for example, on 
higher-than-average introversion, and education attainment that transcended the binary 
measure of university degree attainment (MacCallum et al., 2002). This may have limited 
generalizability because of range restriction (Wiberg & Sundström, 2009). Participants were 
also unevenly distributed across world regions and language groups. Although I often 
confirmed there were consistent effects in separate countries, findings could have still been 
biased when (e.g.) the same scales measured somewhat idiosyncratic constructs in 
overrepresented strata. This could have been exacerbated by differing (non-random) survey 
structures and content across countries, which may have created artefactual order effects and 
increased sample unrepresentativeness respectively. Further, data were cross-sectional. I thus 
assumed that personality was antecedent to SWB. This may be problematic considering recent 
evidence supporting the transience of personality in adulthood (Soto et al., 2011). Moreover, 
in cross-sectional research there are simply more extraneous variables that covary with both 
the predictor and outcome (e.g. mood), compared to longitudinal data. This increases the 
absolute number of possible confounds.  
Finally, there were at least three measurement limitations. Results were constrained by variable 
selection. Due to grant obligations, collaborator requests, time constraints and/or researcher 
error I often used sub-optimal scales and non-exhaustive construct operationalizations. For 
example, the most recent Big Five Inventory has an equal balance of positively and negatively 
phrased items in each facet (Soto & John, 2017). Thus, compared to the NEO-PI-R it may be 
both more resistant to positive response bias and capture more representative aspects of each 
construct. There were also non-exhaustive convergent measures of SWB. For example, I 
evaluated the transitiveness of BMPN using only convergent affect. This increased the chances 
that effect sizes were confounded by other forms of covariance that were not attributable to 
construct transience. In addition, group-mean z-scores assumed that the personality facets and 
SWB were equally prevalent in every country. This helped to control for all country-level main 
effects (e.g. GDP, education). It also equalized score variation, meaning countries with 
particularly wide score distributions were not overrepresented in the results (Aguinis et al., 
2013). However, it also eliminated potentially real differences in national personality and 
SWB. For example, lower gregariousness may have been selected for in countries with greater 
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exposure to pandemic diseases because it reduces the incidences of widespread disease 
transmission (Schaller & Murray, 2008). That is, group-mean z-scores added another source of 
potential bias. Further, they did not eliminate cross-level interactions. National factors may 
have differentially changed individual-level associations. Finally, the fully self-report format 
meant that results were potentially driven by common method variance and introspection bias 
(Tellegen, 1985). Mixed peer, informant and behavioural measures would have yielded more 
comprehensive construct scores. 
7.5. Future directions 
Future research can evaluate causal facet-SWB associations. At the outset, this would involve 
switching to a prospective longitudinal design where both personality and SWB are measured 
at multiple time points. This would (a) help establish the correct temporal sequence where 
personality is antecedent to SWB, (b) control for personality change, and (c) reduce the number 
of possible confounds (which would have to covary with both the predictor and outcome at 
multiple time points). Longitudinal research also enables cross-lagged correlations, which 
establish whether the effect of personality measured at time one on SWB measured at time two 
is larger than the inverse (Kenny, 2005). This helps establish tentative causation. Then, 
researchers can evaluate whether specific facet nuances drive effects. For example, the effect 
of depression on needs satisfaction may be caused by anhedonia (Fava & Tomba, 2009). 
Nuances may correspond to such specific behaviours that they can be induced using 
experimental manipulations. This may be one way of establishing definitive causal effects. 
Results at such a stage may be sufficiently granular to evaluate mechanism—perhaps by 
iteratively testing effects for multiple candidate mechanisms—using preliminary cross-
sectional and then longitudinal studies. Alternatively, each trait may also disproportionately 
exert its effects on specific sub-components of SWB. Thus, future research could evaluate 
patterns of facet effects on different SWB processes (e.g. affect, purposefulness), perhaps with 
the aid increasingly comprehensive SWB measures like the Scales of General Well-Being 
(Longo et al., 2017). This would help further isolate prospective mechanisms, because 
candidates would have to map onto whole patterns of facet effects.  
The large sample and iterative resampling approaches can also be applied in other domains that 
have intercorrelated predictors. For example, they could help untangle the effects of the basic 
values (e.g. achievement, security, benevolence) on political orientation (Schwartz, Caprara & 
Vecchione, 2010). Studies are also not limited to psychology. For example, they can help 
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isolate the differential effects of intercorrelated variables like genetics, exercise, diet, 
socioeconomic status and access to healthcare on obesity (Rooney, Mathiason & Schauberger, 
2011). Excitingly, findings may also be scalable to more than just the 30 predictors used in this 
PhD. Indeed, PSM weights and random forest tolerated all the facets with manageable effect 
suppression. All analyses could also be expediently performed (e.g. overnight) on a single 
personal computer. This makes it possible to mix a wider range of psychological and socio-
demographic predictors in the same models, which allows researchers to control for reasonably 
comprehensive intra- and inter-personal contingencies. This would better fulfil the social 
psychological mandate to consider the individual in their wider social context.  
Finally, I only demonstrate a small subset of emergent computational social science methods. 
The field is becoming increasingly accessible via plain-English instructive texts—for example, 
James et al.’s (2013) Introduction to Statistical Learning—and statistical software that 
packages often complex mathematical operations into easy-to-use functions, such as 
randomForest in ‘R’. These tools often require only the kind of fundamental research skills 
(e.g. corroborating the instructive resources), statistics intuition and intermediate object-
oriented coding (e.g. ‘R’, Python) that are already common/learnable in the social sciences. 
They provide less barriers to entry than differential and integrative calculus, matrix algebra and 
high-level coding (e.g. C++, Java), which were required by previous generations of researchers. 
Ultimately, increasing access means psychologists can increasingly marry computational 
methods with their more focussed training on distilling specific research questions from the 
inexorably complex real-world, theorizing only parsimonious complexity and evaluating the 
practicality of their effects. Rudimentary computational approaches—e.g. ridge and LASSO 
regression, and bootstrapping—are already commonplace. With ongoing interdisciplinary and 
thus translational work, simulations, iterative resampling and machine learning approaches 
may become equally prevalent. When melded with other emergent methods—e.g. consensually 
obtained in vivo event-sampling, live GPS tracking and natural language and image processing 
(Lazer et al., 2009)—they may better enable high-fidelity and comprehensive research 





According to my findings, the happiest people have low trait depression, anxiety and 
vulnerability, and high trait cheerfulness, self-discipline, cooperation, self-efficacy, 
assertiveness and altruism. Other fragmentarily documented effects—e.g. for achievement 
striving, self-consciousness and friendliness (Quevedo & Abella, 2011; Anglim & Grant, 2016; 
Helliwell, 2006)—may be artefacts of intercorrelations with the most robustly internally valid 
facets. Alternatively, they might only be associated with SWB in the presence of certain 
restricted levels of other facets, or facet constellations, that are overrepresented in the 
population sampled. Despite extensive research into personality-SWB effects to-date, 
researchers can only begin to reconcile discordant findings in the field now, with the aid of 
emerging computational technologies. In my PhD, I focussed on very large samples and 
resampling approaches that utilize populations of different plausible effects. They helped to 
iteratively test multiple permutations of each research question, expediently find construct 
valid scales and isolate internally valid bivariate associations. They might conserve the fine 
margin between already-fickle psychological effects and other, artefactual, sources of error. 
Therefore, computational psychology may increase the internal validity of personality-SWB 
and perhaps other descriptive associations. In doing so, it could facilitate a new wave of fully 
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available for academic research. This is to ensure we gain maximum positive impact from our allotted grant 









Question 8:  Who is funding the costs of the study?   
Notes: Give the name and address of funding bodies or other sponsorship (other than the 
University of Cambridge) involved in providing resources for the study.   
AXA Research Fund  
UK/Ireland, Mediterranean region & Latin America 
Life & Health Risks 
GIE AXA 25, avenue de Matignon 75008 
Paris, France 
Tel.: +33 1 40 75 39 86/ E.Fax : +33 1 56 69 93 29 
 
Please find successful grant application in Appendix A. 















Security and Anonymity: Since a key part of the project is to model how tweets map onto survey 
responses, linkage between user survey responses and twitter accounts is needed. Thus, initially data will 
not be anonymous. In order to protect the identity of the participants, all data analysis on raw tweets (which 
will not be anonymous) will occur on the Philometrics internal servers that are encrypted and password 
protected. Once a modelling approach has been settled and raw tweets are no longer necessary, we will 
generate derived dimensional scores for each user and anonymize the data. These dimensions, while based 
on the original tweets, have the advantage that the same scores can be arrived from many different 
combinations of tweets (of which there are near-infinite combinations). Thus having only the dimensional 
scores is not enough to reverse the anonymization. 
 
The derived dimensions data will be made available to the CPW lab (through a data sharing agreement with 
the Research Office) by Philometrics in connection with an anonymized version of the survey results (the 
link between surveys and the derived scores will be facilitated by a randomly generated ID). Thus, by the 
point at which any data reaches the lab, it will be in fully anonymous form. The derived scores will be used 
in generating forecasts expeditiously —see modelling steps below for more details.  
 
Eventually, some of the data will be made available through a website to other researchers for secondary 
data analysis. To ensure security, we will make available only (a) the actual survey responses without the 
Twitter ID link and (b) forecasted scores for several million people for whom we have Twitter data, but 
who never participated in any survey. For the data in (b), only forecasted results will be made available. No 
original twitter data of any kind will be made available.  
 
Group (a) has given consent for their data usage and thus their inclusion in the proposed study raises 
minimal ethical concerns. For group (b), the scores are derived for individuals who never actively 
participated in any way in our research and thus could not have consented. Thus, more care should be taken 
in evaluating the ethical implications of their data usage. In our view, since the data that is used to generate 
scores is publically posted for anyone to see and use, and users of Twitter can be reasonably expected to 
understand this, there is not a necessity to gain consent for our particular application. Furthermore, we 
minimize any potential harm to the users through (a) anonymization of the data and (b) providing only 
forecasted scores which, as we describe below, are relatively inaccurate at the individual level (but provide 
rather accurate aggregate scores and information about how variables are correlated). Access to the original 
raw tweets is further guarded and only occurs within Philometrics by a small number of researchers (named 
the co-investigators on this application). By the time any data reaches university servers, it has already been 
abstracted to a point where working backwards to de-anonymize the records becomes extremely difficult.   
 
Modelling Approach: We plan on using four  aspects of tweets in our modelling: (a) mentions of other 
popular users (typically brands or celebrities), (b) hashtags,  (c) the language used, and (b) who users are 
following. For all four, our first step will be to reduce the data down to a small set of dimensions (e.g. 20-
100). This is done by examining the co-occurrence of different types of mentions, hashtags, words and 
followers throughout Philometrics’s entire database of Tweets, and then collapsing clusters of similar 
values into singular aggregate variables. Once done, we build models by taking the tweet-derived 
dimensions of the users who provided survey responses, and entering these dimensions as predictors in 
various types of linear and non-linear models (e.g., regression lasso/ridge, neural networks) with the 
outcome being the survey response. We build a separate model for each self-report variable (e.g., a model 
for well-being, a model for agreeableness, a model for whether the person smokes or not, etc.). Accuracy is 
tested through cross-validation—that is, we leave out a group with both tweets and survey responses from 
the modelling process, the use forecasting models developed with other participants to forecast the scores 
for this left-out group, and then finally comparing the left-out group’s forecasted scores to their true 
responses. Given sufficient model validity (non-zero positive effect between forecasted and self-report 
scores; evidence for the normal distribution of errors), we then apply the same forecasting method to 
millions of cases for whom we only have Twitter data. We note that the users we forecast for will have 
never interacted with us; rather, they are from the database of 120 million or so users supplied to 





The Accuracy of Predictive Models: Initial pilot studies using data from Facebook data suggest that, at 
best, such models will predict only around 1/3 of the variance in self-report scores for any given 
psychological construct, with most effects much lower – at around 1/10. This suggests that at an individual 
level, the accuracy of the forecasts is rather imprecise. However, the strength of the method is not in 
individual analyses. Rather, our method aims to make prediction errors normally distributed around 
participants’ true scores. If this precondition is fulfilled - as we consistently find that it is - then inferences 
about the population average can still be valid even when scores are very imprecise, provided there is 
enough power. That is, even inaccurate scores produce a highly accurate population average (e.g. nation 
average, state average, or city average) assuming that there are enough data points. Furthermore, we find 
that correlations between variables are very similar in the forecasted and actual survey data. Thus, even 
though individual scores are rather inaccurate, the types of data most useful for researchers - population 
averages and relationships between variables - are highly robust. We view this as an optimal circumstance 
as it strongly reduces any possibility of data abuse (which is an especially poignant risk at the individual 
level) while maintaining the scientific value.  
 
To make the aforementioned data publically accessible, we propose creating a project website using Google 
Sites. In addition to featuring grant-related research, this will contain an application form that interested 
parties can complete to gain access to the data. We feel that such an application is prudent to ensure that data 
are used exclusively for academic purposes and comply with data protection protocols listed in this 
application. To this end, we have created an application template (Appendix G) that is modelled on the one 
used by the Out of Service project, which is an existing publically available personality dataset administered 
by Dr Jeff Potter and colleagues (www.outofservice.com).  
 
The protocol for evaluating an application is as follows: Dr Spectre and at least one listed collaborator will 
determine whether (a) the request is for exclusively academic purposes; (b) granting access will not bring the 
reputations of the university, the grant provider, Dr Spectre or collaborators into disrepute; (c) the applicant 
can be reasonably expected to use the data in an exclusively ethical way. Dr Spectre and all listed 
collaborators who evaluate the application must agree that these criteria are met before the data are shared. 
They may also request application revisions or reject an application outright, at their discretion. Each 
applicant will then be given a unique login to a password-protected page, which contains an indexed version 
of the data that is available for download. The highly sensitive variable “participant zipcode” will not be 
made publically available except under exceptional circumstances, and only then after ethics committee 
approval – via an amendment - for each specific request. Specific Twitter, Philometrics and survey-supplier 
account ID information will not be made publically available under any circumstance, except as mandated 















Question 9a:  Does the study involve any pharmaceutical or other compounds with 
physiological effects?   
Notes: This includes all compounds licensed under the Medicines Act. However, some compounds 
may be considered as Investigational Medical Products and studies of them, therefore, as clinical 
trials (CTIMPs). If there is any ambiguity, investigators should contact the Medicines and Healthcare 
Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) for guidance. Include any response from the MHRA in your 
application. CTIMPs must seek NRES approval. 
No.  
Question 10:  What ethical issues does this study raise and what measures have been taken to 
address them?    
Notes:  Describe any discomfort or inconvenience that participants may experience.  Include 
information about procedures that for some people could be physically stressful or might impinge 
on the safety of participants, e.g. noise levels, visual stimuli, equipment; or that for some people 
could be psychologically stressful, e.g. mood induction procedures, tasks with high failure rate.  
Indicate what procedures are in place if clinically relevant information arises from the study (e.g. 
from brain scans or questionnaire responses that might indicate that a participant is at risk). 
The studies have minimal risk to participants. Those who give self-report information will be made fully 
aware of the aims and implications of the present study. Moreover, participation will be online and thus 
participation will occur in a comfortable and convenient environment. Nevertheless, there are additional 
concerns associated with our collaboration with Philometrics, as well as with the application of our 
machine learning method to the larger database of Twitter profiles.  
 
Collaboration with Philometrics: Dr Kogan (now Dr Spectre) is co-founder and active member of 
Philometrics, and also primary applicant on this document. To mitigate any potential conflict of interest, 
Philometrics will provide the above-mentioned dataset to the applicants listed in this document free of 
charge. Philometrics cannot provide raw data to the lab because this breaches their agreement with Twitter. 
Whilst the applicants listed here will use the Philometrics survey platform to collect data, this is for entirely 
practical reasons: Philometrics offers the capacity to deliver detailed customized feedback to participants – 
an important incentive – that is unavailable by competing survey platforms such as Qualtrics, Google 
Forms and Survey Monkey either at all or in any sort of easy to use manner.  
 
Participant Anonymity: Self-report participants will provide their Twitter username, data from their 
twitter account and self-report information. Thus, data in their raw format are not anonymous. To mitigate, 
versions containing Twitter account information will only be used in the preliminary stages - when we 
establish the best way to reduce the tweet information into dimensions. This stage will only be undertaken 
by those co-applicants who are interning at Philometrics. Furthermore, we will take several steps to ensure 
data protection at the various stages of its usage, both in the lab and beyond. For further reference please 
see the above section on study procedures.  
 















Question 11:  Who will the participants be? 
Notes:  Describe the groups of participants that will be recruited and the principal eligibility 
criteria and ineligibility criteria. Make clear how many participants you plan to recruit into the 
study in total. 
Eligibility criteria: Aged 18 and older.  
Participants: We aim to recruit at least 1,000 from each of the following 35 countries (resulting in 35,000- 
40,000 total participants): Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bolivia, Canada, Chili, China 
(mainland), China (Hong Kong), Colombia, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Turkey, UK, Uruguay, USA, and Venezuela.. Finally, we also aim to collect another 1,000 
responses from Arabic-speaking participants throughout the Middle East. Surveys that are not relevant to 
each of these countries will be omitted (e.g. US political orientation for countries outside the US). Surveys 
will be translated into at least one official non-English language for each country, when the English survey 
is not appropriate.   
 
Question 12:  Describe the recruitment procedures for the study 
Notes:  Gives details of how potential participants will be identified or recruited. Include all 
advertising materials (posters, emails, letters etc.) as appendices and refer to them as 
appropriate. Describe any screening examinations. If it serves to explain the procedures better, 
include as an appendix a flow chart and refer to it. 
Recruitment will take place through Twitter’s advertising platform. Please see Appendix C for the 
recruitment flyer. Alternatively, recruitment will take place via a University sanctioned survey panel 
provider. 
Question 13:  Describe the procedures to obtain informed consent  
 
Notes: Describe when consent will be obtained. If consent is from adult participants, give details 
of who will take consent and how it will be done. If you plan to seek informed consent from 
vulnerable groups (e.g. people with learning difficulties, victims of crime), say how you will ensure 
that consent is voluntary and fully informed.  
 
If you are recruiting children or young adults (aged under 18 years) specify the age-range of 
participants and describe the arrangements for seeking informed consent from a person with 
parental responsibility. If you intend to provide children under 16 with information about the 
study and seek agreement, outline how this process will vary according to their age and level of 
understanding. 
 
How long will you allow potential participants to decide whether or not to take part? What 
arrangements have been made for people who might not adequately understand verbal 
explanations or written information given in English, or who have special communication needs? 
 



























Consent will be gathered at the beginning of the study. We will present the participants with the 
information sheet (Appendix D) and then ask them to consent to partake in the study (Appendix E).  
 
Question 14:  Will consent be written?  
Notes: If yes, include a consent form as an appendix. If no, describe and justify an alternative 
procedure (verbal, electronic etc.) in the space below. 
 
Guidance on how to draft Participant Information sheet and Consent form can be found on the 
Psychology Research Ethics Committee website. 
Yes. Consent will be written in electronic format at the beginning of the study (see Appendices D and E).   
Question 15:  What will participants be told about the study? Will any information on 
procedures or the purpose of study be withheld? 
Notes: Include an Information Sheet that sets out the purpose of the study and what will be 
required of the participant as appendices and refer to it as appropriate. If any information is to be 
withheld, justify this decision. More than one Information Sheet may be necessary. 
The purpose of the proposed research will be provided by the Information Sheet at the very beginning of 
the study. Feedback will be given at the end of the study to maximise comprehension (Appendix F). No 
information will be withheld.  
 
Question 16:  Will personally identifiable information be made available beyond the research 
team? 
Notes: If so, indicate to whom and describe how consent will be obtained. 
 
We will collect twitter user ID as part of the procedure. This information will not be made available 
beyond the research team.  
 
Question 17:  What payments, expenses or other benefits and inducements will participants 
receive? 
Notes: Give details. If it is monetary say how much, how it will be paid and on what basis is the 
amount determined. 
No payment will be made directly to any participants. We will instead compensate them in the form of 























Question 18:  At the end of the study, what will participants be told about the investigation?   
Notes: Give details of debriefings, ways of alleviating any distress that might be caused by the 
study and ways of dealing with any clinical problem that may arise relating to the focus of the 
study. 
The aims of the study will be made fully transparent from the outset. Participants will be reminded of these 
aims upon completing the study via the feedback form (Appendix F).   
Question 19:  Has the person carrying out the study had previous experience of the 
procedures?  If not, who will supervise that person? 
Notes: Say who will be undertaking the procedures involved and what training and/or experience 
they have. If supervision is necessary, indicate who will provide it. 
Yes. Administration is done using conventional online survey methods, which are familiar to all listed 
applicants and co-applicants. Further, these people are all also fully aware of the appropriate procedure to 
conduct a study and how to strictly follow all corresponding rules and regulations. Dr. Kogan (now Dr 
Spectre) also has extensive experience with secure database storage and management, as well as all other 
procedures listed above.  
Question 20:  What arrangements are there for insurance and/or indemnity to meet the 
potential legal liability for harm to participants arising from the conduct of the study? 
Notes: Insurance would normally be provided by the University's or Medical Research Council's 
insurance for persons employed by them or working in their institutions. Please contact the 
appropriate Insurance Office to arrange for insurance. If you do not have an appropriate 
institutional affiliation, say how you will provide public indemnity insurance, including insurance 
against non-negligent injury to participants. Evidence of insurance is required before a Letter of 
Approval can be issued. 
Dr. Kogan (now Dr Spectre) has affiliation with the University of Cambridge and thus falls under the 
University’s insurance. 
 
Question 21:  What arrangements are there for data security during and after the study? 
Notes: Digital data stored on a computer requires compliance with the Data Protection Act; 
indicate if you have discussed this with your Departmental Data Protection Officer and describe 
any special circumstances that have been identified from that discussion. Say who will have 
access to participants' personal data during the study and for how long personal data will be 
stored or accessed after the study has ended. 
 
We comply with the Data Protection Act. All data will be collected on a secure server. All data will be 
stored indefinitely on the server. The data are accessible by only research team members.  
 
All prospective collaborators requesting access to our data will be asked to signed a disclaimer saying they 
will fully accord with the UK data protection act (Appendix G). To aid comprehension, this disclaimer also 
highlights many of its aspects that are most poignant to individual researchers and the present study, and 




Appendix 3.1: ‘R’ Code for Study 1 and 2 Simulated Correlations  
trueValues = Random normally distributed scores—of any size, mean and SD—generated using rnorm(). 
desiredR = Target correlation between trueValues and simulated variable. 
noise.incr = Amount of noise—as proportion of true score SDs—to iteratively add to trueValues. Larger 
proportions decrease processing time. The default specified was sufficient to simulate accurate correlations to two 
decimal places (e.g. r = .31).  
equal.sds = Should SDs be left as they are or corrected to reflect the shrinkage that tends to occur in predicted 
scores from real world machine learning models? If ‘F’, SDs are shrunk so that they are proportional to desiredR.   
simCors <- function(trueValues, desiredR, noise.incr = .05, equal.sds = F){ 
  predictedValues <- trueValues   # duplicate true values 
  # generate noise as a function of SD of trueValues  
  noise <- rnorm(10000, 0, sd(trueValues)*noise.incr) 
  # iteratively add noise to trueValues until desired correlation is reached 
  for (z in 1:2000000){ 
    predictedValues <- predictedValues + sample(noise, length(predictedValues), replace = T) 
    # peg min and max predicted values to min and max trueValues 
    predictedValues[predictedValues > max(trueValues)] <- max(trueValues) 
    predictedValues[predictedValues < min(trueValues)] <- min(trueValues) 
    predictedValues <- round(predictedValues, 2) 
    # find accuracy 
    myR <- cor(trueValues, predictedValues) 
    if (myR < desiredR) break 
  } 
   # adjust SDs 
  if (equal.sds == T) { 
    values <- predictedValues - mean(predictedValues) 
    predictedValues <- values*SD(trueValues)/SD(predictedValues) + mean(trueValues) 
  } else {   
    predictedValues <- (predictedValues - mean(predictedValues))/sd(predictedValues) 
    var <- sd(trueValues)*desiredR 
    predictedValues <- predictedValues*var + mean(trueValues) 
  } 
  results <- as.data.frame(cbind(trueValues, predictedValues)) 
  names(results) <- c("true","predicted") 




Appendix 3.2: Confusion Matrices to Evaluate Bias in Category Assignment  
Here, I decompose correct classifications for predicted psychological characteristics at the 
three pre-defined accuracy benchmarks—personality (r = .30), demographic (r = .60) and best-
case (r = .90)—when scores are bucketed into thirds (i.e. “low”, “medium”, “high”). This can 
be done with confusion matrices, which evaluate whether classifications are either correctly or 
incorrectly (true, false) bucketed into target or non-target categories (positive, negative). First, 
I generated a multigroup (i.e. > 2 categories) confusion matrix, where frequencies on the top-
left to bottom-right diagonal were correct classifications. These are in Table A3.1. It confirmed 
that there was a higher rate of correct classifications as predictions moved towards Best-Case 
accuracy. Across all accuracies, cases were more likely to be misclassified into the adjacent 
category, rather than the opposite category. This trend became more pronounced as accuracy 
increased. Cases with true scores in the middle third had a roughly equal chance of being 
misclassified into top and bottom thirds, regardless of accuracy. Correct classifications were 
roughly equal for bottom vs top thirds at all three accuracies. Put together, results suggested 
that classifications were unbiased.  
 
Table A3.1 
Confusion matrices when bucketing true and predicted scores  
Benchmark Predicted Third 
True Third 
Low Mid High 
Personality (r = .30) 
Low 1515 1133 686 
Mid 1157 1145 1032 
High 663 1055 1616 
Demographic (r = .60) 
Low 2032 1016 287 
Mid 1018 1363 952 
High 285 954 2094 
Best Case (r = .90) 
Low 2706 614 13 
Mid 613 2116 604 
High 15 603 2716 
Notes. Benchmarks were the correlation between true and predicted 
continuous variable scores.  These scores were then both bucketed 
into thirds, with equal N. Frequency estimates are the average from 
10 iterations of 10,000 simulated predicted scores at each 
benchmark. Bold frequencies reflect true classifications.   
 
Aside from total accuracy rates (reported in-text), the key confusion matrix performance 
metrics are precision, sensitivity, specificity and false positive rate. Precision is the proportion 
of true positives to total positives. Recall is the proportion of true positives to combined true 
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positives and false negatives. Specificity is the proportion of true negatives to total negatives. 
Finally, false positive rate is the proportion of false positives to total negatives. They can all be 
calculated from two-by-two confusion matrices. Thus, I collapsed the multigroup confusion 
matrices by evaluating each category in a separate matrix, against the other two aggregated 
categories. An advantage of collapsing the matrices in this way was that I could compare the 
performance of specific categories to one another. Results are in Table A3.2.     
 
Table A3.2 
Confusion matrix accuracy metrics when bucketing true and predicted scores  
Benchmark True Third Precision Recall Specificity 
False  
Positives  
Personality (r = .30) 
Low .45 .45 .73 .27 
Mid .34 .34 .67 .33 
High .48 .48 .74 .26 
Demographic (r = .60) 
Low .61 .61 .80 .20 
Mid .41 .41 .70 .30 
High .63 .63 .81 .19 
Best-case (r = 0.90) 
Low .81 .81 .91 .09 
Mid .63 .63 .82 .18 
High .81 .81 .91 .09 
Notes. Benchmarks were the correlation between true and predicted continuous 
variable scores. The multiclass confusion matrices from Table A3.1 were collapsed 
into a series of two-by-two confusion matrices were each true third was iteratively the 
target (positive), and the other two thirds were aggregated together to form the non-
target category (negative). Precision = true positives / total positives. Recall = true 
positives / (true positives + false negatives). Specificity = true negatives / total 
negatives. False positive = false positives / total negatives. 
 
Results confirmed that classifications were unbiased. At each benchmark, precision was 
approximately equal for low and high thirds, and lower for the middle third. That suggested 
that the proportion of correct classifications was unrelated to whether true scores were in the 
low vs high third. In every case, recall also exactly matched precision. That suggested the 
extreme thirds were equally sensitive to catching every case belonging to an extreme category. 
Specificity and false positives were again almost exactly equal for both extreme categories, at 
each benchmark. This suggested that classifications were equally accurate when assigning non-
target categories at low and high thirds. It was unsurprising that all accuracy metrics were lower 
for true scores in the middle third, across the benchmarks. This reflected results from Table 
A3.1, which suggested that classification errors were more likely to be in the adjacent rather 
than opposite category. That is, the high rate of middle third misclassifications can be explained 
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by it having two adjacent categories and no extreme categories. Finally, confusion matrix 
performance metrics improved exponentially as prediction accuracy progressed to the best-
case benchmark. This could be explained by the concomitant non-linear increases in prediction 
R2. Therefore, the confusion matrices suggested that predictions performed equally well for 
bottom and top third true scores, and the performed worse for middling scores. Finally, they 
also showed increased bucketing success rates as prediction accuracy increased.   
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Appendix 3.3: ‘R’ Code for Study 3 Simulated Correlations 
true = Original scores for the target variable  
predicted = Machine learning predicted scores for true, which are generally obtained with predict() 
desiredR = Target correlation between true and predicted scores 
noise.range = Amount of noise—as proportion of true score SDs—to iteratively subtract from predicted scores to reduce 
prediction error. Larger values speed processing time. The default specified was sufficient to simulate accurate correlations to 
two decimal places (e.g. r = .91).  
equal.sds = Should predicted score SDs be left as they are or corrected to reflect the shrinkage that tends to occur in real world 
machine learning models? If ‘F’, SDs are expanded so that they are proportional to desiredR.   
upCors <- function(true, predicted, desiredR, noise.range = seq(0,.01, .00001), equal.sds = F){ 
  cor <- cor(true, predicted) 
  # find appropriate inflation factor for SDs   
  sd.ratio <- sd(predicted)/sd(true) + (1-sd(predicted)/sd(true))*((desiredR - cor)/(1 - cor)) 
  # iteratively remove random portions of noise from predicted values 
  for (z in 1:2000000){ 
    model <- lm(predicted ~ true) 
    resid <- model$residuals 
    noise <- sample(noise.range, length(predicted), replace = T) 
    predicted <- predicted - (resid*noise) # correct predicted scores   
    # peg min and max predicted values to min and max trueValues 
    predicted[predicted > max(true)] <- max(true) 
    predicted[predicted < min(true)] <- min(true) 
    myR <- cor(true, predicted) 
    if (myR > desiredR) break 
  } 
  # fix final predicted score values 
  if (equal.sds == T) { 
    # equalize means and SDs of true and predicted values 
    values <- predicted - mean(predicted) 
    predicted <- values*SD(true)/SD(predicted) + mean(true) 
  } else { 
    # equalize means and inflate SDs using sd.ratio 
    predicted <- (predicted - mean(predicted))/sd(predicted) 
    var <- sd(true)*sd.ratio 
    predicted <- predicted*var + mean(true) 
  } 
  results <- data.frame(true, predicted) 




Appendix 5.1: Comparison Table for Conventional and PSM Models   
Table A5.1 
Comparison table for zero-order, multiple regression and PSM model performances 
  Zero-Order Multiple Regression PSM 
 Facet Thwarting Satisfaction Thwarting Satisfaction Thwarting Satisfaction 
NUR 
1 -0.1 (-0.19, -0.16) 0.24 (0.22, 0.26) -0.01 (-0.03, 0.01) 0.04 (0.03, 0.06) -0.07 (-0.09, -0.05) 0.11 (0.09, 0.13) 
2 -0.26 (-0.28, -0.25) 0.27 (0.25, 0.28) -0.06 (-0.08, -0.04) 0.01 (-0.01, 0.04) -0.16 (-0.18, -0.13) 0.09 (0.06, 0.11) 
3 -0.2 (-0.21, -0.18) 0.36 (0.34, 0.38) 0.03 (0.01, 0.05) 0.06 (0.04, 0.08) -0.07 (-0.09, -0.04) 0.2 (0.17, 0.22) 
4 -0.27 (-0.29, -0.25) 0.21 (0.19, 0.23) -0.05 (-0.07, -0.03) -0.02 (-0.04, 0) -0.12 (-0.15, -0.1) 0.03 (0.01, 0.05) 
5 0.11 (0.1, 0.13) -0.2 (-0.22, -0.18) -0.01 (-0.03, 0.01) -0.05 (-0.07, -0.04) 0.05 (0.03, 0.07) -0.11 (-0.13, -0.09) 
6 -0.12 (-0.13, -0.1) 0.24 (0.22, 0.26) 0.01 (-0.01, 0.03) 0.01 (-0.01, 0.03) -0.02 (-0.05, 0) 0.09 (0.07, 0.12) 
EXT 
1 -0.36 (-0.38, -0.34) 0.52 (0.5, 0.53) -0.04 (-0.06, -0.02) 0.17 (0.15, 0.19) -0.19 (-0.21, -0.16) 0.32 (0.3, 0.35) 
2 -0.24 (-0.26, -0.22) 0.22 (0.2, 0.24) -0.01 (-0.03, 0.01) -0.03 (-0.05, -0.01) -0.09 (-0.11, -0.07) 0.04 (0.02, 0.06) 
3 -0.28 (-0.29, -0.26) 0.32 (0.3, 0.34) -0.03 (-0.05, -0.01) 0.04 (0.02, 0.06) -0.11 (-0.13, -0.09) 0.12 (0.1, 0.14) 
4 -0.25 (-0.27, -0.23) 0.4 (0.38, 0.41) 0 (-0.02, 0.02) 0.06 (0.04, 0.08) -0.08 (-0.1, -0.06) 0.18 (0.16, 0.2) 
5 -0.4 (-0.41, -0.38) 0.47 (0.45, 0.49) -0.06 (-0.09, -0.04) 0.09 (0.07, 0.11) -0.24 (-0.26, -0.22) 0.27 (0.25, 0.29) 
6 -0.29 (-0.31, -0.27) 0.21 (0.19, 0.23) -0.04 (-0.06, -0.02) -0.01 (-0.03, 0.01) -0.14 (-0.16, -0.11) 0.06 (0.04, 0.08) 
OPN 
1 -0.33 (-0.35, -0.32) 0.39 (0.38, 0.41) -0.02 (-0.04, 0.01) 0.03 (0, 0.05) -0.2 (-0.22, -0.17) 0.23 (0.21, 0.25) 
2 -0.25 (-0.27, -0.23) 0.29 (0.27, 0.31) -0.02 (-0.04, 0) 0 (-0.03, 0.02) -0.16 (-0.19, -0.14) 0.17 (0.15, 0.19) 
3 -0.26 (-0.28, -0.25) 0.41 (0.39, 0.43) 0.01 (-0.01, 0.03) 0.07 (0.05, 0.09) -0.09 (-0.11, -0.07) 0.19 (0.17, 0.21) 
4 -0.09 (-0.11, -0.07) 0.22 (0.2, 0.24) 0.02 (0, 0.03) 0.02 (0.01, 0.04) 0 (-0.02, 0.02) 0.06 (0.04, 0.08) 
5 -0.02 (-0.04, 0) 0.16 (0.14, 0.18) 0.04 (0.02, 0.06) 0.02 (0, 0.04) 0.01 (-0.02, 0.03) 0.07 (0.05, 0.09) 
6 -0.4 (-0.42, -0.39) 0.5 (0.48, 0.52) -0.06 (-0.09, -0.04) 0.14 (0.11, 0.16) -0.24 (-0.27, -0.22) 0.32 (0.3, 0.34) 
AGR 
1 0.42 (0.4, 0.43) -0.27 (-0.29, -0.25) 0.12 (0.1, 0.14) -0.01 (-0.03, 0.01) 0.23 (0.21, 0.25) -0.11 (-0.13, -0.09) 
2 0.34 (0.32, 0.36) -0.27 (-0.29, -0.26) 0.01 (-0.01, 0.03) 0 (-0.02, 0.02) 0.11 (0.09, 0.14) -0.08 (-0.1, -0.06) 
3 0.52 (0.51, 0.54) -0.45 (-0.46, -0.43) 0.26 (0.23, 0.28) -0.1 (-0.12, -0.08) 0.37 (0.35, 0.39) -0.26 (-0.28, -0.24) 
4 0.32 (0.3, 0.34) -0.3 (-0.32, -0.28) 0.04 (0.02, 0.06) 0 (-0.02, 0.02) 0.12 (0.1, 0.14) -0.1 (-0.12, -0.08) 
5 0.19 (0.17, 0.21) -0.17 (-0.19, -0.15) 0.01 (-0.01, 0.02) -0.02 (-0.04, 0) 0.04 (0.02, 0.07) -0.04 (-0.06, -0.02) 
6 0.44 (0.43, 0.46) -0.38 (-0.39, -0.36) 0.09 (0.06, 0.11) -0.02 (-0.04, 0) 0.22 (0.2, 0.25) -0.15 (-0.17, -0.13) 
CON 
1 0.07 (0.05, 0.09) 0.1 (0.08, 0.12) 0.03 (0.01, 0.04) 0.03 (0.01, 0.04) 0.05 (0.03, 0.07) 0.03 (0.01, 0.05) 
2 -0.11 (-0.13, -0.09) 0.28 (0.26, 0.3) 0.05 (0.03, 0.06) 0.03 (0.01, 0.05) 0 (-0.02, 0.02) 0.11 (0.09, 0.13) 
3 -0.1 (-0.12, -0.08) 0.26 (0.24, 0.28) -0.01 (-0.03, 0.01) 0.05 (0.03, 0.07) -0.04 (-0.07, -0.02) 0.12 (0.1, 0.14) 
4 -0.19 (-0.21, -0.17) 0.22 (0.2, 0.24) 0 (-0.02, 0.01) -0.01 (-0.03, 0) -0.06 (-0.08, -0.04) 0.07 (0.05, 0.09) 
5 -0.15 (-0.17, -0.13) 0.25 (0.24, 0.27) 0 (-0.02, 0.01) 0.03 (0.01, 0.05) -0.04 (-0.06, -0.02) 0.09 (0.07, 0.11) 
6 0.02 (0, 0.04) 0 (-0.02, 0.02) 0 (-0.02, 0.02) 0.01 (-0.01, 0.02) 0 (-0.02, 0.02) 0.01 (-0.01, 0.03) 
R2 7% (SD = 7%) 10% (SD = 7%) 1% (SD = < 1%) < 1% (SD = < 1%) 2% (3%) 2% (2%) 
Notes. Values are beta coefficients and 99.9% CIs (in brackets) from linear regression models. For zero order 
and PSM, there were separate models for each facet, and for each outcome. The only difference was that PSM 
contained weights designed to equalize all covariate facet scores across every level of the target facet. For 
multiple regression, there was a single model including all facets, for each outcome. R2 for zero order and PSM 
was the mean percentage of covariation between each facet and the outcome. R2 for multiple regression was 
the percentage of covariation unique to each facet, and the outcome (i.e. the squared partial correlation); 
negligible values highlighted the extent of multicollinearity when using all 29 other facets as controls. Overall 
R2 for multiple regression was 36% for needs thwarting and 41% for needs satisfaction. 
  
